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INTRODUCTION 
In last year’s Federal Circuit Review edition of the American 
University Law Review, Federal Circuit Judge Arthur Gajarsa and Dr. 
Lawrence Cogswell wrote of the “recent increase . . . in the frequency 
of Supreme Court review of our decisions,”1 and specifically, “our 
patent law jurisprudence.”2  That increase continued in 2006, and in 
many ways, the Supreme Court’s greater interest in issues of patent 
law—at a time when its docket of cases continues to shrink—was a 
major theme of the Federal Circuit’s published patent law decisions 
issued in calendar year 2006. 
The year 2006 brought some other important changes to the 
Federal Circuit.  Judge Raymond Clevenger assumed Senior Judge 
status on February 1, 2006, and was replaced on the active bench on 
September 8, 2006 by Judge Kimberly Moore,3 a law professor who 
has published a number of books and articles, including several 
empirical analyses about patent law, generally, and the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisprudence, in particular.4  She is the first Federal Circuit 
judge to come to the Court from a background of academic 
intellectual property scholarship. 
No mention of the Federal Circuit and its judges in 2006 would be 
complete without marking the passing of Howard T. Markey, the first 
Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit (and the last Chief Judge of the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals), on May 3, 2006.  Judge 
Markey was the first judge ever to sit with every federal appellate 
court in the nation, and to this day the Federal Circuit bears the 
stamp of his influence—an influence marked officially by the 1998 
                                                          
 1. Arthur R. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Foreword:  The Federal Circuit 
and The Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 843 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 823. 
 3. Nominated to be Circuit Judge by President George W. Bush on May 18, 
2006, confirmed by the Senate on September 5, 2006, and assumed duties in office 
on September 8, 2006. 
 4. E.g., KIMBERLY A. MOORE, PAUL R. MICHEL & RAPHAEL V. LUPO, PATENT 
LITIGATION AND STRATEGY (2002); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped 
to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical 
Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227 (2004); Kimberly A. 
Moore, Essay:  Juries, Patent Cases, & a Lack of Transparency, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 779 
(2002); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:  Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and 
Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000); 
Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later:  Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005). 
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decision to redesignate the National Courts Building, where the 
Federal Circuit sits, as the Howard T. Markey National Courts 
building.5 
The end of 2006 marked the end of the bar on citing 
“nonprecedential” decisions issued by the Federal Circuit.  Thanks to 
a change in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which now 
bars appellate courts from forbidding the citation of “unpublished” 
or “nonprecedential” opinions (but only those issued after January 1, 
2007),6 the Federal Circuit’s rules have likewise been revised.7  Some 
Federal Circuit opinions may continue to be designated as 
“nonprecedential,”8 but “[p]arties are not prohibited or restricted 
from citing nonprecedential dispositions issued after January 1, 
2007,”9 and the court itself “may refer to a nonprecedential 
disposition in an opinion and order and may look to a 
nonprecedential disposition for guidance or persuasive reasoning, 
but will not give one of its own nonprecedential dispositions the 
effect of binding precedent.”10 
In 2006, the Federal Circuit decided only one portion of one 
patent case en banc,11 and that was done mainly as a procedural 
matter (the entire case was not argued to an en banc court) in order 
to reconcile prior conflicting precedent on the issue of induced 
patent infringement12 with the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,13 involving induced 
copyright infringement.  But in light of the Supreme Court’s much 
more muscular review of the Federal Circuit’s patent cases—which 
may not even reflect the full extent of the Court’s interest in the 
Federal Circuit’s patent decisions—the relative paucity of en banc 
                                                          
 5. Patricia Sullivan, Howard Markey:  First Chief Judge of Federal Circuit Appellate 
Court, WASH. POST, May 5, 2006, at B6. 
 6. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
 7. See FED. CIR. R. 32.1 (removing the prohibition on citing to unpublished 
opinions issued on or after January 1, 2007). 
 8. See FED. CIR. R. 32.1(a) (“An opinion or order which is designated as 
nonprecedential is one determined by the panel issuing it as not adding significantly 
to the body of law.”). 
 9. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(c). 
 10. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(d). 
 11. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304-06, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1238, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc as to Section III(B) only). 
 12. Compare Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553, 16 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The plaintiff has the burden of 
showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew 
or should have known that his actions would induce actual infringements.”), with 
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1525, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[P]roof of actual intent to cause the acts which 
constitute infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.”). 
 13. 545 U.S. 913, 931-32 (2005). 
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decisions in 2006 is understandable, and in many ways irrelevant to 
gaining a better understanding of the Federal Circuit’s patent law 
jurisprudence. 
In the pages that follow, we will address these and many other 
developments reflected in the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence 
of 2006.  And, as we did in our article surveying the Federal Circuit’s 
year 2000 jurisprudence,14 we again conclude with an addendum that 
discusses the statistical output of the Federal Circuit and its judges. 
I.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Almost fifteen years ago, two authors, writing in the Federal Circuit 
Bar Journal, concluded that “[t]he Supreme Court rarely grants 
petitions for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit,”15 that “the Court appears to accord more 
deference to pronouncements of the Federal Circuit on substantive 
patent law issues than on other substantive law issues,”16 and that 
“[t]he Court . . . appears less willing to address substantive patent law 
than the other areas of Federal Circuit substantive law.”17 
No longer can any of those statements be said to be true.  As 2006 
ends, we appear to be in the midst of a “third wave” in the ongoing 
dialogue between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit over 
the content of U.S. patent law—a wave marked by more aggressive 
Supreme Court review of the substance of patent law and patent 
procedure and less deference to the Federal Circuit’s views of what 
the content of U.S. patent law should be.  This change in the 
Supreme Court’s approach to the Federal Circuit’s patent cases may 
well portend real and significant changes for the Federal Circuit—
and perhaps for the Federal Circuit’s bar as well. 
A. The First Wave (1982-1994):  A Hands-Off Approach 
The Supreme Court’s first review of a Federal Circuit patent 
decision, in 1986, was a largely inauspicious event.  In Dennison 
Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp.,18 the Supreme Court granted a 
petition for certiorari, vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment in an 
obviousness dispute (without receiving briefing on the merits or 
                                                          
 14. Kenneth R. Adamo, Gregory A. Castanias, Mark N. Reiter, & Lawrence D. 
Rosenberg, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions in 2000:  Y2K in Review, 50 
AM. U. L. REV. 1435, 1699-1706 (2001). 
 15. Mark J. Abate & Edmund J. Fish, Supreme Court Review of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 1982-1992, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 307, 307 (1992). 
 16. Id. at 308. 
 17. Id. at 333. 
 18. 475 U.S. 809, 809-11 (1986) (per curiam). 
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hearing oral argument), and remanded the case to the Federal 
Circuit for reevaluation of its decision in light of rule 52(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs appellate review of a 
district court’s factual findings.  In language that presaged many of 
the common (and contemporaneous) criticisms of the Federal 
Circuit’s decisional processes, the Supreme Court described the 
petitioner’s (Dennison’s) contention: 
Petitioner contends that the Federal Circuit ignored Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 52(a) in substituting its view of factual issues for 
that of the District Court.  In particular, petitioner complains of 
the rejection of the District Court’s determination of what the prior 
art revealed and its findings that the differences identified between 
respondent’s patents and the prior art were obvious.19 
Because “[t]he Federal Circuit . . . did not mention Rule 52(a), did 
not explicitly apply the clearly-erroneous standard to any of the 
District Court’s findings on obviousness, and did not explain why, if it 
was of that view, Rule 52(a) had no applicability to this issue,”20 the 
Court sent the case back to the Federal Circuit “for further 
consideration in light of Rule 52(a).”21  On remand, the Federal 
Circuit reinstated its earlier holding, but with an explanation 
expressly grounded in rule 52(a); the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari to review that subsequent opinion.22 
It appeared that the Federal Circuit panel was none too happy that 
Dennison had managed to obtain Supreme Court review, however.  
Then-Chief Judge Markey’s opinion for the Court added a blistering 
“Appendix” directed at Dennison’s Petition for Certiorari and Reply 
in support of certiorari.  It began: 
Dennison’s Petition for Certiorari and Reply ignored our earlier 
opinion’s explication of legal error and need to consider all 
evidence, presented material for the first time, and repeated 
misstatements of law Dennison employed before the trial court but 
avoided before this Court.  This Appendix sets forth the more 
egregious of the many obfuscating assertions in the Petition and 
Reply.23 
Whether or not the accusations of obfuscation were merited, the 
message delivered to the bar was that the Federal Circuit did not 
appreciate Dennison’s petition for certiorari, and that the Supreme 
                                                          
 19. Id. at 810. 
 20. Id. at 811. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1565-82, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1593, 1594-1609 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987). 
 23. Id. at 1582, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
800 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
Court had been led down the proverbial primrose path by these 
omissions and “misstatements.” 
Might the Panduit “Appendix” have had a chilling effect on 
subsequent petitions for certiorari in other Federal Circuit cases?  
After all, with all patent appeals now coming before a small cohort of 
judges in Washington, D.C., lawyers and clients may not have wanted 
to risk irking the court.  Whether or not it had such an effect, the fact 
is that the next patent case to make its way to the U.S. Supreme Court 
arrived, in effect, with a backhanded invitation from the Federal 
Circuit.  In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,24 a case raising 
antitrust claims which implicated patent issues, the Seventh Circuit 
rejected appellate jurisdiction over the appeal and transferred the 
case to the Federal Circuit, “based in large part on its expansive view 
of the relevant Federal Circuit jurisdictional statutes.”25  The Federal 
Circuit did not think it had jurisdiction either, though, finding “no 
basis or rationale . . . for an expanded, open-ended view that this 
court has been granted jurisdiction over all appeals in cases that 
contain patent issues.”26  Despite finding that it lacked jurisdiction, 
the court nonetheless decided the merits of the case, rather than 
certifying the question to the Supreme Court,27 because it 
“abhor[red]” placing an additional burden on the Supreme Court’s 
“already heavy workload.”28  Here, again, was a statement suggesting 
that the Federal Circuit would take care of the patent law so that the 
U.S. Supreme Court would not be burdened with that task. 
However, by disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit on the question 
of jurisdiction—creating a now-rare circuit split in a patent case—and 
then deciding the merits of a case over which it believed it had no 
jurisdiction, which ran afoul of basic Supreme Court 
pronouncements regarding jurisdiction,29 the Federal Circuit actually 
made “the case . . . an ideal candidate for review.”30  The ultimate 
result was that the Court agreed with the Federal Circuit that it 
lacked jurisdiction31 but held that the court had erred by going on to 
                                                          
 24. 798 F.2d 1051, 1056-57 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 25. Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 1, at 824. 
 26. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1553, 3 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated, 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
 27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (2000) (permitting certification of questions to the 
Supreme Court by a court of appeals). 
 28. Christianson, 822 F.2d at 1560, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252-53. 
 29. See, e.g., Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“Without 
jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”). 
 30. Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 1, at 826. 
 31. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-13 (1988). 
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reach the merits.32  The Court then ordered the Federal Circuit on 
remand to transfer the case back to the Seventh Circuit.33 
The Court’s next review of a Federal Circuit patent decision did 
not occur for another two years.  In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,34 
the Court addressed a pure question of statutory interpretation: 
[W]hether 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. V) renders 
activities that would otherwise constitute patent infringement 
noninfringing if they are undertaken for the purpose of developing 
and submitting to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
information necessary to obtain marketing approval for a medical 
device under section 515 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA), 90 Stat. 552, 21 U.S.C. § 360e.35 
The Court noted that the Federal Circuit had held that such 
activities “could not constitute infringement if they had been 
undertaken to develop information reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information necessary to obtain 
regulatory approval under the FDCA.”36  The Supreme Court 
ultimately affirmed the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the 
statutory provision.37 
Another three years elapsed before the Supreme Court returned to 
the Federal Circuit and patent law.  This time, in Cardinal Chemical v. 
Morton International, Inc.,38 the Court took up another fundamental 
issue of appellate procedure largely limited to the Federal Circuit:  
whether the Federal Circuit’s practice of routinely vacating 
declaratory judgments regarding patent validity following a 
determination of noninfringement could be squared with the case-or-
controversy requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.39  In 
two prior cases, the Federal Circuit had established the rule that a 
judgment of noninfringement on a patent claim renders moot a 
declaratory judgment challenge to the validity of that same claim.40  
The Court noted in its opinion why it had granted certiorari:  
“Because the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals 
from all United States District Courts in patent litigation, the rule 
that it applied in this case, and has been applying regularly . . . is a 
                                                          
 32. Id. at 818-19. 
 33. Id. at 819. 
 34. 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
 35. Id. at 663-64. 
 36. Id. at 664. 
 37. Id. at 679. 
 38. 508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
 39. Id. at 85. 
 40. Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510, 1517, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1100 
(Fed. Cir. 1987); Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 632-33, 3 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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matter of special importance to the entire Nation.”41  Ultimately, the 
Court reversed the Federal Circuit and held that: 
[t]he Federal Circuit’s decision to rely on one of two possible 
alternative grounds (noninfringement rather than invalidity) did 
not strip it of power to decide the second question. . . . [T]he 
Federal Circuit had jurisdiction to review the declaratory judgment 
of invalidity.  The case did not become moot when that court 
affirmed the finding of noninfringement.42 
Finally, it is worth noting that around this same time, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in one other procedural case, Izumi Seimitsu 
Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp.,43 but then dismissed the 
writ of certiorari as “improvidently granted.”44  The question there 
was whether the courts of appeals “[s]hould . . . routinely vacate 
district court final judgments at the parties’ request when cases are 
settled while on appeal.”45  The petition was dismissed in this case 
because, upon the briefing on the merits, it became apparent that 
there was a preliminary question—whether the petitioner (Izumi) 
should have been allowed to intervene to challenge the vacatur 
order—that was “neither presented in the petition for certiorari nor 
fairly included in the one question that was presented.”46  Shortly 
after this dismissal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a Ninth 
Circuit case that had addressed the same issue, and ultimately sided 
against “routine” vacatur under these circumstances.47 
B. The Second Wave (1995-2002):  (Mostly) Only the Biggest Issues 
The tide began to turn in 1995, when the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in a number of cases that struck at the core of patent 
infringement litigation:  the rules for construing patent claims, the 
scope and application of the doctrine of equivalents, and the right to 
have a jury determine issues of patent invalidity.48  Still, the results of 
most of these cases—especially the ones that went to the core of the 
                                                          
 41. Cardinal Chem., 508 U.S. at 89. 
 42. Id. at 98. 
 43. 507 U.S. 907 (1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 27 (1993) (per curiam). 
 44. 510 U.S. 27, 28 (1993) (per curiam). 
 45. Id. at 30. 
 46. Id. at 28. 
 47. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 18-19 (1994). 
 48. In January 1995, the Court also decided Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 
179 (1995), which addressed the proper interpretation of the Plant Variety 
Protection Act (PVPA), 84 Stat. 1542, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2000).  “The PVPA 
extends patent-like protection to novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants (that 
is, plants grown from seed) which parallels the protection afforded asexually 
reproduced plant varieties (that is, varieties reproduced by propagation or grafting) 
under Chapter 15 of the Patent Act.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164.”  Asgrow Seed, 513 U.S. 
at 181. 
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patent system—were largely affirmances of the Federal Circuit’s 
rulings. 
The first of these cases, American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood,49 never 
yielded a decision.  The Federal Circuit had held, in a panel decision, 
that the patent owner (Lockwood) had a Seventh Amendment jury 
trial right in a declaratory judgment action to determine patent 
validity.50  Three judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en 
banc,51 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 
question of the jury trial right.52  However, shortly after certiorari was 
granted, Lockwood withdrew his request for a jury trial, thereby 
mooting the case.53  Although the Federal Circuit has addressed the 
Seventh Amendment issue in related contexts since then,54 the 
Supreme Court has not seen fit to reach out to consider this issue 
again in the last eleven years. 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,55 the case that gave its name 
to the now-ubiquitous “Markman hearing,” was decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court as a Seventh Amendment jury trial issue.  The 
Federal Circuit had taken the Markman case en banc to resolve two 
contrary lines of its precedents:  One line had said that patent claim 
construction was to be determined by the court as a matter of law; the 
other had held that it was appropriate to submit disputed issues of 
claim construction to a jury.  The en banc Federal Circuit held that 
claim interpretation was a matter of law for the court, and that there 
was no Seventh Amendment right to have such issues decided by a 
jury.56  The Markman petition for certiorari presented only a single 
question:  “In a patent infringement action for damages, is there a 
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United 
States Constitution of genuine factual disputes about the meaning of 
                                                          
 49. 515 U.S. 1182 (1995) (order vacating cert.). 
 50. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1406, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
 51. Id. at 980-90 (Nies, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Judge Archer and Judge 
Plager). 
 52. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1121, cert. vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 
(1995). 
 53. Am. Airlines, 515 U.S. 1182 (order vacating cert.). 
 54. Compare Teagal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1351-
52, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (granting jury trial where 
accused infringer had raised invalidity as a separate claim), with In re Technology 
Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1291, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (denying jury trial where accused infringer raised invalidity only as a defense), 
cert. denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S. June 5, 2006).  Note:  One of the authors served 
as counsel to the respondent in In re Tech. Licensing Corp. in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 55. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 56. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 971, 976-79, 983-88, 34 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1322, 1327-29, 1333-37 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 
U.S. 370 (1996). 
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a patent?”57  The Supreme Court answered that particular 
constitutional question “no.”58  What may prove to be most important 
about the Supreme Court’s Markman decision in coming years is 
understanding what the Court did, and did not, decide.  It clearly did 
decide that the interpretation of a patent claim term “is an issue for 
the judge, not the jury.”59  But it arguably did not decide that claim 
construction is a “question of law,”60 nor did it decide that all issues of 
claim construction must be reviewed de novo on appeal.61  The latter 
two issues remain a matter of some contention in the Federal 
Circuit.62 
Next, the Supreme Court waded into the undercurrents of the 
doctrine of equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical 
Co.63  There, the Court affirmed another en banc decision of the 
Federal Circuit and rejected the petitioner’s (Warner-Jenkinson’s) 
argument that the 1952 Patent Act had done away with the doctrine.64  
In the course of affirming the Federal Circuit, the Court offered 
some important subsidiary holdings.  It endorsed the Federal 
Circuit’s longstanding “all elements” rule,65 it held that prosecution-
history estoppel was an important limitation on the application of the 
doctrine of equivalents but did not foreclose entirely a patentee’s 
recourse to the doctrine,66 it established a presumption that patent 
amendments bear a substantial relationship to patentability,67 it held 
that intent is not an element of the doctrine,68 it concluded that 
equivalents are not limited to those disclosed in the patent itself,69 
and it declined to decide whether the doctrine of equivalents was an 
issue for judge or jury.  However, the Court noted that “[t]here was 
                                                          
 57. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Markman, 517 U.S. 370 (No. 95-26). 
 58. Markman, 517 U.S. at 391. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 378, 388 (characterizing claim construction as a “mongrel practice” that 
may “‘fall[] somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical 
fact’” (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
 61. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455-56, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1169, 1173-75 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 62. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (declining to address the issues of whether claim 
construction is a question of law, and whether issues of claim construction should be 
granted any deference upon appellate review). 
 63. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 64. Id. at 25-28. 
 65. Id. at 29-30; see Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935, 4 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739-40 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (applying the “all 
elements” rule within the doctrine of equivalents). 
 66. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30-31. 
 67. Id. at 33-34. 
 68. Id. at 36. 
 69. Id. at 37. 
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ample support in our prior cases for [the Federal Circuit’s] holding” 
that “it was for the jury to decide whether the accused process was 
equivalent to the claimed process.”70 
The Court’s next foray into patent law again resulted in an 
affirmance of the Federal Circuit.  In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,71 
which involved the frequently invoked on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b), the Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between 
Federal Circuit precedent and pre-Federal Circuit precedents from 
the regional courts of appeals regarding whether an invention has to 
be reduced to practice before the on-sale bar can apply.72  The Court 
concluded that two conditions must be satisfied before the on-sale 
bar can apply:  One, “the product must be the subject of a 
commercial offer for sale,”73 and two, “the invention must be ready 
for patenting.”74 
A few months later, the Federal Circuit suffered a reversal on a 
procedural issue in Dickinson v. Zurko.75  Zurko, a patent applicant, 
had been denied a patent by the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”).  A Federal Circuit panel applied the “clearly erroneous” 
standard of review to the PTO’s factual findings,76 and the en banc 
Federal Circuit agreed.77  The Supreme Court granted the 
government’s petition for certiorari and ultimately reversed, holding 
that the standards of review established by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”)— “arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, 
or . . . [in limited cases subject to sections 556 and 557 of the APA] 
unsupported by substantial evidence”78—controls judicial review of 
findings of fact made by the PTO.79  The Court rejected the 
argument, advanced by the applicant, that the pre-APA practice of 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had been to review Patent 
Office determinations for clear error, and thus that the preexisting 
                                                          
 70. Id. at 38 (citing Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 
(1878) and Winans v. Denmead,  56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 344 (1854)). 
 71. 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
 72. Id. at 60 (citing Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 299-302, 187 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257, 265-68 (2d Cir. 1975) and Dart Indus., Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De 
Nemours & Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1365 n.11, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 392, 397 n.11 (7th 
Cir. 1973)). 
 73. Id. at 67. 
 74. Id. 
 75. 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
 76. In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887, 889, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1476, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 
1997), reh’g granted, 142 F.3d 1447, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1691 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
banc), rev’d, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
 77. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1691, 1693 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev’d, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (following the 
previous Federal Circuit decision in again applying a “clearly erroneous” standard). 
 78. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 152 (quoting, in relevant part, 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
 79. Id. at 157-59. 
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“clearly erroneous” standard was an “additional 
requirement[] . . . recognized by law.”80 
The Federal Circuit was again reversed less than two weeks later in 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings 
Bank.81  The issue there was whether Congress had, in the Patent and 
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act,82 validly abrogated 
the States’ sovereign immunity.83  The Federal Circuit had held that 
Congress had acted within its constitutional power because it had 
made its intent clear and because it was permissibly creating a money-
damages remedy against states to prevent states from depriving 
patent owners of their property (patents) without due process of law, 
and that such a remedy was a proportionate response to patent 
infringement by states.84  The Supreme Court, which was in the 
process of reasserting a more muscular version of state sovereign 
immunity in several cases, reversed by a 5-4 vote.85  It held that 
Congress did not have the authority to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity by invoking its Commerce Clause power under Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution, but could only abrogate immunity, if at 
all, by a proper exercise of its enforcement powers under the 
Reconstruction Amendments.86  It further held that Congress had 
overstepped its power by not merely enforcing a constitutional right 
of due process, but by changing what the right was.87  In particular, 
the Court noted that there had been no particular history of states 
infringing patents, let alone a history so compelling to warrant 
congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Therefore, the Court held that the congressionally 
enacted remedies, giving a sweeping right to sue states for money 
damages in patent-infringement cases, “are ‘so out of proportion to a 
supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be 
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional 
behavior.’”88 
                                                          
 80. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000); see Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 170-72 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (noting that until the decision in Dickinson the “clearly erroneous” 
standard was a requirement imposed upon the Patent & Trademark Office by § 559). 
 81. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
 82. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (2000). 
 83. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 630 (1999). 
 84. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 
1343, 1347-55, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1163-70 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d, 527 U.S. 
627 (1999). 
 85. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 629. 
 86. Id. at 645-47. 
 87. Id. at 645-46. 
 88. Id. at 646 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)). 
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A year passed before the Court considered another Federal Circuit 
patent decision, this one a narrow procedural issue, in Nelson v. 
Adams USA, Inc.89  In this unusual case, Ohio Cellular Products 
(“OCP”) had sued Adams USA for patent infringement, but OCP’s 
claim was eventually dismissed with fees and costs awarded to 
Adams.90  Adams, fearing that OCP might not be sufficiently solvent 
to pay the award, moved to amend its pleadings to have OCP’s 
president and sole shareholder, Nelson, added as a party under rule 
15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the district court granted 
the motion, which had the curious effect of simultaneously making 
Nelson a party and entering a judgment against him.91  The Federal 
Circuit affirmed, over a dissent from Judge Newman,92 but the 
Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the procedures 
of rule 15 had not been followed, and that Nelson should have been, 
consistent with due process, allowed to contest the effort to make him 
liable for the judgment after being added as a party to the suit; 
“instead, he was adjudged liable the very first moment his personal 
liability was legally at issue.”93 
Two terms later, the Federal Circuit was affirmed in J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.,94 a case presenting the 
question of whether utility patents may be issued for plants.95  J.E.M. 
had argued that in view of two previously enacted federal statutes, the 
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 on the one hand,96 and the Plant 
Patent Act of 1930 on the other,97 there was no room to interpret 
section 101 of the Patent Act to allow other kinds of plants, not 
addressed in these two statutes, to receive patent protection.98  The 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that 
neither act was intended by Congress to be an exclusive means of 
providing patent protection to plants, and that both statutes could be 
reconciled with the general, broad terms of section 101.99 
                                                          
 89. 529 U.S. 460 (2000). 
 90. Id. at 462-63. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 464-65. 
 93. Id. at 468. 
 94. 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
 95. Id. at 127. 
 96. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-
2583 (2000)).  
 97. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2000). 
 98. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 131-32. 
 99. Id. at 132-41. 
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C. The Third Wave (2002-present):  Is Everything In Play? 
The Federal Circuit had been treated well by the Supreme Court 
on the biggest issues of patent law—claim construction, the doctrine 
of equivalents, and the on-sale bar—with affirmances across the 
board on these seminal issues for the first twenty years of the Federal 
Circuit’s existence. 
But that began to change in 2002, when the Supreme Court 
vacated the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.100  The Federal Circuit had held, en banc, that 
“[w]hen a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel 
with regard to a claim element, there is no range of equivalents 
available for the amended claim element.  Application of the 
doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is completely barred (a 
‘complete bar’).”101  This holding “overruled the entire Hughes Aircraft 
line of ‘flexible bar’ cases”102 and yielded the clear (but rigid) rule 
that where an amendment to a claim is made for reasons of 
patentability, the doctrine of equivalents could not be asserted.  The 
Supreme Court’s vacatur of the Federal Circuit’s ruling represented a 
fundamental disagreement with the Federal Circuit’s stated views and 
tempered the harshness of the Federal Circuit’s rule, essentially 
adopting the “presumption” approach that had been advocated by 
the U.S. Solicitor General in his brief.103  Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
for a unanimous Court adopted a presumptive bar, not a “complete” 
one.104  A minor change to the law, perhaps, but the Court’s opinion 
did not mince words:  The Federal Circuit had “ignored the guidance 
of Warner-Jenkinson, which instructed that courts must be cautious 
before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the 
inventing community.”105  The Federal Circuit’s new rule “risk[ed] 
destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their 
property,”106 and there was “no justification for applying a new and 
more robust estoppel to those who relied on prior doctrine.”107 
                                                          
 100. 535 U.S. 722 (2002), vacating 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 101. Festo, 234 F.3d at 569, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (en banc), vacated, 535 
U.S. 722 (2002). 
 102. Adamo et al., supra note 14, at 1636. 
 103. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and 
Remand at 11-26, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722 (2002) (No. 00-1543). 
 104. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740-41. 
 105. Id. at 739. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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Less than a week later, the Supreme Court reminded bench and 
bar alike that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction over all 
patent issues arising anywhere in a federal case.  In Holmes Group, Inc. 
v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,108 the Court reminded the 
Federal Circuit that its jurisdiction was limited to cases “arising 
under” the patent laws, meaning that the patent law basis for Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction had to be present on the face of the “well-pleaded 
complaint,” and could not be found in a counterclaim.109  The 
Federal Circuit had asserted jurisdiction over a case where the only 
issue of patent law had been injected into the case by the defendant’s 
compulsory counterclaim; the well-pleaded complaint had been one 
for trade-dress infringement.110  Not only did the Court reiterate the 
“well-pleaded complaint” rule, but it also specifically rejected the 
argument that “whenever a patent-law counterclaim is raised,” the 
Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.111  Justice Stevens, 
concurring, accurately presaged the Court’s heightened interest in 
issues of patent law: 
Necessarily . . . other circuits will have some role to play in the 
development of this area of the law.  An occasional conflict in 
decisions may be useful in identifying questions that merit this 
Court’s attention.  Moreover, occasional decisions by courts with 
broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote to the risk that the 
specialized court may develop an institutional bias.112 
Taken together, Festo and Holmes Group appear to have signaled the 
end of Supreme Court fealty to the Federal Circuit’s views of patent 
law.  In the span of six days in 2002, the Supreme Court had accused 
the Federal Circuit of “ignor[ing]” Supreme Court precedent113 and 
creating new rules with “no justification,”114 and one Justice had even 
raised the spectre that “the specialized court” might be infected with 
“institutional bias.”115  Even then, it would be a few more years before 
the “third wave” reached its crest in 2005. 
In the interim, the Court granted certiorari in Zapata Industries, Inc. 
v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Connecticut,116 involving the question of whether 
the time limit for filing a cross-appeal was a hard-and-fast 
                                                          
 108. 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
 109. Id. at 830-32. 
 110. Id. at 828. 
 111. Id. at 832, 833-34. 
 112. Id. at 839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). 
 113. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 
(2002). 
 114. Id. at 739. 
 115. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). 
 116. 536 U.S. 990 (2002), cert. dismissed, 537 U.S. 1025 (2002). 
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jurisdictional rule; the circuits were irretrievably split on that 
question, and the Federal Circuit had sided with those circuits 
viewing the time limit as a hard, jurisdictional one.117  But after 
certiorari was granted, Zapata (the petitioner) withdrew its petition 
for certiorari, and the writ was dismissed.118 
The year 2005 was truly the watershed year in the Supreme Court’s 
continuing dialogue with the Federal Circuit.  It was certainly the 
beginning of a time of transition for the Supreme Court as well.  The 
end of the October 2004 term of the Supreme Court in June 2005 
effectively marked the end of the “Rehnquist Court”—Justice 
O’Connor would announce her retirement (effective upon the 
confirmation of her successor) in July 2005, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist would pass away in September 2005, leading to the 
appointments and confirmations of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito.  Some have speculated that these two additions will bring to the 
Court a greater awareness of business issues, and in particular patent 
law issues, that “presages continuing high patent activity before the 
[C]ourt for the foreseeable future.”119 
And while there is no doubt that the interest in patent cases has 
continued apace since the arrival of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito, the fact is that the Court had already jumped into the patent 
law waters in 2005 with a big splash when these changes in 
composition came upon the Court.  In June 2005, with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor joining Justice Scalia’s unanimous 
opinion for the Court, it decided Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, 
Ltd.,120 vacating the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the preclinical 
research exemption of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and concluding that the 
safe harbor contained in that statutory provision was somewhat 
broader than the Federal Circuit had read it to be.121  Before the 
retirement of Justice O’Connor and the death of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the Court had already granted certiorari in Unitherm Food 
Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.,122 dealing with a procedural issue (the 
requirement of a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 
                                                          
 117. Zapata Indus. v. W.R. Grace & Co.–Conn., 34 F. App’x. 688, 690 n.* (Fed. 
Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 536 U.S. 990 (2002), cert. dismissed, 537 U.S. 1025 (2002). 
 118. Zapata Indus. v. W.R. Grace & Co.–Conn., 537 U.S. 1025 (2002) (order 
dismissing cert.). 
 119. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Adamo & Susan M. Gerber, Reigning Supreme Over the U.S. 
Patent System, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), Sept. 22, 2006, at 550. 
 120. 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
 121. Id. at 206-07; Gregory A. Castanias & Laura A. Coruzzi, The Supreme Court 
Widens the Range of Preclinical Studies, IP Frontline (June 23, 2005), http://www. 
ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=4414&deptid=7 (last visited Feb. 1, 2007). 
 122. 375 F.3d 1341, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 
1186 (2005). 
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50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after the jury’s verdict in 
order to preserve a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge for appeal) 
important to, but not unique to, patent litigation; it had also granted 
certiorari to Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,123 dealing 
with the question of whether the fact that a product is patented 
supports a presumption of market power in that product under the 
antitrust laws (it was held that it does not).124  And although Chief 
Justice Roberts had already joined the Court and initially voted on 
whether to grant the petition for certiorari in Laboratory Corporation of 
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,125 he ultimately recused 
himself from the case; the Court then re-voted on whether to grant 
certiorari and confirmed the grant of certiorari without his 
participation.126  (The case was ultimately dismissed on the ground 
that the writ of certiorari had been improvidently granted, owing 
largely to the way the issue had been framed in the lower courts.127)  
The Court’s interest in Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings had 
gone back even further; however—with both Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice O’Connor still on the Court, it had asked the then-Acting 
Solicitor General to file a brief on the question of whether the 
Metabolite patent was attempting to claim “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” in contravention of the patent 
laws.128 
Perhaps the most noted patent case taken up by the Court over the 
past two years was eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC.129  For years, the 
Federal Circuit had hewn to the virtually inflexible rule that, when a 
patent owner obtained a judgment of infringement, a permanent 
injunction followed as a matter of course.  As the Federal Circuit had 
put it in its decision in the eBay case, there exists a “general rule that 
courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement 
absent exceptional circumstances.”130  Despite the Solicitor General’s 
endorsement of the Federal Circuit’s rule, a unanimous Supreme 
                                                          
 123. 96 F.3d 1342, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 545 U.S. 1127 
(2005). 
 124. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1293 (2006). 
 125. 547 U.S. 28 (2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (mem.). 
 126. 370 F.3d 1354, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 
601 (2005) (mem.), cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (mem.). 
 127. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (mem.), dismissing cert. as 
improvidently granted by, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (mem.). 
 128. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 543 U.S. 1185 (2005) (mem.) (quoting Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)) (order calling for the views of the Acting Solicitor 
General). 
 129. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
 130. MercExchange LLC v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1225, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
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Court reversed, holding that “well-established principles of equity” 
require that a party seeking an injunction, even if the party had 
obtained a judgment of patent infringement, still must satisfy the 
traditional four-factor test for obtaining an injunction.131  As Chief 
Justice Roberts noted in his concurring opinion, “[f]rom at least the 
early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a 
finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.”132  While 
it is far too early to ascertain meaningful trends in the case law, 
particularly in the absence of Federal Circuit precedent, some district 
courts applying the eBay standard after a judgment of patent 
infringement have denied injunctive relief in cases where the patent 
owner is not in competition with the infringer in the marketplace133—
the sort of patent holder sometimes referred to as a “patent troll” and 
excoriated in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay.134 
As this article goes to press, the Supreme Court has just decided 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,135 which again reversed the Federal 
Circuit, scuttled its rule that a patent licensee must terminate or 
breach its patent license before obtaining declaratory-judgment 
jurisdiction in an action to challenge that license or the patents 
underlying it,136 and raises serious questions regarding the survival of 
the “reasonable apprehension of suit” standard that governs 
declaratory-judgment jurisdiction in most circuits.137  It has heard 
argument in, but not yet decided, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, 
                                                          
 131. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839. 
 132. Id. at 1841 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 133. See, e.g., Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 WL 
3741891, at *4-*5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006) (granting permanent injunction to 
competitor patentee); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 
2385139, at *4-*6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (denying permanent injunction to non-
competitor patentee); Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., Inc., No. CIV-04-1693-C, 
2006 WL 2128851, at *4-*5 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006) (granting permanent 
injunction to competitor patentee); Finisar Corp. v. DIRECTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-
CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70300, at *14 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006) (denying 
permanent injunction to non-competitor patentee); z4 Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 
F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (denying permanent injunction to non-
competitor patentee).  Note:  One of the authors served as counsel to the defendants 
in the Finisar v. DIRECTV Group case. 
 134. See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An industry has 
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods 
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”). 
 135. 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). 
 136. Id. at 773-74. 
 137. Id. at 774 n.11.  See also SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. 05-
1300, 2007 WL 881008, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 26, 2007) (“The Supreme Court’s 
opinion in MedImmune represents a rejection of our reasonable apprehension of suit 
test.”); id. at *12 (Bryson, J., concurring) (expressing “reservations” at this apparent 
“sweeping change in our law”). 
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Inc.,138 which presents a challenge to the Federal Circuit’s 
longstanding teaching-suggestion-motivation test for determining 
obviousness under section 103 of the Patent Act, and which seems to 
have inspired several decisions from the Federal Circuit in 2006 that 
attempted to explain the flexibility of the teaching-suggestion-
motivation test.139  It has also heard argument in Microsoft Corp. v. 
AT&T Corp.,140 which involves the question of whether software object 
code can be a “component[]of a patented invention under Section 
271(f) of the Patent Act,” and if so, whether copies of software object 
code are “supplie[d]” from the United States under that subsection 
when the copies are created overseas by replicating a master version 
supplied from the United States.141  The Court’s decision in this latter 
case may bring an increased emphasis on issues of extraterritorial 
application of the U.S. patent laws, issues that have been recurring in 
a number of recent Federal Circuit cases (in addition to Microsoft 
Corp. v. AT&T Corp.).142 
Even beyond these grants of certiorari and decisions, however, 
there is another gauge of the Supreme Court’s apparently enhanced 
interest in the patent law jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit.  The 
Court has been following the practice of issuing orders calling for the 
views of the Solicitor General (known colloquially as a “CVSG order”) 
when seriously considering a grant of certiorari in a patent case.  It 
did so before granting certiorari in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,143 
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,144 Laboratory Corporation of America 
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,145 and Merck KGAA v. Integra 
                                                          
 138. 119 F. App’x. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) 
(mem.). 
 139. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Ormco 
Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1306, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1931, 1936 
(Fed. Cir. 2006); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006); DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. 
Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 140. 414 F.3d 1366, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 
467 (2006) (mem.). 
 141. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-
1056 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2006) (internal quotations omitted). 
 142. E.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2005); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 
75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Eolas Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 
F.3d 1325, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782 (Fed. Cir. 2005); cf. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. 
05-1238, 2007 WL 269431, at *15 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 2007) (holding that it was an 
abuse of discretion to grant leave to amend a U.S. patent-infringement complaint in 
order to add claims of infringement of five foreign patents under the supplemental-
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)). 
 143. 127 S. Ct. 1901 (2006) (mem.). 
 144. 126 S. Ct. 327 (2005) (mem.). 
 145. 543 U.S. 1185 (2005) (mem.). 
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Lifesciences I, Ltd.,146 just to name a few recent examples.  But it has 
also issued CVSG orders in patent cases where it ultimately did not 
grant certiorari, including, recently, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex 
Corp.,147 presenting the question of whether the “unwitting” or 
“unappreciated” prior creation of a product can constitute an 
inherent anticipation under section 102 of the Patent Act; Apotex Inc. 
v. Pfizer Inc.,148 presenting a question regarding declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction for cases filed by generic pharmaceutical manufacturers; 
and Federal Trade Commission v. Schering-Plough Corp.,149 a case arising in 
the Eleventh Circuit but presenting the question of whether an 
agreement between a pharmaceutical patent holder and a would-be 
generic competitor, in which the patent owner makes a substantial 
payment to the generic manufacturer allegedly to delay the generic 
challenger’s entry into the market, constitutes an unreasonable 
restraint of trade. 
While each of these cases was ultimately deemed unworthy of 
certiorari by the Supreme Court, the Court’s interest in these issues 
should not go unnoticed by the practicing bar, for they did capture 
enough of the Court’s interest to seek out the views of the United 
States on each case.  These developments, too, provide further 
confirmation of the exponential leap in the Supreme Court’s interest 
in the development of the U.S. patent laws. 
D. Surfing the Third Wave:  Lessons for the Bar 
Since it now appears that an era of active U.S. Supreme Court 
review of Federal Circuit decisions is upon us, what can we learn from 
the recent dialogue between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court?  We suggest a few lessons: 
1. The Supreme Court will be a more aggressive policeman of the 
Federal Circuit’s decisions than it was over the first twenty years of 
that court’s existence.  (Festo;150 Holmes Group;151 eBay;152 KSR153). 
                                                          
 146. 543 U.S. 805 (2004) (mem.). 
 147. 126 S. Ct. 1133 (2006) (mem.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2887 (2006). 
 148. 126 S. Ct. 2057 (2006) (mem.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 379 (2006) (mem.).  
Note:  One of the authors served as counsel to respondent in this case. 
 149. 126 S. Ct. 544 (2005) (mem.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006) (mem.). 
 150. See 535 U.S. 722, 739-41 (2002), vacating 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (vacating the Federal Circuit’s ruling on the ground, 
inter alia, that, due to inventors’ expectations, the Federal Circuit ought to have been 
more cautious in its attempt to change the existing estoppel rule). 
 151. See 535 U.S. 826, 832-34 (2002) (holding that the Federal Circuit’s subject 
matter jurisdiction is limited to cases “arising under” the patent laws; thus, a patent-
law basis for federal jurisdiction must be present in the complaint in order for the 
claim to be heard in federal court); supra text accompanying notes 108-112. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
2007] 2006 PATENT SUMMARY 815 
2. Lines of Federal Circuit authority, even those of long-standing 
application, should be critically evaluated at the beginning of a case 
to determine whether a challenge to that authority should be raised 
and preserved in the lower courts or agencies.  (MedImmune;154 KSR;155 
eBay156). 
3. Old (pre-Federal Circuit) Supreme Court authority, and not 
just that in the patent area, should be considered and urged, where 
appropriate, on the Federal Circuit and the lower courts.  
(MedImmune;157 KSR;158 eBay159). 
4. The same rules apply to litigation involving patents as in 
ordinary, non-patent litigation.  (MedImmune;160 Unitherm;161 Panduit v. 
Dennison162). 
5. Lawyers need to start thinking about these issues, substantive 
or procedural, and how to properly frame them for Supreme Court 
review, as soon as the case is filed, and not just when the case reaches 
the Federal Circuit or afterward.  (Laboratory Corp.;163 Unitherm164). 
                                                                                                                                      
 152. See 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006) (vacating the Federal Circuit’s decision, 
which had objected to the seemingly mandatory requirement for courts to issue a 
permanent injunction upon a judgment of infringement, on the grounds that 
injunctions are to be issued if required by the four-factor test). 
 153. 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (order granting certiorari). 
 154. See 127 S. Ct. 764, 773-74 (2007); supra text accompanying notes 135-137 
(indicating that the Supreme Court’s reversal of the MedImmune decision raises 
concern about the weight the “reasonable apprehension of suit” standard, which 
governs declaratory-judgment jurisdiction in most circuits, will be given in the 
future). 
 155. See 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (mem.) (order granting certiorari); supra note 138 
and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court recently heard arguments 
that challenge the Federal Circuit’s longstanding teaching-suggestion-motivation test 
for determining obviousness under section 103 of the Patent Act but has yet to make 
a ruling). 
 156. See 126 S. Ct. at 1839 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s challenge to the general 
rule that permanent injunctions should be issued once the court concludes that 
there has been a patent infringement). 
 157. See 127 S. Ct. 764.   
 158. See 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (mem.). 
 159. See 126 S. Ct. at 1839-41 (applying the four-factor test historically employed by 
courts of equity). 
 160. See 127 S. Ct. at 774 (applying declaratory judgment rules). 
 161. See 543 U.S. 1186 (2005) (order granting certiorari) (noting that the Court 
would address a procedural issue–the requirement of a motion for summary 
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50—which is not unique to patent litigation). 
 162. See 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (remanding the case for reconsideration in light 
of FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)). 
 163. See 126 S. Ct. 543 (2005) (per curiam); supra note 127 and accompanying text 
(indicating that the case was dismissed on the ground that, because of how the issue 
had been framed in the lower courts, the writ of certiorari had been improperly 
granted). 
 164. See 543 U.S. at 1186 (order granting certiorari) (noting that the Court would 
be addressing whether a court of appeals may review the sufficiency of evidence 
supporting a jury verdict when the motion for such a review was made prior to 
submission of the case to a jury). 
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6. The support of the U.S. Solicitor General may be useful in 
some cases (Festo165), but the Court will not blindly accept the Solicitor 
General’s position (eBay166). 
At bottom, the single most important lesson from the Supreme 
Court’s recent dialogue with the Federal Circuit may be this:  The 
Supreme Court is still “supreme,” even when it comes to issues of 
patent law that fall within the aegis of “the specialized court.”167  That 
lesson may have been forgotten in the early years of the Federal 
Circuit, when patent cases were not reviewed frequently, and later, 
when the Federal Circuit was affirmed by the Supreme Court on the 
major issues of the day.  But the world has changed, and that lesson 
now has profound importance for the way cases are litigated up 
through, and past, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. 
Keep these principles in mind as we consider the patent law work 
of the Federal Circuit in 2006. 
II.  FEDERAL COURT AND AGENCY PRACTICE 
The cases decided by the Federal Circuit in the year 2006 involved 
numerous procedural issues.  Perhaps the most significant of these 
were a number of decisions addressing the use of summary judgment 
to resolve inequitable conduct disputes, as well as two decisions 
addressing the application of the local “patent rules” that apply in 
several district courts around the country. 
We have organized the discussion of the Federal Circuit’s 
procedural rulings in roughly the order in which they are 
encountered in litigation:  jurisdictional and other issues involved in 
initiating the case, pre-trial matters, trial issues, and post-trial matters.  
After a discussion of the special case of local patent rules, we then 
turn to appellate procedural issues, and conclude with a discussion of 
some procedural issues unique to the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office. 
                                                          
 165. See 535 U.S. 722, 739-41 (2002); supra note 104 and accompanying text 
(discussing how the Supreme Court adopted the “presumption” approach that had 
been advocated by the U.S. Solicitor General in his brief). 
 166. See 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2007); supra note 131 and accompanying text 
(noting that the Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s objection to 
permanent injunctions even though the Solicitor General had given his support to 
the argument). 
 167. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circ. Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part). 
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A. District Court Practice 
1.  Initiating the case 
a. Standing 
A party has standing to bring suit only if it has a legally sufficient 
“personal stake” in a dispute to justify exercise of a court’s remedial 
powers on its behalf.168  The Patent Act provides that a “patentee” may 
bring an action for “infringement of his patent.”169  The term 
“patentee” includes “not only the patentee to whom the patent was 
issued but also the successors in title to the patentee.”170  The courts 
have recognized that in some instances a patent licensee may have 
standing to sue for infringement, but in others it may not.171 
Issues of standing arose a few times in 2006.172  In Aspex Eyewear, Inc. 
v. Miracle Optics,173 the district court had concluded that neither 
Contour Optik (the original patent assignee) nor Aspex Eyewear (a 
sublicensee) had standing to sue for infringement of an eyeglass-
frame patent because neither possessed the “rights of the patentee” 
when the original complaint was filed, and because the sublicense 
agreement between Aspex and Chic (a licensee of Contour’s) was 
executed after the complaint was filed.174  The Federal Circuit 
vacated, however, holding that the Contour-Chic agreement “did not 
constitute a transfer from Contour to Chic of all substantial rights to 
the ‘747 patent, and hence it was not an assignment” under Waterman 
v. Mackenzie.175  Although the Chic-Contour agreement contained 
provisions that “strongly favor a finding of an assignment, not a 
license,”176 the dispositive factor to the Federal Circuit was the limited 
                                                          
 168. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (invoking “personal 
stake” as the primary element in determining standing and justiciability of the case 
or controversy). 
 169. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000) (declaring the right to a civil action as a “remedy 
for infringement” under the Patent Act). 
 170. Id. § 100(d). 
 171. Compare Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (holding that an 
exclusive territorial licensee has standing to sue for patent infringement) and Vaupel 
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875-76, 20 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045, 1049-50 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding same), with Rite-Hite 
Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551-52, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1074 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that a non-exclusive licensee does not have standing 
to sue for patent infringement). 
 172. See also infra  notes 704-23,  and accompanying text. 
 173. 434 F.3d 1336, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 174. Id. at 1339, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 175. See id. at 1341-42, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460 (noting that in Waterman the 
Supreme Court held that an assignee has standing to bring suit if it has an exclusive 
right to the patented invention). 
 176. Id. at 1342, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460. 
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time of the agreement—“As of March 16, 2006, Contour, absent an 
amendment of the agreement, will regain all of the rights under the 
‘747 patent that it had previously transferred to Chic.  It is thus the 
unquestioned owner of the patent . . . .”177  The court remanded for 
the district court to consider whether Aspex was an exclusive licensee 
who was a necessary party required to be joined—an issue the district 
court had not addressed.178 
In Bicon, Inc. v. Strautmann Co.,179 the district court had dismissed 
Bicon as a party on the ground that it was a nonexclusive licensee and 
thus lacked standing to sue.180  The legal principle at issue was 
unexceptional and agreed-to by the parties—“an exclusive licensee 
may sue on a patent, if the patent owner is joined as a party, but . . . a 
nonexclusive licensee may not.”181  Bicon’s only argument was that the 
district court should not have resolved this issue on summary 
judgment, because Bicon’s president had testified that the licensed 
right to practice the invention of the patent was “exclusive at the 
moment”—but, as the Federal Circuit pointed out, that testimony was 
further qualified by the statement that the license was only 
“exclusive” in that Bicon was the only licensee of the patent at the 
time.182  That was not enough to overcome summary judgment, and 
so the Federal Circuit affirmed.183 
b. Subject-matter jurisdiction 
A federal court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over a 
controversy before it can reach the merits of that controversy; for a 
federal court to proceed to the merits without assuring itself of 
jurisdiction “carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized 
judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation 
of powers.”184  In most patent cases, the basis for federal subject-
matter jurisdiction is section 1338(a) of the Judicial Code, which 
provides for “jurisdiction . . . exclusive of the courts of the states in 
                                                          
 177. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460. 
 178. Id. at 1344, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462. 
 179. 441 F.3d 945, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 180. Id. at 956, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 181. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277 (citing Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice 
Cheese, Inc., 402 F.3d 1198, 1202-03, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1204, 1207-08 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) and Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1031, 34 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, 1446-47 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 182. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 183. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 184. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); see Ruhrgas AG 
v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1999) (noting that federal court inquiries 
into subject-matter jurisdiction should be answered prior to questions of personal 
jurisdiction so as to show “expedition and sensitivity to state courts’ coequal share”). 
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patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.”185  But 
jurisdictional issues crop up under other statutes and constitutional 
provisions—most notably when sovereign immunity (domestic or 
foreign) is at issue. 
In fact, the major developments in subject-matter jurisdiction in 
2006 dealt with these sources of immunity.  In Intel Corp. v. 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation,186 the court 
addressed the question of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (“FSIA”),187 as the defendant, the Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (“CSIRO”), was 
Australia’s national science agency.188  CSIRO had engaged in 
ultimately unsuccessful licensing negotiations with United States 
companies such as Dell, Intel, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, and 
Netgear; when the discussions ended, each of the U.S. companies 
filed declaratory judgment actions against CSIRO.189  CSIRO claimed 
that it was immune from suit, and specifically urged that the 
“commercial activity” exception to foreign sovereign immunity190 did 
not apply to “patent licensing negotiations that do not result in a 
fully-executed, binding contract.”191  The district court disagreed with 
CSIRO, but, because denials of claims of immunity are immediately 
appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, CSIRO was able to 
take an immediate appeal to the Federal Circuit.192  In deciding this 
“issue of first impression for this court,”193 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, noting that “CSIRO’s acts of (1) obtaining a United States 
patent and then (2) enforcing its patent so it could reap the profits 
thereof—whether by threatening litigation or by proffering licenses 
to putative infringers—certainly fall within the . . . category” of 
“‘exercis[ing] only those powers that can also be exercised by private 
citizens,’” which are not “‘powers peculiar to sovereigns.’”194  The 
licensing discussions with United States companies were therefore 
“commercial activity” under the FSIA, and the U.S. companies’ 
                                                          
 185. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). 
 186. 455 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 187. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611; see id. § 1604 (stating that “a foreign state shall be 
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States”). 
 188. Intel, 455 F.3d at 1366, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509. 
 189. Id. at 1366-68, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509-11. 
 190. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(2), 1603(d) (indicating that foreign states engaging 
in “a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction” 
in the United States will not be immune from jurisdiction). 
 191. Intel, 455 F.3d at 1369, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512. 
 192. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511. 
 193. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512. 
 194. Id. at 1370, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512 (quoting Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)). 
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declaratory-judgment actions were “based on” those commercial 
activities of obtaining and asserting a U.S. patent.195 
Another immunity issue that arises with increasing frequency in the 
Federal Circuit is the question of the states’ sovereign immunity.196  
This issue recurs with some regularity because state universities 
(which are arms of the state for purposes of the Eleventh 
Amendment) have become more active in the business of patent 
procurement and enforcement, and in several cases are accused 
infringers.  For instance, in Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exchange 
No. 299,197 Pennington Seed attempted to sue the University of 
Arkansas and four of its officers for “actively growing, marketing, 
offering for sale, promoting and selling a product containing” 
Pennington Seed’s patented fescue grass.198  The district court found 
the action barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the Federal 
Circuit affirmed, rejecting Pennington Seed’s argument that 
Arkansas’s state-law claims procedures provided no adequate 
remedies for patent infringement on the ground that Congress made 
no specific finding that these state procedures were so inadequate 
that it “abrogated state sovereign immunity” to allow a patent 
infringement suit for damages to proceed in federal court.199  The 
court also noted that although injunctive relief against state officials 
for continuing violations of federal law might be theoretically 
available under Ex Parte Young;200 here there was no proper allegation 
that the state university officials themselves were involved in any 
ongoing violation of federal law.201 
Sovereign immunity was also at issue in Tegic Communications Corp. 
v. Board of Regents of the University of Texas System.202  The district court 
held that the University of Texas had not waived its sovereign 
immunity to a declaratory judgment suit brought by Tegic by filing a 
covenant not to sue, by obtaining patent rights and enforcing them 
in other federal court actions, or (with respect to its immunity from 
suit in Washington State) by filing suit in Texas as to the same 
                                                          
 195. Id. at 1370-71, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512-13. 
 196. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial powers of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
 197. 457 F.3d 1334, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1777 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 198. Id. at 1338, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 199. Id. at 1340-41, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
 200. See 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that a state’s sovereign immunity cannot 
insulate the unconstitutional actions of a state official because, upon violation of the 
Constitution, that individual is stripped of his or her official capacity). 
 201. Pennington Seed, 457 F.3d at 1341-43, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780-82. 
 202. 458 F.3d 1335, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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patent.203  The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the University’s 
assertion of its patents against certain telephone companies in a 
Texas federal court waived its immunity as to any compulsory 
counterclaims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, but 
did not extend to Tegic’s declaratory suit in Washington federal 
court.204 
Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Benun205 presented an interesting question of 
subject-matter jurisdiction vis-à-vis the district courts and the 
International Trade Commission (“ITC”).206  Ordinarily, a patent 
owner can bring actions regarding importations of allegedly 
infringing products in both a federal district court and before the 
ITC.207  The bases for jurisdiction  (and the scope of the available 
remedies) differ in the two fora:  ITC jurisdiction is in rem, not in 
personam, the only available remedies there are exclusion orders 
enforceable at the border by the U.S. Customs Service against any 
infringing product, and damages are unavailable.208  An exclusion 
order may be specific (as it is typically) or general (which is less 
common):  A specific exclusion order excludes from the United 
States only those articles at issue in the investigation; a general 
exclusion order typically excludes all infringing articles, whether or 
not included in the investigation, and whether or not imported by 
any of the respondents in the investigation.209  In Fuji Photo Film, the 
defendants urged, in a federal court action following an ITC action, 
that the ITC’s earlier issuance of a general exclusion order had 
precluded a district court from granting injunctive relief, or, as the 
Federal Circuit described the argument, “once the [ITC] issues a 
general exclusion order, the statutory scheme that allows an importer 
to challenge a seizure of its goods under such an order also prevents 
a district court from considering importation issues involving those 
same goods.”210  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, noting 
that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which grants the Court of International 
Trade exclusive jurisdiction over denials of protests of general 
exclusion orders,211 “says nothing about district court jurisdiction over 
                                                          
 203. Id. at 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203. 
 204. Id. at 1341-43, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 205. 463 F.3d 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 206. Id. at 1253. 
 207. Id. at 1254; Texas Instruments Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1330, 56 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674, 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  Three of the authors were counsel to 
Texas Instruments in this case. 
 208. Id. at 1330, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678. 
 209. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2000). 
 210. Fuji Photo, 463 F.3d at 1254. 
 211. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000). 
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patent infringement claims . . . or injunctions . . . .”212  This statute 
only gives the Court of International Trade exclusive jurisdiction over 
actions “commenced to contest the denial of a protest,”213 and 
because a district court patent infringement action is not a “contest” 
to “the denial of a protest,” the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s rejection of the defendants’ jurisdictional challenge.214 
In Thompson v. Microsoft Corp.,215 the court held that a state law claim 
of unjust enrichment, based on a claim that Microsoft improperly 
filed a patent application for an invention that the plaintiff alleged he 
invented, did not “arise under” the U.S. patent laws for purposes of 
the Federal Circuit’s subject-matter jurisdiction.216  The Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Thompson applied two of the most important 
principles undergirding the well-pleaded complaint rule for purposes 
of ascertaining federal subject-matter jurisdiction:  one, if a cause of 
action is not on its face one for patent infringement, it only “arises 
under” patent law if “patent law is a necessary element of [a] well-
pleaded [non-patent-law] claim;”217 and two, even a defense on 
federal preemption grounds—which Microsoft had interposed as a 
defense to Thompson’s unjust-enrichment claim—will not support 
“arising under” subject-matter jurisdiction.218  Because the Federal 
Circuit’s own appellate jurisdiction depends on a finding that the 
district court’s jurisdiction “arises under” the U.S. patent laws,219 the 
court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Thompson’s appeal 
and ordered the appeal transferred to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.220 
c. Personal jurisdiction 
A federal district court has personal jurisdiction over a party so 
long as two basic requirements are fulfilled:  “First, a defendant must 
be amenable to process in the forum state.  Second, the court’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction must comply with the precepts of 
federal due process.”221  A party is “amenable to service of process” if 
                                                          
 212. Fuji Photo, 463 F.3d at 1255. 
 213. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). 
 214. Fuji Photo, 463 F.3d at 1255-56. 
 215. 471 F.3d 1288, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 216. Id. at 1292, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
 217. Id. at 1291, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 797, 808-09 (1988)). 
 218. Id. at 1292, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
 219. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). 
 220. Thompson, 471 F.3d at 1292, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
 221. LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1371, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1965, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of 
Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
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it could be “subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general 
jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located,” such as 
under a state “long-arm” jurisdictional statute or “nonresident 
motorist statute.”222 
In Breckenridge Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,223 
the Federal Circuit addressed several of these issues and attempted to 
synthesize the law with respect to personal jurisdiction in the context 
of “cease and desist” letters.224  A Florida district court had held that 
Metabolite’s sending of certain “cease and desist” letters into Florida 
from its Colorado home did not meet the due process standards for 
personal jurisdiction.225  The Federal Circuit disagreed and held that 
there were sufficient contacts between Metabolite and parties in the 
State of Florida to satisfy the constitutional personal-jurisdiction 
requirement.226  The court surveyed several of its prior cases, which 
reached differing results on similar (though not identical) facts, and 
set forth these guiding principles: 
[W]here a defendant has sent cease and desist letters into a forum 
state that primarily involve a legal dispute unrelated to the patent 
at issue, such as an injunction obtained for misappropriation of 
trade secrets, the exercise of jurisdiction is improper.227 
. . . . 
[A] defendant may not be subjected to personal jurisdiction if its 
only additional activities in the forum state involve unsuccessful 
attempts to license the patent there.228 
. . . . 
A defendant may not be subjected to personal jurisdiction where 
the defendant “has successfully licensed the patent in the forum 
state, even to multiple non-exclusive licenses, but does not, for 
example, exercise control over the licensees’ sales activities and, 
instead, has no dealings with those licensees beyond the receipt of 
royalty income.229 
. . . . 
                                                          
 222. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
 223. 444 F.3d 1356, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1581 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 224. Id. at 1366, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587-88; see infra notes 227–232 and 
accompanying text (laying out the court’s summary of the relevant case law). 
 225. Breckenridge, 444 F.3d at 1360, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584. 
 226. Id. at 1369, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590. 
 227. Id. at 1366, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587 (citing Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong 
Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1202, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1602, 1607 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 228. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587 (citing Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co., Inc., 
279 F.3d 1351, 1356, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 229. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587-88 (citing Red Wing Shoe Co. v. 
Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361-62, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1192, 
1197 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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In contrast, the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the 
forum state by virtue of its relationship with its exclusive forum 
state licensee if the license agreement, for example, requires the 
defendant-licensor, and grants the licensee the right, to litigate 
infringement claims.230 
. . . . 
[T]he defendant will also be subject to personal jurisdiction in the 
forum state if the exclusive licensee (or licensee equivalent) with 
which it has established a relationship is not headquartered in the 
forum state, but nonetheless conducts business there.231 
Thus, the Federal Circuit summarized, 
the crux of the due process inquiry should focus first on whether 
the defendant has had contact with parties in the forum state 
beyond the sending of cease and desist letters or mere attempts to 
license the patent there.  Where a defendant-licensor has a 
relationship with an exclusive licensee headquartered or doing 
business in the forum state, the inquiry requires close examination 
of the license agreement.  In particular, our case law requires that 
the license agreement contemplate a relationship beyond royalty or 
cross-licensing payment, such as granting both parties the right to 
litigate infringement cases or granting the licensor the right to 
exercise control over the licensee’s sales or marketing activities.232 
Applying these standards, which are a matter of Federal Circuit law 
because of their close relationship to matters of substantive patent 
law,233 the Federal Circuit held that the district court had erred in 
finding no personal jurisdiction over defendant Metabolite because:  
Metabolite had entered into an exclusive license arrangement with 
PamLab, a company that does business in Florida; that license 
agreement resulted in an ongoing relationship under which PamLab 
was granted “full control of the prosecution or maintenance” of any 
patent or application for a patent that Metabolite abandons or lets 
lapse; and the agreement also resulted in PamLab and Metabolite 
cooperating in sending cease-and-desist letters and in litigating 
infringement claims in Florida and elsewhere.234 
In Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exchange No. 299,235 the court 
affirmed a Missouri district court’s decision that it lacked personal 
                                                          
 230. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (citing Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 
1546, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1505, 1509 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 231. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (citing Genetic Implant Sys., Inc. v. Core-
Vent Corp., 123 F.3d 1455, 1457-59, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1788-90 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)). 
 232. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588. 
 233. Id. at 1362, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585. 
 234. Id. at 1366-67, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588. 
 235. 457 F.3d 1334, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1777 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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jurisdiction over officials of the University of Arkansas.236  Noting that 
it was only necessary for Pennington Seed to make out a prima facie 
case of personal jurisdiction in its complaint, the court nonetheless 
concluded that the complaint was wholly lacking in any allegation 
that these officials had any contacts with the State of Missouri.237  
“Even if their residence is within sixty miles of the Missouri border, as 
Pennington states in its brief to this court, such a fact does not 
demonstrate activities directed at Missouri or claims arising out of 
activities in Missouri.”238 
d. Specific issues affecting the initiation of a case 
In addition to these essential legal jurisdictional requirements, 
there are other jurisdictional (and related) doctrines that are 
occasionally invoked at the outset of a case, often involving 
discretionary determinations by district courts.  A few of the doctrines 
that cropped up in the 2006 decisions of the Federal Circuit are 
discussed below. 
i.  Declaratory judgments 
As noted above,239 the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.240 raises substantial questions about 
the continued vitality of the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable 
apprehension of suit” (or “reasonable apprehension of imminent 
suit”) test, which has governed the question of declaratory-judgment 
jurisdiction over the years.241  The pre-MedImmune decisions that the 
Federal Circuit rendered in 2006 should therefore be evaluated with 
a critical eye to determine what effect they may have, post-
MedImmune. 
In Microchip Technology Inc. v. Chamberlain Group, Inc.,242 the Federal 
Circuit relied on the 2005 decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, 
Inc.,243 concluding that an existing settlement agreement, which the 
declaratory judgment plaintiff believed had brought “patent peace” 
between the parties, demonstrated that the declaratory plaintiff had 
                                                          
 236. Id. at 1344-45, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783. 
 237. Id. at 1344, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783. 
 238. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783. 
 239. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text. 
 240. 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). 
 241. Id. at 774 n.11 (quoting Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 
1332-33, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1088, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 242. 441 F.3d 936, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 243. 409 F.3d 1376, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 
1118 (2007). 
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no “reasonable apprehension of suit.”244  However, the U.S. Supreme 
Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment in MedImmune v. 
Centocor, remanding the case for the Federal Circuit to reconsider its 
decision in light of the Supreme Court decision in MedImmune v. 
Genentech.245  So, as this article goes to press, it is unclear what weight, 
if any, the Microchip Technology case will have in the future. 
In Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, LLC,246 the Federal Circuit 
again applied the “reasonable apprehension of suit” test but 
determined based on the totality of the circumstances that 
Datamize’s earlier suit against Plumtree regarding a parent patent 
created a reasonable apprehension of a suit in relation to later 
patents on related technology, thereby making Plumtree’s 
declaratory-judgment suit appropriate.247  The court rejected 
Datamize’s argument that the passage of time since that earlier suit 
had minimized or eliminated that apprehension, “because, between 
the two lawsuits, Datamize continued to ‘engage[] in a course of 
conduct that show[ed] a willingness to protect [its] technology’”—it 
had sued nine other defendants (not Plumtree) in another suit in 
federal district court in Texas and had stated in discovery responses 
in that Texas suit that it also believed Plumtree was infringing these 
patents.248  “Plumtree was aware of the Texas action, and whether or 
not the interrogatory response was actually communicated to 
Plumtree, the response is probative of Datamize’s intentions.”249 
ii.  Supplemental jurisdiction 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a federal district court may exercise 
“supplemental jurisdiction” over a state law claim for which the 
federal court would not otherwise have jurisdiction, if the state law 
claim arises from the same common nucleus of operative fact as the 
claim or claims properly in the federal court.250  In 2006, the Federal 
Circuit issued a pronouncement on supplemental jurisdiction in 
                                                          
 244. Microchip Tech., 441 F.3d at 942, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298. 
 245. No. 05-656, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1012 (Jan. 16, 2007). 
 246. 473 F.3d 1152, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 247. Id. at 1159, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255-56. 
 248. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256 (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 956, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 
1987)). 
 249. Plumtree Software, 473 F.3d at 1159, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256. 
 250. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (granting the district courts supplemental 
jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within 
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under 
Article III of the United States Constitution”); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (indicating that a federal court may hear both state 
and federal claims if those claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts). 
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Highway Equipment Co. v. FECO, Ltd.251  The court held that a district 
court had “erred in exercising supplemental jurisdiction” over a state 
law counterclaim (between two nondiverse parties) for wrongful 
termination of a dealership agreement, because the wrongful 
termination claim and the federal patent infringement claim did not 
arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts.252  The contract 
relating to the distribution of Highway Equipment’s products was 
completely unrelated to the patent, which dealt with a product 
manufactured by FECO; and the dealership agreement was 
terminated in 2002, a year before the patent being contested at the 
federal level was even issued.253 
iii.  Forum non conveniens 
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a district court, despite 
otherwise having jurisdiction over a claim or parties, may nonetheless 
decline to hear a case if it determines that the dispute is one better 
heard in a foreign forum.254  In Bonzel v. Pfizer, Inc.,255 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s alternative holding that the suit 
was properly dismissed under the forum non conveniens doctrine 
because “the contract at issue was made in Germany and by its terms 
requires interpretation and application of German law.”256 
                                                          
 251. 469 F.3d 1027, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 252. Id. at 1038-39, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128-29. 
 253. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129 (comparing the situation to Mars, Inc. v. 
Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) and Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 598 
(N.D. Iowa 2006), two cases in which supplemental jurisdiction was denied because 
the respective agreements, products, and alleged acts were different, indicating that 
there was not a “common nucleus of operative facts”). 
 254. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 
1184, 1188 (2007) (Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “a federal district 
court may dismiss an action on the ground that a court abroad is the more 
appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating the controversy.”); Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 511-12 (1947), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 
(2000), as recognized in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (finding 
the New York court’s refusal of jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens 
appropriate because the negligence suit, which was brought by a Virginia resident 
against a Pennsylvania company (conducting buisiness in both New York and 
Virginia) after a fire at the company’s Virginia warehouse had destroyed the 
plaintiff’s goods, could best be heard in Virginia); see also Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 
510 U.S. 443 (1994) (finding that state law regarding the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens is not preempted by federal law in admiralty cases filed in state court 
under the Jones Act and the “saving to suitors clause”).  One of the authors was 
counsel to Sinochem in the first-cited case in this footnote. 
 255. 439 F.3d 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  One of the 
authors was counsel to Pfizer, Inc. in this case. 
 256. Id. at 1363, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.  The district court had dismissed 
the case for lack of federal jurisdiction, either “arising under” the patent laws or 
diversity jurisdiction, and the Federal Circuit had affirmed that dismissal prior to 
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iv.  Stays pending arbitration 
Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that, 
where a federal district court is satisfied that an issue in a court 
dispute is “referable to arbitration” under a written instrument 
providing for such arbitration, “the court in which such suit is 
pending . . . shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of 
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement . . . .”257  In Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp.,258 the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the Qualcomm-Nokia agreement 
clearly and unmistakably provided that the question of arbitrability 
was to be decided by the arbitrator, but remanded the case for the 
district court to determine whether Nokia’s claim of arbitrability, as 
to the particular issues claimed to be arbitrable, was “wholly 
groundless.”259  The district court had, in denying the request for 
arbitration, misunderstood its task as determining whether the 
asserted issues were in fact arbitrable; because the agreement 
assigned arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, not the court, only 
the limited “wholly groundless” inquiry avoids “invad[ing] the 
province of the arbitrator.”260 
2.  Pre-trial matters 
a. Leave to amend the complaint 
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
leave to amend a complaint after a responsive pleading is filed “shall 
be freely given when justice so requires.”261  However, leave to amend 
a complaint need not be granted when there has been undue or 
prejudicial delay, the moving party acted in bad faith, or an 
amendment is legally futile.262  Moreover, where a district court has 
entered a scheduling order under rule 16 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the deadline for amendment under that order 
has passed, a party seeking amendment must also demonstrate “good 
cause” for the amendment.263  In Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos 
Vegetales Del Centro S.A. de C.V.,264 the Federal Circuit applied these 
                                                                                                                                      
reaching the alternative forum non conveniens holding.  Id. at 1362-63, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1139-40. 
 257. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). 
 258. 466 F.3d 1366, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 259. Id. at 1373-74, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674-75. 
 260. Id. at 1374, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675. 
 261. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). 
 262. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 
 263. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
 264. 464 F.3d 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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principles (under Eighth Circuit law) and held that two proposed 
amended counterclaims, and three proposed new counterclaims, 
which the defendant attempted to add after trial, were indeed 
futile.265  The two proposed amended counterclaims were legally 
foreclosed by the earlier judgment as to patent invalidity and 
unenforceability, and the three proposed new counterclaims had not 
been shown by the defendant to be sufficiently supportable that they 
would survive summary judgment.266  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend.267 
b. Res judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel 
The doctrines of res judicata (or claim preclusion) and collateral 
estoppel (or issue preclusion) serve to prevent unnecessary multiple 
lawsuits on matters that parties have had a “full and fair opportunity 
to litigate.”268  Under the doctrine of res judicata/claim preclusion, “a 
final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their 
privies based on the same cause of action.”269  Thus, such a judgment 
prevents relitigation of claims that were or could have been brought 
in the first action.270  Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue 
preclusion, “once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in 
subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party 
to the prior litigation.”271 
In 2006, the Federal Circuit had several opportunities to apply 
these and related doctrines.  In Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. 
Surgical Corp.,272 the court (applying Ninth Circuit law) held that an 
earlier determination of a seven percent reasonable royalty for 
infringement damages as to an earlier version of U.S. Surgical’s 
infringing trocars (surgical devices used as access ports in 
laparoscopic abdominal surgery) did not have collateral-estoppel 
effect in a later suit involving a redesigned U.S. Surgical trocar 
                                                          
 265. Id. at 1356, 80 U.S.P.Q.3d (BNA) at 1397. 
 266. Id. at 1355-56, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394-97. 
 267. Id. at 1356, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. 
 268. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979) (noting that 
preclusion under these doctrines “conserves judicial resources” and fosters reliance 
on judicial precedent “by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions”). 
 269. Id. at 153 (emphasis added) (citing Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 
352 (1877)). 
 270. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998) (referring to FED. 
R. CIV. P. 8(c), which states that claim preclusion is an affirmative defense that must 
be pleaded in the initial action). 
 271. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)). 
 272. 435 F.3d 1356, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
830 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
because the issues in the two cases were not the same.273  The court 
explained that the infringements were not the same because there 
were vast differences in the products, timing, and market.274  
Furthermore, “[b]ecause the determination of reasonable royalty 
damages is tied to the infringement being redressed, a separate 
infringement beginning at a different time requires a separate 
evaluation of reasonable royalty damages.”275  As such, the issues were 
not the same in the two cases, and collateral estoppel could not 
apply.276 
The Federal Circuit addressed two recurring issues of claim 
preclusion in Pactiv Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co.277  There, Pactiv and 
Dow had (in 1998) resolved an earlier case between them through a 
joint stipulation and a dismissal with prejudice.278 Pactiv did not 
dispute that claim preclusion would apply to its later suit, but 
contended that two exceptions to that doctrine applied:  It had 
reserved its rights in the joint stipulation to later challenge two Dow 
patents,279 and it had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
these issues in the earlier case as the result of “fraudulent 
misrepresentations” by Dow in the earlier action.280  The court 
rejected both of Pactiv’s assertions.281  As to the first, the court 
acknowledged that an “express” reservation in an earlier stipulated 
judgment will avoid claim preclusion in a second case,282 but held that 
Pactiv “ha[d] the standard backwards”—it was arguing that nothing 
in the stipulation precluded a later challenge to the patents, when its 
burden was to demonstrate that there had been an express 
reservation of the otherwise—applicable claim-preclusive effect of the 
stipulation.283  And as to the second, the court held that the only 
proper ground for concluding that a party lacked a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate an issue in a prior action was upon showing 
that the deprivation amounted to a denial of due process; Pactiv’s 
“fraud” allegation did not rise to that level, and was, besides, 
                                                          
 273. Id. at 1361, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 274. Id. at 1362, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670-71. 
 275. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670-71. 
 276. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670-71. 
 277. 449 F.3d 1227, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1939 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 278. Id. at 1229, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940. 
 279. Id. at 1230-31, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 280. Id. at 1232-33, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943. 
 281. Id. at 1231, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 282. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(a) (1982); id. § 26 cmt. A; and 18 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 
R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4415, at 354 (2d ed. 2002)). 
 283. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
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inappropriately invoked as a defense to claim preclusion.284  
According to the court, such an attack on a prior judgment properly 
lies under rule 60(b), but would not be permitted in a collateral 
attack to the application of res judicata.285 
The doctrine of “judicial estoppel” applies when a party asserts a 
position, succeeds, and attempts later to switch positions; in that 
circumstance, the switching of positions will generally be barred.286  In 
Bonzel v. Pfizer, Inc.,287 the Federal Circuit (somewhat obliquely) 
appeared to endorse application of judicial estoppel in a 
jurisdictional dispute, noting that “[t]he district court observed that 
Dr. Bonzel had successfully obtained a transfer back to state court in 
the earlier federal case, on the position that there is no substantial 
question of patent law and that this is an action to enforce a contract, 
not to decide patent infringement.”288  The district court and the 
Federal Circuit both rejected Bonzel’s efforts to claim, in this later 
case, that resolution of the contract issues “‘necessarily depend[s] on 
resolution of a substantial question of federal [patent] law.’”289  
Nonetheless, the panel disclaimed “primar[y]” reliance on estoppel, 
because “Dr. Bonzel sufficiently changed his complaint [in the 
second case] to require a fresh look in the district court.”290 
c. Summary judgment 
In the past, we (and others) have chronicled the extensive use of 
summary judgment in patent cases.291  For the year 2006, it is worth 
focusing on the use of summary judgment in a particular class of 
cases:  those involving inequitable conduct. 
                                                          
 284. Id. at 1233, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943. 
 285. Id. at 1234, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
 286. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (holding that judicial 
estoppel barred New Hampshire from claiming that the Piscataqua River boundary 
runs along the shore of Maine because the State had previously agreed (after 
litigation) that the boundary fell in the middle of the river); U.S. Philips Corp. v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 55 F.3d 592, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1699 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(finding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevented an alleged infringer, 
Windmere Corporation, from relitigating its antitrust counterclaims in Illinois, 
having already litigated antitrust claims in Florida). 
 287. 439 F.3d 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 288. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139-40. 
 289. Id. at 1363, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)). 
 290. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 291. See Adamo et al., supra note 14, at 1439-41 & n.8 (reviewing the numerous 
Federal Circuit Court patent cases that were decided via summary judgment in 
2000); Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the 
Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1187-88 (1999) (noting that “[s]ummary 
judgments . . . make up a large portion of [the Federal Circuit] caseload” and 
proceeding to discuss several key cases decided by summary judgment). 
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“Determining at summary judgment that a patent is unenforceable 
for inequitable conduct is permissible, but uncommon.”292  That 
statement, from the Federal Circuit’s decision in Digital Control, Inc. v. 
Charles Machine Works, served as a theme for several of the decisions 
that would follow it in 2006.  In synthesizing its prior decisions in 
Digital Control, the court stated, “we have upheld grants of summary 
judgment on inequitable conduct where, for example, ‘the affidavits 
submitted to explain the representations made to the PTO were 
“bare declaration[s] of lack of intent to mislead” and . . . the 
explanations provided in the affidavits were either “nonresponsive” 
or lacked evidentiary support.’”293  On the other hand, the Federal 
Circuit has 
refused summary judgment where the plaintiff submitted an 
affidavit that “set[] forth a non-frivolous explanation that could 
lead a finder of fact to determine that his declaration [to the PTO] 
was not false or misleading,” or where the plaintiff “state[d] facts 
supporting a plausible justification or excuse for the 
misrepresentation.”294 
In Digital Control itself, the court reversed a determination of 
inequitable conduct on the ground that the district court had 
improperly determined, on summary judgment, that the failure to 
cite a particular patent (the Rorden patent) was a material 
omission.295  Because “the scope and content of the prior art and what 
the prior art teaches are questions of fact,” and because the parties 
had a material factual dispute over what the Rorden patent disclosed 
and taught (under one version of the facts, it was merely cumulative; 
under another, it was not), summary judgment on the issue of 
materiality was inappropriate.296 
However, in Ferring B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,297 decided only one 
week after Digital Control, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit 
upheld a summary judgment of inequitable conduct.298  On the issue 
                                                          
 292. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Machine Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826-27 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 293. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Bayer BioScience 
N.V., 363 F.3d 1235, 1240, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2004), in turn 
quoting Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1191-92, 25 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 294. Id. at 1314, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827 (quoting Monsanto, 363 F.3d at 
1240, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62, in turn quoting Paragon Podiatry, 984 F.2d at 
1191, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569). 
 295. Id. at 1319, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831. 
 296. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831 (citing Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS 
Imps. Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1088, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1237, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 
1995)). 
 297. 437 F.3d 1181, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 298. Id. at 1194, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171. 
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of materiality, the court upheld the district court’s conclusion that 
the inventors’ failure to disclose the prior business relationships 
between several declarants (on a highly material issue—the 
understanding of the term “peroral” in the relevant art) and the 
inventors’ employer (and ultimate assignee of the patent) was a 
failure to disclose a material fact.299  “A witness’s interest is always 
pertinent to his credibility and to the weight to be given to his 
testimony, and relevant interests are not limited to direct financial 
interests.”300  Similarly, the court upheld summary judgment on the 
issue of intent, concluding (as did the district court) that it was 
proper to infer culpable intent from the high materiality of the 
withheld information.301  While not being willing to “attempt to lay 
down a general rule as to when intent may be or must be inferred 
from the withholding of material information by an applicant,” the 
court did recognize “three conditions” under which summary 
judgment on the issue of intent would be appropriate:  “(1) the 
applicant knew of the information; (2) the applicant knew or should 
have known of the materiality of the information; and (3) the 
applicant has not provided a credible explanation for the 
withholding.”302  The fatal flaw in appellants’ efforts to overcome 
summary judgment, the court said, was in the third condition:  “In 
short, appellants’ argument concerning credible explanations 
consists entirely of speculation.  Conclusory allegations and attorney 
arguments are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary 
judgment.”303  Indeed, the court added, “[f]ar from there being a 
credible explanation for the withholding, there is evidence in the 
summary judgment record supporting a conclusion that the past 
relationships were deliberately concealed.”304 
Judge Newman “respectfully, but urgently, dissent[ed].”305  In her 
view, the panel decision had returned the court to the pre-Kingsdown 
era of inequitable-conduct law,306 the benighted era when inequitable-
                                                          
 299. Id. at 1188-90, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-68. 
 300. Id. at 1188, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 301. Id. at 1194, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171. 
 302. Id. at 1191, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169. 
 303. Id. at 1193, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (citing Biotec Biologische 
Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1353, 58 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v. 
Northlake Marketing & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550, 1561-62, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1496, 1503 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 304. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171. 
 305. Id. at 1197, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 306. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 827, 873-74, 
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1389-91 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc in relevant part) 
(limiting potential claims of inequitable conduct by holding that:  (1) a failure to 
realize that a patent claim does not correspond to an amended version of another 
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conduct claims were present in virtually every case, placing a 
“scourge” on U.S. patent litigation.307  In particular, she saw the 
majority’s error as embracing a “casually subjective standard,” and 
imposing a “positive inference of wrongdoing, replacing the need for 
evidence with a ‘should have known’ standard of materiality, from 
which deceptive intent is inferred, even in the total absence of 
evidence.”308  Ferring’s petition for rehearing was denied, over the 
dissents (without opinion) of Judges Newman, Lourie, and Gajarsa.309 
Another summary judgment of inequitable conduct, and another 
Federal Circuit reversal, occurred in M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. 
Fisher Tooling, Inc.310  The patent was directed to an invention for 
removing decals from motor vehicles, and in connection with the 
application, the inventor submitted a declaration stating that “he was 
not aware of any relevant prior art . . . .”311  Eventually, the examiner 
allowed the claims “because none of the art of record shows all of the 
detailed internal workings of the instant claims including [various 
listed components].”312  The district court granted summary judgment 
of inequitable conduct, in particular because the patentee had sold a 
prior-art product (for twenty years) that contained the components 
listed by the examiner as missing from the prior art,313 and from this 
omission—and the lack of a good faith explanation for the 
omission—the district court inferred culpable intent.314  In an 
opinion by Judge Lourie, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that 
“[w]hen the absence of a good faith explanation is the only evidence 
of intent, however, that evidence alone does not constitute clear and 
convincing evidence warranting an inference of intent.”315  There is 
some obvious tension between this holding of M. Eagles and the 
court’s decision, just weeks earlier, in Ferring, yet the M. Eagles court 
                                                                                                                                      
claim does not necessarily demonstrate inequitable conduct, and (2) it is not 
inequitable to file a patent application in order to lawfully exclude a competitor’s 
product from the marketplace). 
 307. Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1195, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172 (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Michael D. Kaminski, Effective Management of U.S. Patent 
Litigation, 18 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13, 24 (2006)). 
 308. Id. at 1196, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 309. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 05-1284, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10811 
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2006). 
 310. 439 F.3d 1335, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 311. Id. at 1336, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 312. Id. at 1337, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 313. Id. at 1338, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. 
 314. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. 
 315. Id. at 1341, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235. 
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did not even cite the Ferring decision, and its author, Judge Lourie, 
later dissented from the denial of en banc rehearing in Ferring.316 
Moving away from the context of inequitable conduct, the Federal 
Circuit issued an important exposition on summary judgment 
procedure and burdens of proof and production in Exigent 
Technology, Inc. v. Atrana Solutions, Inc.317  There, Atrana had 
successfully moved for summary judgment of non-infringement in 
the district court, and the Federal Circuit affirmed that grant despite 
Exigent’s argument that “Atrana did not properly support its motion 
for summary judgment of non-infringement with evidence sufficient 
to establish non-infringement.”318  The court’s opinion explained 
that, under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,319 the summary judgment movant 
need not produce evidence on issues where the non-movant bears 
the burden of proof to prevail:320  “In the light of Celotex, we conclude 
that nothing more is required than the filing of a summary judgment 
motion stating that the patentee had no evidence of infringement 
and pointing to the specific ways in which accused systems did not 
meet the claim limitations.”321 
Another important procedural aspect of summary judgment 
practice addresses the level of detail required of an expert affidavit or 
declaration to demonstrate a “genuine issue of material fact.”  A bare 
or conclusory affidavit will not suffice; some level of detail is 
required.322  In Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,323 
the court reversed a grant of summary judgment where the district 
court had concluded that a witness declaration was “conclusory and 
lacking particularized testimony and linking argument necessary to 
establish equivalence.”324  The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding the 
declaration in question was “not overly conclusory,” and sufficiently 
particularized to meet the doctrine-of-equivalents standards.325 
                                                          
 316. See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10811, at *2 (Fed. 
Cir. Apr. 12, 2006) (noting that Judges Newman, Lourie, and Gajarsa would have 
heard the appeal en banc). 
 317. 442 F.3d 1301, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 318. Id. at 1307, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325. 
 319. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 320. Exigent, 442 F.3d at 1307, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (quoting Celotex, 477 
U.S. at 325); id. at 1307 n.6, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 n.6 (quoting Saab Cars 
USA, Inc. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1359, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 321. Id. at 1308-09, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 322. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., No. SACV 03-1267, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 42653, at *25 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2005). 
 323. 448 F.3d 1324, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 324. Id. at 1335, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 325. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
836 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
d. Attorney-client privilege and work-product protection 
In 2006, the Federal Circuit in In re EchoStar Communications Corp.326 
invoked the extraordinary procedure of a writ of mandamus to 
address several important issues regarding the scope of waiver (of 
both attorney-client privilege and work-product protection) when an 
advice-of-counsel defense is asserted to a willful-infringement claim.327  
The district court had found a waiver of both attorney-client privilege 
and work-product protection, and issued a sweeping discovery 
order.328  EchoStar and its law firm, Merchant & Gould, P.C., sought 
mandamus from the Federal Circuit, which was granted in limited 
part.329  EchoStar urged that there had been no waiver of the attorney-
client privilege because it relied solely on an “in-house investigation 
supervised by in-house counsel.”330  The court rejected that argument, 
noting that in-house counsel are still lawyers, and reliance on the 
conclusions of in-house counsel constitutes reliance on a legal 
opinion, which thereby waives the attorney-client privilege.331 
EchoStar’s argument about the work-product doctrine had more 
success.332  The court noted three categories of work-product relevant 
here: 
(1) documents that embody a communication between the 
attorney and client concerning the subject matter of the case, such 
as a traditional opinion letter; (2) documents analyzing the law, 
facts, trial strategy, and so forth that reflect the attorney’s mental 
impressions but were not given to the client; and (3) documents 
that discuss a communication between attorney and client 
concerning the subject matter of the case but are not themselves 
communications to or from the client.333 
The Federal Circuit concluded that, where an advice-of-counsel 
defense is proffered, the “waiver extends to the third category [of 
work-product] but does not extend so far as the second.”334  
Mandamus was thus granted, in limited form, to protect that second 
category of documents from disclosure.335 
                                                          
 326. 448 F.3d 1294, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 846 (2006) (mem.). 
 327. Id. at 1296, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
 328. Id. at 1297, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677-78. 
 329. Id. at 1297-98, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-79. 
 330. Id. at 1299, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 331. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 332. Id. at 1300-05, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680-84. 
 333. Id. at 1302, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 334. Id. at 1303, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 335. Id. at 1305, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
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e. Rule 54(b) 
Under rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district 
court may, in appropriate cases, enter a partial final judgment on one 
or more, but fewer than all, of the claims in a case (or as to all claims 
involving one or more, but fewer than all, parties to a case).336  The 
ability to obtain an early partial final judgment (for example, on a 
claim on which summary judgment has been granted) is important to 
the ability to secure immediate appellate review over that partial 
dismissal while the rest of the case continues in the trial court.337  
When counterclaims (or other claims) remain pending in the trial 
court, rule 54(b) may be the only practical way of securing immediate 
appellate review.338  Thus, in Exigent Technology, Inc. v. Atrana Solutions, 
Inc.,339 the Federal Circuit had identified, after the case had been fully 
briefed and the day after argument, that “counterclaims concerning 
invalidity and unenforceability remained pending in the district 
court.”340  The court thus instructed the parties to return to the 
district court and seek a nunc pro tunc order entering a partial final 
judgment under rule 54(b).341  This is a frequent problem of appeals 
to the Federal Circuit, and subsequent panels of the court dealing 
with the same issue have not been so charitable.342 
3.  Trial 
a. Right to jury trial 
As noted above, the question of when, in a patent case, the parties 
are entitled to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution has reached the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court 
                                                          
 336. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 337. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1315, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that the district court had 
entered partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) “with respect to the invalidity of the 
‘944 patent”). 
 338. See Exigent Tech., Inc. v. Atrana Solutions, Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1311, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 
803 F.2d 661, 667, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 363, 367 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that 
under rule 54, interlocutory decisions can be reviewed by the district court prior to 
the entry of a final judgment)). 
 339. Id. at 1301, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321. 
 340. Id. at 1305 n.2, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324 n.2. 
 341. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324 n.2 (citing State Contracting & Eng’g Co. v. 
Florida, 258 F.3d 1329, 1334-35, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498, 1501-02 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
 342. See, e.g., Int’l Elec. Tech. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Corp., 2007 WL 189341, at 
*2, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1543, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he parties and other 
members of the bar are hereby placed on notice that the court shall in the future 
begin to cite counsel for failure to determine whether or not the appealed judgment 
is final.”). 
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has never issued a decision on that issue.343  The Supreme Court has 
yet to address the issue again, despite several opportunities to do so, 
in varying factual contexts, over the years.  And the Federal Circuit 
continues to reach divided opinions when the subject arises.  In Agfa 
Corp. v. Creo Products, Inc.,344 Agfa urged that it was entitled to a jury 
trial on Creo’s inequitable-conduct defense (the district court, sitting 
without a jury, had held all of Agfa’s patents unenforceable).345  The 
court found Agfa’s case indistinguishable from the Federal Circuit’s 
prior decision in Gardco Manufacturing, Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co.,346 
with the exception of two slight procedural differences.  Gardco was a 
declaratory judgment case, and involved a “claim” of inequitable 
conduct rather than a defense, but the court explained that those 
type of procedural differences have no “bearing on the question of 
the right to a jury trial.”347  The court rejected Agfa’s analogy to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,348 which 
had held that there was a Seventh Amendment jury trial right on 
even equitable claims, when the resolution of the equitable claim 
would resolve issues that are “common” with a juriable claim; while 
acknowledging that the inequitable conduct defense and the 
invalidity defense “overlap to some degree,” the court concluded that 
“they [were] not ‘common’ issues as in Beacon Theatres.”349  The court 
also rejected Agfa’s analogy to the writ of scire facias, where jury trials 
were allowed at common law, distinguishing away “some dicta in a 
footnote in In re Lockwood . . .”350 suggesting that “[t]he contemporary 
analog of the writ [of scire facias] is . . . an action for a declaration of 
unenforceability due to inequitable conduct not due to invalidity.” 351  
While acknowledging that this footnote is “easy to misread,”352 the 
court ultimately held that “a writ of scire facias was not, in fact, a suit at 
common law analogous to modern inequitable conduct.”353  Judge 
                                                          
 343. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (describing that the jury trial 
issue became moot after the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this issue). 
 344. 451 F.3d 1366, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 345. Id. at 1369, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386-87. 
 346. 820 F.2d 1209, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2015 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 347. See Agfa, 451 F.3d at 1372, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389 (explaining that the 
“right to jury trial is examined without regard to the alignment of the parties or the 
posture of the issue, i.e. a defense or separate claim”) (citing In re Tech. Licensing 
Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1288, 1290-91, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450, 1452, 1454 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005))). 
 348. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
 349. Agfa, 451 F.3d at 1372, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 350. Id. at 1373, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
 351. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390 (quoting In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974 
n.9, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1406, 1412 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Am. 
Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995)). 
 352. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
 353. Id. at 1374, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
2007] 2006 PATENT SUMMARY 839 
Newman dissented, urging that she would have ordered a jury trial 
based upon the court’s prior opinion in Lockwood and her own 
research on English common law (and early American) practice with 
respect to the writ of scire facias.354 
b. Stipulated judgments 
On occasion, parties will stipulate to a judgment of non-
infringement after the district court reaches a claim construction.  
This allows the loser on the claim-construction issues to make the 
adverse judgment final and immediately appealable, and it saves the 
parties (and the district court) the time and expense of a trial that 
the parties would view as an academic exercise.  (To our knowledge, 
through the end of 2006, the Federal Circuit had never granted an 
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1) on a question of 
claim construction, even after the Markman decision established that 
patent claim construction is a question of law, ordinarily decided on a 
limited, intrinsic record.  Just before this Article went to press, the 
Federal Circuit did just that, but in a case having an “unusual” 
procedural posture—the same patent claims were before the Federal 
Circuit in a parallel appeal.355)  In Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich 
& Bradsby,356 the parties utilized the stipulated judgment option; the 
procedural question before the Federal Circuit was the appropriate 
appellate standard for reviewing the court’s judgment.357  The court 
rejected the analogy to a summary judgment ruling, where appellate 
review is de novo,358 and instead accepted the Seventh Circuit’s 
analogy to a bench trial—“review[ing] the district court’s legal 
conclusions de novo and any factual inferences for clear error.”359 
At the same time, however, Judge Rader’s opinion for the court 
again expressed a general displeasure with such appeals from 
stipulated judgments.360  Similar to his recent opinions,361 he wrote in 
Wilson Sporting Goods that: 
                                                          
 354. Id. at 1380-84, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395-98 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 355. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dako N. Am., Inc., 2007 WL 471167, at *1, 81 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1927 (Feb. 14, 2007). 
 356. 442 F.3d 1322, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 357. Id. at 1324, 1326-27, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383-84, 1385-86. 
 358. Id. at 1326, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385. 
 359. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385 (citing Hess v. Hartford Life & Accident 
Ins. Co., 274 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 360. See id. at 1327, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386 (explaining that the “sparse 
record lacks the complete context for accurate claim construction”). 
 361. See, e.g., Serio-US Indus., Inc. v. Plastic Recovery Techs. Corp., 459 F.3d 1311, 
1319, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a trial court may consult 
the accused device for context that informs the claim construction process”); Lava 
Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., 445 F.3d 1348, 1350-51, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1624, 1625-26 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Without the vital contextual knowledge of the 
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[t]his court reviews claim construction only as necessary to reach 
that final judgment on an infringement cause of action.  
Therefore, in reviewing claim construction in the context of 
infringement, the legal function of giving meaning to claim terms 
always takes place in the context of a specific accused infringing 
device or process.  While a trial court should certainly not prejudge 
the ultimate infringement analysis by construing claims with an aim 
to include or exclude an accused product or process, knowledge of 
that product or process provides meaningful context for the first 
step of the infringement analysis, claim construction.362 
Nonetheless, despite those complaints, the court reviewed the 
claim-construction issues presented there.363 
c. Evidentiary rulings 
Reversals by the Federal Circuit on evidentiary issues are rare 
indeed.  This is a consequence of the extremely limited, deferential 
standard of review that applies, as well as the requirement that any 
such error be seriously prejudicial in the context of the trial.364  The 
concomitant facts (1) that the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit 
law to such issues, and (2) that evidentiary rulings have limited 
importance to the court’s mandate to bring unity and coherence to 
the patent law, may also affect the relative lack of sweeping 
developments in this area.365 
The deferential standard of review was summarized (under Ninth 
Circuit law) in Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.:366  
“The Ninth Circuit reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion; 
to reverse, we must conclude both that the district court abused its 
discretion and that the error was prejudicial so that it more probably 
than not tainted the verdict.”367  As a consequence, each of the 
                                                                                                                                      
accused products or processes, this appeal takes on the attributes of something akin 
to an advisory opinion on the scope of the ‘982 patent.”); Bayer AG. v. Biovail Corp., 
279 F.3d 1340, 1349, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1675, 1682 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[I]t would 
be premature for this court to engage in its own claim construction without, for 
instance, evidence of the meaning of the terms to one of skill in the art at the time of 
invention.”). 
 362. Wilson Sporting Goods, 442 F.3d at 1326-27, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 363. Id. at 1327-28, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386-87. 
 364. See Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1365, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring both abuse of discretion 
and prejudicial error to reverse an evidentiary ruling). 
 365. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673 (noting that the Federal Circuit applies 
regional circuit law to evaluate evidentiary rulings). 
 366. Id. 1356, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666. 
 367. Id. at 1365, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673. 
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Federal Circuit’s 2006 decisions involving contested evidentiary 
admission or exclusion resulted in affirmances on these points.368 
d. Jury instructions 
The content of the law that a jury applies is provided through the 
instructions read to the jury before its deliberation.369  Rule 51 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs most questions regarding 
jury instructions; it provides that a party must object to jury 
instructions “before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for objection.”370  
Although it is ordinarily said that compliance with rule 51 is a matter 
of regional circuit law,371 the Federal Circuit has honored this rule 
more in the breach than in the observance.  Indeed, in some cases, it 
has required more than the distinct objection and grounds that rule 
51 requires on its face.372  For example, in Advanced Display Systems, 
Inc. v. Kent State University,373 it set forth four requirements for “[a] 
party seeking to alter a judgment based on erroneous jury 
instructions[:] . . . (1) it made a proper and timely objection to the 
jury instructions, (2) those instructions were legally erroneous, 
(3) the errors had prejudicial effect, and (4) it requested alternative 
instructions that would have remedied the error.”374  Yet in Primos, Inc. 
v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc.,375 the court cited Advanced Display Systems 
and said that “[a] party seeking to alter a judgment based on 
erroneous jury instructions must establish” only two things:  “that 
‘those instructions were legally erroneous,’ and that ‘the errors had 
prejudicial effect.’”376  Advanced Display Systems purported to apply 
Fifth Circuit law;377 Primos applied Eighth Circuit law.378 
                                                          
 368. Id. at 1365-66, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673-74; see, e.g., DSU Med. Corp. v. 
JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1309-10, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Cook Biotech, Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1379 n.8, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1875 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc., 451 
F.3d 841, 850-51, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1136-37 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 369. See FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)(3) (“The court . . . may instruct the jury at any time 
after trial begins and before the jury is discharged.”). 
 370. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281-82, 54 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 51). 
 371. See, e.g., id. at 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 372. See, e.g., id. at 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (explaining that there are 
four requirements that a party must satisfy to alter a judgment based on an 
erroneous jury instruction). 
 373. Id., 212 F.3d 1272, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673. 
 374. Id. at 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citations omitted). 
 375. 451 F.3d 841, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 376. Id. at 852, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138 (quoting Advanced Display Sys., 212 
F.3d at 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679). 
 377. Advanced Display Sys., 212 F.3d at 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 378. Primos, 451 F.3d at 847, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134. 
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In any event, it is crucial to make the timely objection required by 
rule 51; otherwise, the appellant will be relegated to arguing plain 
error under rule 51(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which is an extremely narrow standard of appellate review.379  This 
situation occurred in Serio-US Industries, Inc. v. Plastic Recovery 
Technology Corp.380—the appellant failed to object as required by Rule 
51, which limited the Federal Circuit’s plain error review (under 
Fourth Circuit law) to finding a “miscarriage of justice.”381 
e. Resolving inconsistent verdicts 
Regional circuit law applies to the review of inconsistent jury 
verdicts.382  The only Federal Circuit case in 2006 to deal with this 
issue, L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc.,383 addressed not only the 
reconciliation of inconsistent verdicts, but the question of waiver.  In 
this case, L & W sought to challenge the adverse verdict as 
inconsistent; however, it failed to raise the issue with the trial court 
before the jury was discharged: 
Trial counsel could have objected either before the court 
discharged the jury or immediately thereafter, when the court 
directed the jurors to return to the jury room and asked counsel, 
‘Anything anybody would like the record to reflect at this time?’  If 
counsel had raised the issue of verdict inconsistency at that point, it 
would have been a simple matter for the court to recall the jury 
and direct it to resume its deliberations until the inconsistency in 
the verdict was resolved.384 
The Federal Circuit was unpersuaded by L & W’s claim “that the 
return of the verdict, the poll of the jury, and the discharge of the 
jury all occurred within six minutes, and that counsel therefore ‘did 
not have adequate time to evaluate the verdicts for the first time.’”385  
And, it declined to apply a plain-error exception to the waiver rule 
despite L & W’s urging; it concluded that the Sixth Circuit would 
look unkindly upon such an analysis: 
No published Sixth Circuit opinion has recognized such an 
exception with respect to inconsistent verdicts, and we think that 
                                                          
 379. See Serio-US Indus., Inc., v. Plastic Recovery Tech. Corp., 459 F.3d 1311, 1317, 
80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (concluding that in the absence of 
an objection, an appeal is not permitted unless there is “plain error”). 
 380. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065. 
 381. Id. at 1317-18, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068-69. 
 382. L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1318, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1198, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 383. Id., 471 F.3d 1311, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1198. 
 384. Id. at 1319, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203-04. 
 385. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
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the pragmatic justification behind the waiver doctrine—preventing 
misuse of procedural rules to obtain a new trial when 
inconsistencies are most efficiently resolved by the original jury—
would lead the Sixth Circuit to reject such an exception if it were 
asked to create one.386 
4. Post-trial matters 
a. Post-trial motions under rules 50, 52, and 59 
The most significant development in the area of post-trial motions 
came in the Supreme Court decision Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. 
Swift-Eckrich, Inc.387  There, the Court held that courts of appeals lack 
“power” to review the sufficiency of the evidence—even to order a 
new trial under rule 59 rather than order judgment as a matter of law 
(“JMOL”) under rule 50—in the absence of a proper and timely 
motion in the district court.388 
As with most procedural matters (so long as not unique to patent 
law), regional circuit law applies to issues arising under rules 50, 52, 
and 59.389 
With respect to rule 50 practice, perhaps the most important issues 
include timing of the motions and the requirement that issues raised 
in a rule 50(b) motion be first timely and properly raised in a rule 
50(a) motion.390  That is certainly a principal lesson of the Supreme 
Court’s Unitherm decision, and it was also controlling in Syngenta Seeds, 
Inc. v. Delta Cotton Co-op., Inc.391  In Syngenta Seeds, applying Eighth 
Circuit law, the court noted that “a post-verdict motion for judgment 
as a matter of law may not raise issues not previously raised in a pre-
verdict motion.”392  Accordingly, because the pre-verdict motion only 
addressed the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, appellate review of 
                                                          
 386. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 387. 546 U.S. 394 (2006). 
 388. Id.  
 389. See, e.g., DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1302, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1238, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating the the court evaluates a motion for a 
new trial under an abuse of discretion standard); Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence 
Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1314, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1708-09 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (explaining that the Federal Circuit applies the district court’s standard for 
evaluating a JMOL motion); Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 
1354, 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004, 1007-08 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (describing that the 
court would apply Fifth Circuit law to determine whether granting a rule 52(b) 
motion was appropriate). 
 390. Unitherm Food Sys., 546 U.S. at 985-87. 
 391. 457 F.3d 1269, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1576 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 392. Id. at 1274, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (citing Walsh v. Nat’l Computer 
Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1158 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
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the denial of the post-verdict motion could not expand beyond that 
one issue.393 
In Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co.,394 the court addressed 
procedural issues relating to rule 52, which allows a court to alter or 
amend its findings on motion made within ten days of judgment.395  
Peterson, the defendant, argued that the district court had clearly 
erred by vacating all of its non-infringement findings since Golden 
Blount’s rule 52(b) motion only sought to amend some of the court’s 
findings.396  The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, concluding 
that the district court had acted within its discretion by vacating its 
prior findings and entering findings of infringement that had been 
proposed, subsequently, by Golden Blount.397 
Finally, DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co.398 is a good example of the 
various issues that might be raised on a motion for a new trial under 
rule 59.  There, DSU moved for a new trial on a variety of grounds:  
that the jury’s verdict was “against the clear weight of the evidence,”399 
that the trial court improperly admitted or excluded evidence,400 or 
that the damages were inadequate or excessive.401  DSU also illustrates 
the difficulty of obtaining appellate reversal of an order denying a 
motion for a new trial due to the deferential standard of appellate 
review:  All of DSU’s new trial arguments were rejected by the trial 
court and affirmed on appeal.402 
b. Post-judgment relief under rule 60(b) 
Although requests for relief under rule 60(b) are often coupled 
with requests for a new trial under rule 50(b), rule 60(b) relief is of a 
different type entirely.403  Rule 60(b) allows relief from a judgment, 
sometimes years after it is entered (even after it has been subject to 
appellate review), when newly discovered evidence, changed 
circumstances, fraud, or other exceptional circumstances justify this 
extraordinary relief.404  Regional circuit law ordinarily applies to rule 
                                                          
 393. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
 394. 438 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 395. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(b). 
 396. Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 397. Id. at 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008. 
 398. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 399. Id. at 1302-03, 1306-07, 1311, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244, 1247-48, 1250-51. 
 400. Id. at 1308-09, 1310-11, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248-49, 1250-51. 
 401. Id. at 1307, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248. 
 402. Id. at 1310-11, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250-51. 
 403. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (stating that a party can file a motion within ten 
days to renew a request for a judgment as a matter of law), with FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) 
(describing that parties can file a motion for relief of judgment based on certain 
circumstances such as mistake, new evidence, and fraud). 
 404. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). 
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60(b) motions, and district court rulings on those motions are 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.405 
In Louisville Bedding Co. v. Pillowtex Corp.,406 Louisville Bedding 
sought relief under rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which allows relief where there is “any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”407  Previously, 
Louisville Bedding and Pillowtex had been engaged in litigation 
involving a Louisville Bedding patent;408 the case ended, after claim 
construction, with a settlement agreement between the parties 
providing for a license, and a court order determining that 
Pillowtex’s accused bedding material did not infringe the asserted 
claims of the Louisville Bedding patent, as construed by the trial 
court.409  Pillowtex, however, dissolved, and Louisville wanted to assert 
its patent against another bedding manufacturer.410  In the 
subsequent case against this second manufacturer, Perfect Fit, the 
“[district] court determined that it would give the claim construction 
from the earlier Pillowtex action collateral estoppel effect.”411  The 
district court denied Louisville Bedding’s rule 60(b)(6) motion, and 
the Federal Circuit affirmed.412  Explaining that rule 60(b)(6) 
motions are to be granted only in the case of “exceptional or 
extraordinary circumstances,” the court concluded that this was not 
such a case, “[b]ecause businesses fail every day,”413 and “‘[p]ublic 
policy dictates that there be an end of litigation . . . .’”414  It is worth 
noting that the Federal Circuit might equally well have decided this 
case under the rubric of U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall 
Partnership,415 which held that vacatur of lower-court judgments when 
cases settle on appeal should only be granted in “exceptional 
circumstances”416 because of the interest in “the orderly operation of 
the federal judicial system,”417 but the court did not cite U.S. Bancorp. 
                                                          
 405. See, e.g., Louisville Bedding Co. v. Pillowtex Corp., 455 F.3d 1377, 1379-80, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 406. Id., 455 F.3d 1377, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698. 
 407. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). 
 408. Louisville Bedding, 455 F.3d at 1378, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699. 
 409. Id. at 1378, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699. 
 410. Id. at 1378-79, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699-1700. 
 411. Id. at 1379, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700. 
 412. Id. at 1379-80, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700-01. 
 413. Id. at 1380, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701. 
 414. Id. at 1380-81, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701 (quoting Baldwin v. Iowa State 
Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931)). 
 415. 513 U.S. 18 (1994). 
 416. Id. at 29. 
 417. Id. at 27. 
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In Venture Industries Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc.,418 the Federal Circuit 
addressed both timing and substance issues in connection with a rule 
60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence) and 60(b)(3) (fraud, 
misrepresentation, etc.) motion based on the use of fraudulent 
company financial statements by an expert witness, which was only 
discovered after trial and during appeal.419  The fraud was discovered 
after Venture’s SEC disclosures came to light, while the appeal was 
pending, so the Federal Circuit stayed the appeal to allow Autoliv to 
file its 60(b) motion with the district court.420  Ultimately, the district 
court denied Autoliv’s motion based on an expert’s testimony at an 
evidentiary hearing that the fraudulent financial statements had no 
effect on his calculation of damages.421  Although the district court 
did not expressly address the merits of Autoliv’s rule 60(b)(3) 
motion, it did hold that Autoliv had failed to establish prejudice 
under rule 60(b)(2).422  Ordinarily, one might think that the finding 
of lack of prejudice under rule 60(b)(2) would simply carry over to 
the rule 60(b)(3) analysis, but the Federal Circuit concluded that—
under governing Sixth Circuit law—the standards for showing 
prejudice are different under the two subsections of rule 60(b);423 
under subsection (3), where fraud, misrepresentations, or other 
misconduct are shown, the burden shifts to the non-movant to 
demonstrate that the misconduct had no effect on the judgment.424  
Accordingly, the court vacated the denial of Autoliv’s rule 60(b)(3) 
motion and remanded for consideration of this issue.425 
5. Local patent rules 
A signal development in the Federal Circuit in 2006 was its 
consideration of the interpretation and application of local patent 
rules, which have gained popularity in several district courts around 
the country, including two of the most active venues for patent 
cases—the Northern District of California and the Eastern District of 
Texas.  The two 2006 decisions implicating local patent rules came 
out of these two districts; both opinions were written by Judge Dyk. 
In Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Abacus Software,426 the 
Federal Circuit held that the district court for the Eastern District of 
                                                          
 418. 457 F.3d 1322, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1758 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 419. Id. at 1323, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759-60. 
 420. Id. at 1327, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762. 
 421. Id. at 1326-27, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762. 
 422. Id. at 1332, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766. 
 423. Id. at 1333-34, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766-67. 
 424. Id. at 1333, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766-67. 
 425. Id. at 1334, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767. 
 426. 462 F.3d 1344, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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Texas had erred by barring plaintiffs from asserting Microsoft 
Windows as an infringing product based on the application of that 
court’s local patent rules.427  The district judge had entered a Docket 
Control Order (“DCO”) setting a September 3, 2002 deadline for the 
parties’ preliminary infringement contentions;428 after claim 
construction (which was issued on July 3, 2003), the district court 
entered an amended DCO requiring those infringement contentions 
to be updated by November 21, 2003 (later extended to December 
22, 2003).429  Along with the amended DCO, the court notified the 
parties—for the first time—that “Judge Ward’s Rules” for patent cases 
would apply, and that under those rules, preliminary infringement 
contentions could be amended only upon a showing of “good 
cause.”430  MIT nonetheless attempted (timely, under the DCO) to 
update its infringement contentions to add Microsoft Windows as an 
infringing product, but the district court rejected that effort on the 
ground that no “good cause” had been shown.431 
The Federal Circuit, although acknowledging that “district courts 
are afforded broad discretion in interpreting their own orders,” 
nonetheless held that the court had failed to provide clear notice of 
the requirements of those rules.432  The court “conclude[d] that MIT 
was not provided with sufficient notice that its preliminary 
infringement contentions would be deemed final or that they could 
only be updated upon a showing of good cause.”433  Chief Judge 
Michel dissented because he did not find abuse of discretion in the 
district court’s application of its own rules.434 
By contrast, the court in 02 Micro International Ltd. v. Monolithic 
Power Systems, Inc.,435 affirmed the Northern District of California’s 
application of its “good cause” requirement with respect to a party’s 
attempted amendment of final infringement contentions based on 
newly discovered evidence; the Federal Circuit ruled that 02 Micro’s 
lack of diligence in seeking the amendment amply supported the 
district court’s refusal to allow it.436 
We can expect to see more such challenges in the coming years, as 
more federal districts adopt local patent rules. 
                                                          
 427. Id. at 1347, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226-27. 
 428. Id. at 1349, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 429. Id. at 1358, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 430. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 431. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 432. Id. at 1358-59, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234-35 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b)). 
 433. Id. at 1359, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235. 
 434. Id. at 1364-67, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238-41 (Michel, C.J., dissenting). 
 435. 467 F.3d 1355, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 436. Id. at 1367-68, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777-78. 
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B. Federal Circuit Practice 
1. Appellate jurisdiction 
As noted earlier,437 the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over all cases where the well-pleaded complaint in the 
district court shows that the case “arises under” the patent laws, or 
where an issue of federal patent law is a necessary element of one of 
the well-pleaded claims.  Moreover, Christianson v. Colt Industries 
Operating Corp.438 provides that where another appellate court makes a 
“plausible” decision to transfer a case to the Federal Circuit, that 
decision should be respected by the Federal Circuit lest the courts 
engage in a “jurisdictional ping-pong” match that has to be settled by 
the Supreme Court, as with the Colt decision.439  In Parental Guide of 
Texas v. Thomson, Inc.,440 the court applied both of these principles, 
respecting the Fifth Circuit’s decision to transfer a case involving a 
breach-of-contract claim that required the court to interpret section 
284 of the Patent Code, which was an essential part of the contract 
claim.441 
Contrast that holding with that of Thompson v. Microsoft Corp.442  
There, the Federal Circuit concluded that it had no jurisdiction over 
a complaint sounding in unjust enrichment under Michigan law 
because even though Thompson’s unjust enrichment claim involved 
a claim that Microsoft had filed a patent application for something 
Thompson had invented, neither that, nor Microsoft’s federal 
preemption defense, made the case one where federal patent law was 
an essential element of the claim.443  The court thus transferred the 
case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.444 
As noted above in connection with rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure,445 the final-judgment rule imposes an important 
limitation on the power of the Federal Circuit to hear appeals.  
Interlocutory appeals are rare in the Federal Circuit, but they do arise 
occasionally.  In Gemmy Industries Corp. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd.,446 the 
                                                          
 437. See supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text (explaining that the patent 
issue must be part of the well-pleaded complaint for the court to have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case). 
 438. 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
 439. Id. at 818-19. 
 440. 446 F.3d 1265, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 441. Id. at 1268, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631-32. 
 442. 471 F.3d 1288, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 443. Id. at 1291-92, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157-58. 
 444. Id. at 1292, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
 445. See supra notes 337-338 and accompanying text (explaining that a court can 
enter a partial final judgment to expedite appellate review). 
 446. 452 F.3d 1353, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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court noted that it had allowed an appeal from an otherwise-
interlocutory grant of a summary-judgment motion on invalidity to be 
appended to an appeal as of right from a preliminary-injunction 
ruling, “on the basis that the preliminary injunction depends on the 
ruling of invalidity.”447  This is an unusual procedure, under the 
doctrine of “pendent appellate jurisdiction,” whose validity in 
interlocutory appeals is still a matter of some question.448 
2. Appealability and cross-appeals 
In Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health and Fitness, Inc.,449 on a motion 
to dismiss Icon’s cross-appeal, the court (writing per curiam) 
reiterated the ordinary rule of appealability and cross-appeals:  “A 
party has no right of cross-appeal from a decision in its favor.  
Similarly, a party who prevails on noninfringement has no right to 
file a ‘conditional’ cross-appeal to introduce new arguments or 
challenge a claim construction, but may simply assert alternative 
grounds in the record for affirming the judgment.”450  The court thus 
dismissed Icon’s cross-appeal, which was styled as a conditional cross-
appeal on certain claim-construction issues “in the event that 
Nautilus prevails on appeal.”451 
3. Waiver and preservation of error 
The rule for preserving error on appeal is this:  “Absent 
exceptional circumstances, a party cannot raise on appeal legal issues 
not raised and considered in the trial forum.”452  We have already 
seen applications of this general rule in connection with JMOL and 
                                                          
 447. Id. at 1354, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173. 
 448. Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 44 n.2 (1995).  The Seventh 
Circuit has referred to Swint as reflecting “profound skepticism concerning judge-
created doctrines of appellate jurisdiction” and as leaving the doctrine “hang[ing] by 
a thread.”  In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98 F.3d 956, 964 (7th Cir. 1996).  Yet the doctrine still 
survives, even twelve years later.  See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 686, 707 n.41 (1997) 
(describing that the two legal issues were “inextricably intertwined” (quoting Swint, 
514 U.S. at 51)); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 318 (1995) (explaining that it would 
assume that exercising “pendent appellate jurisdiction” can sometimes be 
appropriate). 
 449. 437 F.3d 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2012 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
 450. Id. at 1377, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
363 F.3d 1207, 1216, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376 
F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 451. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
 452. Sw. Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1289 n.7, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1161, 1167 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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new-trial motions, as well as jury instructions and inconsistent 
verdicts.453 
With respect to waiver on appeal, two cases decided by the Federal 
Circuit applied the cardinal rule that issues and arguments must be 
made in the opening appellate brief or they will be considered 
waived.454  As the court concluded in Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex 
Corp.,455 “[o]ur law is well established that arguments not raised in the 
opening brief are waived.”456  The same rule of waiver was applied by 
the Federal Circuit in Optivus Technology, Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications, 
S.A.457  There are corollaries to this rule, too:  “[M]ere statements of 
disagreement with the district court . . . do not amount to a 
developed argument”; those, too, are waived.458  So, too, “arguments 
raised in footnotes are not preserved.”459  While the court always 
retains “discretion” to consider issues not properly raised,460 parties 
cannot rely on courts to exercise this discretion.461 
4. Cardinal Chemical issues 
As noted above,462 the Supreme Court in Cardinal Chemical463 
concluded that a holding of noninfringement on appeal did not 
“moot” a declaratory judgment counterclaim of invalidity.464  This 
continues to be a source of some controversy in the Federal Circuit.  
In Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp.,465 the panel split on 
                                                          
 453. See supra notes 368-373, 381-385, 389-393, and 399-402, and accompanying 
text (identifying the recent case developments regarding JMOL, motions for a new 
trial, jury instructions, and inconsistent verdicts). 
 454. See Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications, S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex 
Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 455. 439 F.3d 1312, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 456. Id. at 1319, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (citing Cross Med. Prods. v. 
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1320-21 n.3, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1662, 1683 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 457. 469 F.3d 978, 989, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839, 1847-48 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 458. Smithkline, 439 F.3d at 1320, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. 
 459. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103 (citing Cross Med. Prods., 424 F.3d at 1320-21 
n.3, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 n.3; Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 
F.3d 1368, 1375 n.4, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1684 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Graphic 
Controls Corp. v. Utah Med. Prods., 149 F.3d 1382, 1385, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 
1624 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 460. Id. at 1320 n.9, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103 n.9 (citing Becton Dickinson & 
Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 
1990)). 
 461. See id. at 1320 n.9, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103 n.9 (“But here, as in Becton, 
we see no reason to exercise that discretion.”). 
 462. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s resolution of 
whether a non-infringement judgment moots the declaratory judgment issue). 
 463. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
 464. Id. at 98. 
 465. 448 F.3d 1309, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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the question of Cardinal’s applicability.  The majority affirmed the 
district court’s noninfringement finding, but then addressed the 
issues of invalidity and unenforceability raised by the defendant’s 
counterclaims (and cross-appeal).466  Judge Mayer dissented from this 
procedure, contending that there was no longer a live case or 
controversy for the declaratory judgment counterclaims once the 
infringement risk had been removed by the panel’s affirmance of the 
noninfringement finding467 because there was “no longer . . . any 
reasonable apprehension of suit.”468  (Query, however, whether Judge 
Mayer’s analysis can survive the Supreme Court’s recent MedImmune 
v. Genentech opinion, or at least the dicta regarding the “reasonable 
apprehension of suit” requirement.469) 
5. Reassignment on remand 
Ordinarily, the reassignment of a case to another judge on remand 
is an extraordinary request, and granted by an appellate court only in 
“rare and compelling circumstances.”470  But in the Seventh Circuit 
and the Northern District of Illinois, local rules exist that require, in 
most cases, that actions remanded to the district court for a new trial 
be reassigned to a new judge.471  The Federal Circuit has no such rule.  
Thus, in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,472 the Federal Circuit 
granted permission for an interlocutory appeal on this issue, and 
ultimately held that because the question of reassignment was not a 
question unique to the Federal Circuit, the Seventh Circuit’s 
reassignment rule would apply to Federal Circuit remands to district 
courts within the Seventh Circuit.473  This decision will have 
repercussions in any case remanded for a new trial from the district 
courts in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, which, as a circuit, 
                                                          
 466. Id. at 1318-22, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711-15. 
 467. Id. at 1323, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715-16 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 468. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 469. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 774 n.11 (2007). 
 470. Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 424 F.3d 1235, 1244, 76 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1506, 1512-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2021 (2006) 
(mem.); see, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d 1367, 1373-74, 72 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying reassignment since there 
was no showing of personal bias or unusual circumstances); Micro Chem., Inc. v. 
Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1122, 1126, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1695, 1697, 1700 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (denying reassignment since the party did not provide evidence of 
bias or favoritism).  Two of the authors were counsel to Micro Chemical, Inc. in the 
last-cited case in this footnote. 
 471. 7TH CIR. R. 36; N.D. ILL. R. 40.5. 
 472. 163 F. App’x. 899, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 473. Eolas Tech. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 457 F.3d 1279, 1282-84, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1597, 1598-1600 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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produced the second-most published decisions from the Federal 
Circuit in 2006.474 
C. Patent and Trademark Office Practice 
Finally, the Federal Circuit had three occasions to consider matters 
of practice and procedure before the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (“PTO”).  In Brown v. Barbacid,475 the Federal Circuit held that, 
in an interference, prior conception must be proven with 
corroborated evidence,476 and that waiver for failure to raise 
arguments below will apply in PTO practice, as it does in court 
practice.  Barbacid argued that Brown was required to show diligence 
measured from the date of Barbacid’s date of conception, not 
Barbacid’s date of reduction to practice, but the Federal Circuit held 
that Brown’s prior silence on this issue, including in a prior Federal 
Circuit appeal in the same case, “waived the issue of the length of the 
period during which diligence should be shown.”477 
In Lacavera v. Dudas,478 the Federal Circuit held that the PTO’s 
decision to grant an alien attorney only limited recognition, and not 
full registration, was not an abuse of its discretion under the PTO’s 
governing statutes and regulations.479  The court rejected the 
applicant’s arguments that the PTO’s reliance on the applicant’s visa 
restrictions was:  (1) an unreasonable interpretation of the PTO’s 
own regulations, (2) beyond the PTO’s statutorily granted powers, 
and (3) a denial of equal protection based on alienage.480 
In Sheinbein v. Dudas,481 the court upheld the PTO’s decision to 
exclude Sheinbein from PTO practice based on his disbarment in 
other jurisdictions (for illegally assisting his son to flee the country 
after learning that the son was being investigated in connection with 
a murder).482  The court also held that the five-year statute of 
limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2462 did not begin to run until his 
disbarment by the State Bar of Maryland (the condition precedent to 
                                                          
 474. See infra tbl. 4B. 
 475. 436 F.3d 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1848 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 476. Id. at 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851 (citing In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 
1328, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 477. Id. at 1379-80, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851 (citing Barrow v. Falck, 11 F.3d 
729, 730 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 478. 441 F.3d 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1955 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 75 
U.S.L.W. 3106 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007). 
 479. Id. at 1383, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957. 
 480. Id. at 1383-84, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957-58. 
 481. 465 F.3d 493, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1537 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 482. Id. at 495-96, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1538-40. 
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his exclusion from PTO practice under the appropriate regulations); 
it did not run from the acts that led to his Maryland disbarment.483 
III.  PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY 
Perhaps the most significant development in 2006 in the area of 
patentability and validity was the dialogue that the Federal Circuit 
and the Supreme Court had over the proper standard for 
determining obviousness.  As this article goes to press, the Supreme 
Court has yet to issue its decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc.,484 involving the appropriate standard to use in determining an 
obviousness challenge.  Even before the Supreme Court has decided 
KSR, however, the decision to grant certiorari in that case has 
prompted the Federal Circuit to defend its “motivation-teaching-
suggestion” test in several of its 2006 decisions, and, at the same time, 
to engage in a remarkable conversation with the Supreme Court and 
the members of the bar on this issue. 
While the Federal Circuit’s obviousness cases have demonstrated 
(even before a Supreme Court decision in KSR) that the court is 
making obviousness into a more muscular defense to a patent’s 
validity, the court’s cases are also suggesting a similarly more 
muscular anticipation defense, and they further show that the court is 
closely scrutinizing attempts to invalidate a patent on the ground of 
inequitable conduct.  Additionally, the Federal Circuit in 2006 
invalidated, for the first time, a dependent claim for failure to meet 
the drafting requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 4.  And the 
court gave further guidance on the doctrine of recapture.  These and 
other issues of patentability and invalidity arising out of the court’s 
2006 cases are surveyed below. 
A. Validity in the Preliminary-Injunction Context 
For a moving party to obtain a preliminary injunction, it must 
establish:  “(1) a reasonable likelihood of its success on the merits; 
(2) irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted; (3) a balance of 
hardships tipping in its favor; and (4) the injunction’s . . . impact on 
the public interest.”485  In Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc.,486 the Federal 
Circuit considered the patent challenger’s request to overturn, on 
                                                          
 483. Id. at 496, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1539-40. 
 484. 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (mem.). 
 485. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1097, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 2006); accord Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 
1331, 1334, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 486. 470 F.3d 1368, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097. 
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invalidity grounds, the district court’s grant of a preliminary 
injunction.487  The court explained that an order granting a 
preliminary injunction will be overturned on appeal only if “the court 
made a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or 
exercised its discretion based upon an error of law or clearly 
erroneous factual findings.”488  The Federal Circuit affirmed the grant 
of the preliminary injunction and held that the challenger had not 
sufficiently demonstrated a clearly erroneous finding and an abuse of 
discretion.489 
When seeking a preliminary injunction, a patent holder bears the 
burden of proving a likelihood of success in establishing the patent’s 
validity.490  The presumption of validity created by 35 U.S.C. § 282 
assists, but does not relieve the patentee of this burden.491  
                                                          
 487. Id. at 1373-74, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1100; cf. Abbott, 452 F.3d at 1332, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322 (granting motion to review the validity of a preliminary 
injuction). 
 488. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100 (quoting 
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1364, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also Abbott, 452 F.3d at 1335, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1324 (“An abuse of discretion in granting or denying a preliminary injunction may 
be found ‘by showing that the court made a clear error of judgment in weighing 
relevant factors or exercised its discretion based upon an error of law or clearly 
erroneous factual findings.’”) (quoting Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 
970, 973, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1185, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also Curtiss-Wright 
Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1988, 
1992 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The court’s determination can be overturned only on a 
showing that it abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or seriously 
misjudged the evidence.”) (quoting We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int’l Corp., 930 F.2d 
1567, 1570, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1562, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 489. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1385, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108; cf. PHG 
Tech., LLC v. St. John Co., Inc., 469 F.3d 1361, 1369, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1088, 
1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (vacating preliminary injunction where patentee failed to 
establish likelihood of success on merits weighs in its favor); Gemmy Indus. Corp. v. 
Chrisha Creations Ltd., 452 F.3d 1353, 1354-55, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172, 1173 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (vacating summary judgment of invalidity, thus vacating preliminary 
injunction as to patent marking); Abbott, 452 F.3d at 1332, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1322 (vacating preliminary injunction where alleged infringer raised substantial 
issues as to the validity of asserted claims); Curtiss-Wright, 438 F.3d at 1381-82, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994 (vacating preliminary injunction where district court 
erred in its claim construction, thus subsequent infringement analysis was flawed). 
 490. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1375, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101; see also 
Abbott, 452 F.3d at 1335, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324 (“When moving for the 
extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction, a patentee need not establish the 
validity of a patent beyond question.  The patentee must, however, present a clear 
case supporting the validity of the patent in suit.”) (citing Amazon.com, Inc. v. 
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747, 1758 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 491.  See Sanofi-Sythelabo, 470 F.3d at 1375, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101; see also 
PHG Tech., 469 F.3d at 1365, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Our 
case law and logic both require that a movant cannot be granted a preliminary 
injunction unless it establishes both of the first two factors, i.e., likelihood of success 
on the merits and irreparable harm.”) (citing Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1350, 57 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751). 
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Accordingly, to show a likelihood of success, the patentee must 
demonstrate that:  (1) the alleged infringer’s product likely infringes; 
and (2) the patentee will likely withstand the alleged infringer’s 
challenges to validity and enforceability.492  In Sanofi-Synthelabo, the 
alleged infringer stipulated to infringement, thus only the second 
inquiry was at issue.493  The Federal Circuit explained that the 
likelihood-of-success factor is properly satisfied if the alleged 
infringer fails to raise a substantial question concerning validity.494  
The party resisting a preliminary injunction need not make out a case 
of actual invalidity, but instead must raise a substantial question as to 
invalidity.495  The court examined each validity challenge proffered by 
the alleged infringer and reviewed the district court’s ruling on each 
defense.496  The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court did 
not err in determining that the alleged infringer failed to raise a 
substantial question of invalidity.497 
Having ruled that the first factor for a preliminary injunction was 
satisfied, the Federal Circuit turned to the remaining three factors 
and concluded that the district court did not clearly err in ruling for 
the patentee nor abuse its discretion in granting preliminary 
injunctive relief.498  Further, the Federal Circuit noted that it 
considered the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction in 
the context of the standard applicable to a motion for a preliminary 
injunction, and that the district court is not bound to its prior 
conclusions at later stages of the litigation.499 
B. Standard of Review for Validity in JMOL Context 
In SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Engineering Inc.,500 the Federal Circuit 
reviewed a district court’s ruling (made on cross-motions for 
summary judgment) that prior art did not invalidate a claim of the 
patent in suit.501  In its decision, the Federal Circuit repeated the well-
known standard under 35 U.S.C. § 282 that patents enjoy a 
                                                          
 492. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 493. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 494. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 495. See Abbott, 452 F.3d at 1335, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324  (“[‘]Vulnerability 
is the issue at the preliminary injunction stage, while validity is the issue at trial.  The 
showing of a substantial question as to invalidity thus requires less proof than the 
clear and convincing showing necessary to establish invalidity itself.[’]”) (citing 
Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758). 
 496. Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1374-75, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100-01. 
 497. Id. at 1379, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. 
 498. Id. at 1385, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108. 
 499. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108. 
 500. 465 F.3d 1351, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 501. Id. at 1355-56, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366. 
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presumption of validity that can be overcome only by clear and 
convincing evidence of invalidity.502  To invalidate a patent on 
summary judgment, therefore, the moving party must submit clear 
and convincing evidence of invalidity to the extent that no reasonable 
jury could find otherwise.503  Moreover, in the context of a summary-
judgment motion, the panel noted that the evidence must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.504 
C. Anticipation 
The Federal Circuit’s year 2006 cases addressing anticipation to any 
significant degree began by stating that anticipation is a question of 
fact.505  Therefore, the Federal Circuit will affirm a jury verdict if it is 
supported by substantial evidence.506  The Federal Circuit reviews a 
                                                          
 502. Id. at 1357, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (citing U.S. Surgical Corp. v. 
Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 
see also Aero Prods. Int’l Corp. v. Intex Recreation Corp., 466 F.3d 1000, 1015, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1490-91 (Fed. Circ. 2007); Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. 
Prods. Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1367, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860, 1862-63 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1378, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 
1290, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 
459 F.3d 1328, 1336-37, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Gemmy 
Indus. Corp. v. Chrisa Creations Ltd., 452 F.3d 1353, 1358, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1172, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S. Inc., 441 F.3d 963, 968,  78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 434 
F.3d 1375, 1377, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702, 1704 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 503. SRAM, 465 F.3d  at 1357, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367; see also L & W Inc. v. 
Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1320, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1198, 1204 (Fed Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893, 221 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 669, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 504. SRAM, 465 F.3d at 1357, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (citing Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). 
 505. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1375, 
81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (positing that anticipation is a 
question of fact); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc. 468 F.3d 1366, 1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (remarking that anticipation is a factual matter); SRAM, 465 F.3d at 1357, 
80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (stating that anticipation is a question of fact); Kim v. 
ConAgra Foods Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1325, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495, 1503 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (“‘What a prior art reference discloses in an anticipation analysis is a 
factual determination.’”) (quoting Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. 
Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1355, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811, 1816 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1300, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1705, 1713 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (commenting that anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102 is a question of fact); Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 995, 
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that anticipation is a question of 
fact)). 
 506. L & W, 471 F.3d at 1320, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (“In reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we may inquire only whether 
the findings necessary to the jury’s verdict are supported by the evidence . . . “); Kim, 
465 F.3d at 1326, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503 (holding that jury verdict that claims 
are not invalid was supported by substantial evidence). 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
2007] 2006 PATENT SUMMARY 857 
district court finding of anticipation for clear error.507  In the context 
of summary judgment, however, the Federal Circuit reviews de novo a 
district court’s ruling on an anticipation issue.508  And, in the context 
of a district court ruling on a preliminary injunction, the Federal 
Circuit reviews a finding of anticipation under an abuse of discretion 
standard.509 
There are two steps to an anticipation analysis:  (1) claim 
construction, and (2) a comparison of the construed claim to the 
prior art.510  “[I]nvalidity by anticipation requires that the four 
corners of a single, prior art document describe every element of the 
claimed invention.”511  The elements can be described explicitly or 
inherently.512  “[A]nticipation by inherent disclosure is appropriate 
only when the reference discloses prior art that must necessarily 
include the unstated limitation.”513  Additionally, a “reference may 
anticipate even when the relevant properties of the thing disclosed 
were not appreciated at the time.”514 
Furthermore, “[i]n order to anticipate, a prior art reference must 
not only disclose all of the limitations of the claimed invention, but 
also be enabled.”515  And to be enabling, a prior art reference must 
disclose the claimed subject matter so that one skilled in the art may 
                                                          
 507. Amgen, 457 F.3d at 1304, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (“Anticipation under 
35 U.S.C. § 102 is a question of fact, which we review for clear error after a bench 
trial.”); Atofina, 441 F.3d at 995, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (“[W]e review 
[anticipation] for clear error.”). 
 508. Go Med. Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264, 1270, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1629, 1633 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that summary judgment of invalidity is 
reviewed without deference); SRAM, 465 F.3d at 1356, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 
(“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment without deference.”). 
 509. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1097, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 510. SRAM, 465 F.3d at 1352-53, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (vacating partial 
summary judgment because district court erred in claim construction, and 
remanding to district court for decision under new claim construction); Amgen, 457 
F.3d at 1304, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (vacating and remanding for new ruling 
on anticipation based on a new claim construction); In re Johnston, 435 F.3d 1381, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1788 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (upholding the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interference’s construction of claims 
and ruling of anticipation based on construction). 
 511. Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1916, 
1927 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 
F.3d 1272, 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 512. Atofina, 441 F.3d at 999, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423  (“Anticipation 
requires a showing that each limitation of a claim is found in a single reference, 
either expressly or inherently.”). 
 513. Id. at 1000, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424. 
 514. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1367, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860, 1863 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 515. Amgen, 457 F.3d at 1306, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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make or use it.516  Importantly, however, “[t]he enablement 
requirement for prior art to anticipate under section 102 does not 
require utility, unlike the enablement requirement for patents under 
section 112. . . . [P]roof of efficacy is not required . . . .”517 
Many of the Federal Circuit’s anticipation decisions engage in a 
detailed analysis in construing the claims and applying those claim 
constructions to the specific prior art at issue.518  A recitation of each 
case and its facts thus provides limited insight into the overall state of 
Federal Circuit law.  Nevertheless, some of the decisions warrant an 
examination of relevant legal principles as articulated in their specific 
factual contexts. 
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,519 the Federal Circuit was 
faced with a product-by-process claim directed to paroxetine, an anti-
depressant, made by an allegedly novel, dry admixing process.520  The 
court ruled that it need not reach the issue of whether the claims 
should be construed “broadly to cover the product made by any 
process or narrowly to cover only the product made by a dry 
admixing process,” because “[e]ither way, anticipation by an earlier 
product disclosure . . . cannot be avoided.  While the process set forth 
in the product-by-process claim may be new, that novelty can only be 
captured by obtaining a process claim.”521 
The Federal Circuit faced the question of new uses of known 
processes in Abbott Laboratories v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 
which dealt with method claims directed to adding water to the 
inhalation anesthetic sevoflurane to prevent degradation by certain 
acids.522  The prior art taught adding water to sevoflurane, but did not 
appreciate that adding the water would prevent such degradation.523  
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit held that the claim was anticipated.  
While noting that new uses of known processes may be patentable, 
                                                          
 516. Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc. 468 F.3d 1366, 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1001, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 517. Id. at 1381-82, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 518. See supra note 510 and accompanying text; see also Planet Bingo, LLC. v. 
Gametech Int’l, Inc., 472 F.3d 1338, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(construing claims as part of infringement analysis and then applying same 
construction in finding claims invalid). 
 519. 439 F.3d 1312, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 520. Id. at 1314, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.  A product-by-process claim is “‘one 
in which the product is defined at least in part in terms of the method or process by 
which it is made.’”  Id. at 1315, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099 (quoting Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 158-59 n.*, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847, 
1859 n.a1 (1989)).  “[I]t is clear that such claims are always to a product, not a 
process.”  Id. at 1317, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 521. Id. at 1318-19, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 522. 471 F.3d 1363, 1365, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860, 1864 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 523. Id. at 1366, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
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both the prior art and present purpose was the delivery of a safe, 
effective sevoflurane anesthetic.  The prior art taught removing the 
added water from the solution during the manufacturing process to 
remove impurities.  The patent at issue accomplished that goal 
mainly by adding water, but the use was the same.524 
In a number of cases the Federal Circuit was asked to determine 
whether a genus disclosed in a prior-art reference anticipated a 
claimed species falling within that genus.525  “It is well established that 
the disclosure of a genus in the prior art is not necessarily a 
disclosure of every species that is a member of that genus. . . . 
[However,] a very small genus can be a disclosure of each species 
within the genus.”526  The problem is often viewed as one of 
enablement:  A person having ordinary skill in the art should be able 
to “‘at once envisage each member of th[e] . . . class’ for the individual 
compounds, i.e., species, to be enabled. . . . If the members cannot be 
envisioned, the reference does not disclose the species and the 
reference is not enabling.”527  The court also looks for a “pattern of 
preferences” that can limit a “generic” class to a “narrow class” 
including the claimed element.528 
The Federal Circuit applied these principles in Atofina v. Great 
Lakes Chemical Corp.529  The patent claim disclosed a preferred 
temperature range of 330 to 450 degrees Celsius for synthesizing the 
chemical difluoromethane, and the prior art reference disclosed a 
range of 100 to 500 degrees Celsius.530  The court found no 
anticipation, because “[a] temperature range of over 100 degrees is 
not a small genus, and the range of temperatures of [the prior art 
reference] does not disclose Atofina’s temperature range.”531  The 
                                                          
 524. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 525. See Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1097, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 468 
F.3d 1366, 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Atofina v. Great 
Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
 526. Atofina, 441 F.3d at 999, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 527. Impax, 468 F.3d at 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681, 133 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275, 280 (C.C.P.A. 
1962)). 
 528. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
 529. 441 F.3d 991, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417. 
 530. Id. at 999, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423. 
 531. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.  “Given the considerable difference 
between the claimed range and the range in the prior art, no reasonable fact finder 
could conclude that the prior art described the claimed range with sufficient 
specificity to anticipate this limitation of the claim.”  Id. 
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court further noted that the prior art “disclosure is only that of a 
range, not a specific temperature in that range . . . .”532 
In Impax Laboratories, Inc. v. Aventis Pharmaceuticals Inc.,533 the 
Federal Circuit dealt with an enablement question in a genus-species 
context with two prior art references.534  The issue was whether the 
references, a patent and an application to which the prior art patent 
claimed priority, disclosed riluzole, a compound used to treat 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”).  The patent reference disclosed 
a large genus of compounds and specifically mentioned riluzole.  The 
district court concluded that the patent was not enabling, however, 
because it did not disclose that riluzole was “effective” in treating 
ALS.535  The Federal Circuit explained that efficacy is not required, 
and remanded to the court to make the proper determination on 
enablement.536  The application did not specifically mention riluzole, 
and the Federal Circuit held that it was not enabling, because of “the 
large number of compounds included” in the disclosed formula and 
lack of a “specific identification.”537 
In Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc.,538 the challenged patent covered 
clopidogrel bisulfate, which inhibits platelets from aggregating and is 
used to reduce thrombotic events such as heart attacks or strokes.539  
The Federal Circuit concluded that the prior art lacked a “pattern of 
preferences” serving to narrow the prior art class of compounds to 
one that included the claimed compound.540  Thus, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction, 
because the patentee was likely to succeed against the accused 
infringer’s anticipation challenge.541 
                                                          
 532. Id. at 1000, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.  The court distinguished Atofina 
from Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 773, 
779 (Fed. Cir. 1985), which stands for the proposition that an earlier species 
reference anticipates a later genus claim, not that an earlier genus anticipates a 
narrow species.  Atofina, 441 F.3d at 999, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423. 
 533. 468 F.3d 1366, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 534. Id. at 1381-83, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012-13. 
 535. Id. at 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 536. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 537. Id. at 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013. 
 538. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 539. Id. at 1372, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 540. Id. at 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. “The principal, obvious distinction 
is that the generic formula [of the prior art] does not include a salt.  On this basis 
alone, we find that clopidogrel bisulfate is not a species of any genus comprised by 
[the prior art].”  Id. at 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102-03. 
 541. Id. at 1384, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107. 
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D. On-Sale Bar and Public Use Bar 
A claimed invention will trigger the on-sale bar to patentability of 
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) if it is sold or offered for sale more than one year 
before the filing date of the patent application.542  The statute guards 
against undue delay in commencing the patenting process, while 
providing a year wherein an inventor may assess the commercial 
potential of the invention without losing the opportunity of patenting 
it in the United States.543  The determination of whether an invention 
was on sale within the meaning of Section 102(b) is a question of law 
to be reviewed without deference.544  Because patents bear a 
presumption of validity, invalidity based on the on-sale bar must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence.545 
In Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, LLC,546 the Federal Circuit 
vacated a summary judgment invalidating a patent for a computer 
program based on the on-sale bar.547  The court reiterated the 
Supreme Court’s two-part test in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.548 for 
determining whether there was a sale or offer for sale for purposes of 
35 U.S.C. § 102(b):  “First, the product must be the subject of a 
commercial [sale or] offer for sale. . . . Second, the invention must be 
ready for patenting.”549  In Plumtree, the court noted that the patent 
challenger could meet Pfaff’s first prong by either:  (1) showing there 
was a commercial offer to perform the patented method before the 1-
year on-sale bar cut-off date; or (2) showing that the patentee, in fact, 
performed each of the steps of the patented process before the 
critical date pursuant to a contract.550  The Federal Circuit held that 
the record did not establish that this Pfaff prong was satisfied, and the 
court therefore vacated the district court’s order of summary 
judgment of invalidity due to the on-sale bar. 
Gemmy Industries Corp. v. Chrisha Creations Ltd.,551 also vacated a 
summary judgment based on the on-sale bar.  In Gemmy, the district 
court bound the plaintiff to statements in its sworn affidavit despite 
contradictory evidence.  In reversing, the Federal Circuit explained 
                                                          
 542. Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, LLC, 473 F.3d 1152, 1163, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1251, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 543. Gemmy Indus. Corp. v. Chrisha Creations Ltd., 452 F.3d 1353, 1358, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 544. Plumtree, 473 F.3d at 1160, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256. 
 545. Gemmy, 452 F.3d at 1358, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176. 
 546. 473 F.3d 1152, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251. 
 547. Id. at 1164, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 548. 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
 549. Id. at 67. 
 550. 473 F.3d at 1162, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258. 
 551. 452 F.3d 1353, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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that a party can overcome the averments in its own sworn affidavit 
regarding the dates its invention was “ready for patenting” or when it 
made the first “commercial offer of sale” if there is credible evidence 
supporting the contradiction.552  Without undisputed evidence that a 
patented invention is “fully disclosed” in that the product displayed 
for sale is the product that is claimed in the patent, summary 
judgment is not appropriate on the ground of the on-sale bar of 
§ 102(b).553 
Also included within § 102(b), and almost identical in application 
to the “on-sale bar,” is the so-called “public use bar.”  Under § 102, a 
patent will not be awarded if “the invention was . . . in public use . . . 
in this country, more than one year prior to the application for 
patent in the United States.”554  Public use includes “any public use of 
the claimed invention by a person other than the inventor who is 
under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the 
inventor.”555  In assessing whether a particular use is “public” within 
the meaning of § 102(b), the Federal Circuit considers the policies 
underlying the public-use bar.556 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,557 the court 
considered whether a drug, olanzapine, used in clinical trials for over 
one year was subject to the public-use bar to patentability.  The court 
held that the experimental character of the trials negated any 
statutory bar, stating that “even a use that occurs in the open may not 
invoke a bar when undertaken to experiment on or with the claimed 
invention.”558  The Federal Circuit then quoted the U.S. Supreme 
Court from City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co.:559  “The 
use of an invention by the inventor himself, or of any other person 
under his direction, by way of experiment, and in order to bring the 
invention to perfection, has never been regarded as [a public] use.”560 
In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit listed six indicia that may be 
considered to determine the experimental character of a use for 
negating the public use bar:  (1) the length of the test period, (2) any 
confidentiality agreement, (3) any records of testing, (4) any 
                                                          
 552. Id. at 1359, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176-77. 
 553. Id. at 1360, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177, citing Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 68. 
 554. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002).  
 555. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1380, 81 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 
1134, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 556. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
 557. Id. at 1369, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324. 
 558. Id. at 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
 559. 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877). 
 560. Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
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monitoring and control of the test results, (5) the number of tests, 
and (6) the length of the test period in relation to tests of similar 
inventions.561 
E. Obviousness 
The appropriate legal standard for obviousness determinations led 
to an unusual dialogue in 2006 between the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court.  The Patent Act defines obviousness in section 
103(a): 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this 
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made 
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner 
in which the invention was made.562 
The Federal Circuit has uniformly defined obviousness as a 
question of law based on underlying factual issues.563  The court 
reviews obviousness de novo, because the ultimate conclusion of 
obviousness is a legal conclusion, but it reviews a district court’s 
determination of the underlying factual issues for clear error.564  For 
                                                          
 561. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
 562. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 563. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1289, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Obviousness is a question of law . . . based upon 
underlying factual questions . . . .”); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 
1306, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1931, 1936 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Obviousness is a legal 
question where, as here, the relevant underlying facts are undisputed.”); In re Kahn, 
441 F.3d 977, 985, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The ultimate 
determination of whether an invention would have been obvious is a legal 
conclusion based on underlying findings of fact.”); Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 
437 F.3d 1157, 1164, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“Obviousness . . . is a legal conclusion . . . based in turn on underlying factual 
determinations . . . “). 
 564. Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (noting that the 
court reviews the obviousness determination without deference, but it reviews a 
district court’s determination of the underlying factual determinations for clear 
error); Alza, 464 F.3d at 1289, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (“Obviousness is a 
question of law, reviewed de novo, based upon underlying factual questions which are 
reviewed for clear error following a bench trial.”); Old Town Canoe Co. v. 
Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1319, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1715 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (vacating a district court’s judgment as a matter of law of non-
invalidity for obviousness, because patent challenger produced clear and convincing 
evidence that prior art references, in combination, disclose every element, and 
evidence that there was a motivation to combine the prior art references, thereby 
establishing an issue of fact for the jury); Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1164, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1869 (“Obviousness . . . is a legal conclusion that is reviewed de novo; 
however it is based in turn on factual determinations which are reviewed for clear 
error.”). 
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orders originating from the patent office and jury verdicts, the 
Federal Circuit reviews the factual record for the presence or absence 
of substantial evidence.565 
The Supreme Court defined the underlying factual questions in 
Graham v. John Deere Co.566 to include the following:  “(1) [the] scope 
and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in the prior 
art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior 
art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness.”567  Examples of 
the fourth factor, also called “secondary considerations,” include 
“commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, and failure of 
others,”568 and also unexpected results.569  The Federal Circuit has 
considered two subsidiary factual inquiries pertinent to the Graham 
analysis:  the “presence or absence of a motivation to combine the 
references”570 and the “presence or absence of a ‘reasonable 
expectation of success’ from making such a combination.”571 
Of all the factors recited by the Federal Circuit regarding 
obviousness, the court focused most on the issue of “motivation to 
combine.”572  This increased focus appears to be, at least in significant 
                                                          
 565. Kim v. ConAgra Foods Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1320, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495, 
1503 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (reviewing jury verdict for substantial evidence); Kemin Foods 
L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A. de C.V., 464 F.3d 1339, 1344, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (reviewing jury verdict for substantial 
evidence); Kahn, 441 F.3d at 985, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344 (reviewing the 
United States PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interference’s decisions on the 
underlying factual determinations for substantial evidence). 
 566. 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (stating that several factual inquiries must be 
satisfied to determine patent validity). 
 567. Alza, 464 F.3d at 1289, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting In re 
Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1616 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).  
See DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 
1356, 1360, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Kahn, 441 F.3d at 985, 
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334-35 (“[I]n assessing whether the subject matter would 
have been non-obvious under § 103, the Board follows the guidance of the Supreme 
Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.”); Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1164, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
at 1869 (“The ultimate determination of whether an invention would have been 
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is a legal conclusion based on the factual Graham 
findings . . .”). 
 568. DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1360, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (citing Graham, 
383 U.S.at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467 (1966)).  See Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1380, 81 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. 
 569. See id. at 1380, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331; Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 
441 F.3d 963, 970, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that 
the patentee overcame a prima facie case of obviousness by providing evidence of 
unexpected results). 
 570. Alza, 464 F.3d at 1289, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting In re Gartside, 
203 F.3d 1305, 1316, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1776 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  See DyStar, 
464 F.3d at 1360-61, 1372, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. 
 571. Alza, 464 F.3d at 1289, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting Medichem, 437 
F.3d at 1165, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870). 
 572. See supra note 570 and accompanying text; see also Ormco Corp. v. Align 
Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1307, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1931, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
2007] 2006 PATENT SUMMARY 865 
part, a reaction to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in a case 
involving this test, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.573  Under the 
Federal Circuit’s “motivation to combine” inquiry, it is not enough to 
find each element of a claimed invention in the prior art;574 rather, “a 
court must ask ‘whether a person of ordinary skill in the art, 
possessed with the understandings and knowledge reflected in the 
prior art, and motivated by the general problem facing the inventor, 
would have been led to make the combination recited in the 
claims.’”575  “The ‘motivation-suggestion-teaching’ requirement 
protects against the entry of hindsight into the obviousness 
analysis . . . .”576 
In light of the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, the Federal 
Circuit has taken several opportunities to emphasize that its 
“motivation-suggestion-teaching” test is not an inflexible, categorical 
rule: 
In contrast to the characterization of some commentators, the 
suggestion test is not a rigid categorical rule.  The motivation need 
not be found in the references sought to be combined, but may be 
found in any number of sources, including common knowledge, 
the prior art as a whole, or the nature of the problem itself.577 
                                                                                                                                      
In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 986, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335 (explaining that to make a 
prima facie case of obviousness, the Board must “explain the reasons one of ordinary 
skill in the art would have been motivated to select the references and combine them 
to render the claimed invention obvious”) (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 
1357-59, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); Medichem, 437 F.3d at 
1164, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 573. 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (mem.).  See also DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1367 n.3, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 n.3 (acknowledging the Supreme Court’s grant of 
certiorari). 
 574. See Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 575. Alza, 464 F.3d 1286 at 1290, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting Kahn, 441 
F.3d at 998, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337). 
 576. Kahn, 441 F.3d at 986, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
 577. DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1361, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.  DyStar surmised that 
confusion about this aspect of the test probably led to the Court’s grant of certiorari 
in KSR: 
DyStar’s argument and the above-cited commentary highlight the danger 
inherent in focusing on isolated dicta rather than gleaning the law of a 
particular area from careful reading of the full text of a group of related 
precedents for all they say that is dispositive and for what they hold.  When 
parties like DyStar do not engage in such careful, candid, and complete legal 
analysis, much confusion about the law arises and, through time, can be 
compounded. 
Id. at 1367, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.  See Alza, 464 F.3d at 1290-91, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004 (quoting Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987-88, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
at 1336-37); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1307-09, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1931, 1937-39 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987-88, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1366); Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 
1319, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1712-13 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that the 
defendant introduced enough evidence that a motivation to combine would have 
been inherent in the techniques known in the art and the nature of a problem to be 
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However, while “common knowledge and common sense” are 
sufficient to establish a motivation to combine, “assumptions about 
common sense cannot substitute for evidence thereof . . . .”578  Put 
another way, “rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained 
by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some 
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support 
the legal conclusion of obviousness.”579  Particularly because they 
played such a notorious role in the briefing and argument before the 
Supreme Court in KSR, a brief discussion of these decisions is 
worthwhile. 
In In re Kahn,580 which was decided before the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in KSR, the Federal Circuit upheld a decision by 
the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that claims in a 
patent application for a “reading machine” for blind readers were 
unpatentable as obvious.581  Kahn’s claimed invention concerned a 
device operated by eye control and sound localization that can read a 
word “looked at” by a totally blind user, in a fashion that the user can 
tell, by the direction of the sound, the area of the screen where he 
was looking.582  The Board and the Federal Circuit focused on a 
combination of three references:  a patent to Garwin, one of two 
patents to Anderson, and a patent to Stanton.  Garwin disclosed an 
eye-controlled processor that sensed where on a visual display the 
user looked, presented the user with a number of targets (such as 
words), and provided feedback to indicate a selection has been 
received.  Two Anderson references, which were used 
interchangeably, each disclosed an interactive “electronic teaching 
aid” that enabled a user viewing text to select a portion for 
vocalization.  Stanton disclosed an acoustical imaging system allowing 
a user to locate the position of a sound; the preferred embodiment 
                                                                                                                                      
solved in order to create a factual issue for a jury); Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336 (“A suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the 
relevant prior art teachings does not have to be found explicitly in the prior art, as 
‘the teaching motivation or suggestion may be implicit from the prior art as a whole, 
rather than expressly stated in the references’”) (quoting In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 
1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted)); 
In re Johnston, 435 F.3d 1381, 1385-86, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1788, 1791 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (finding motivation with respect to an invention relating to a large diameter, 
shaped, spiral pipe for two references to be combined because they deal with the 
same field of technology and show spirally formed pipe of large diameter, even 
though the motivation was not explicit in the prior art). 
 578. DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1367, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. 
 579. Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987-88, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336. 
 580. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336. 
 581. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336. 
 582. Id. at 980-81, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. 
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had four speakers at the corners of a vertical display that produce a 
directional sound based on the location of a cursor.583 
Kahn did not dispute that each element of his claimed invention 
could be found in either the Garwin, Anderson, or Stanton 
references, or that a person having ordinary skill in the art would 
have been motivated to combine Anderson and Garwin.584  Rather, 
Kahn challenged the Board’s finding of a motivation to apply 
Stanton.585  The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board, however, 
noting that a skilled artisan who knew of a “learning machine” 
capable of reading aloud the word on a screen at which a user is 
looking, and who desired to permit a visually impaired user to better 
control the device, would have had reason to add Stanton’s teaching 
that a two-dimensional sound could help a blind person locate a 
point in space.586  In so deciding, the Court noted that “[t]he use of 
patents as references is not limited to what the patentees describe as 
their own inventions”587 and “the skilled artisan need not be 
motivated to combine Stanton for the same reason contemplated by 
Kahn.”588 
In Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc.,589 decided by the Federal 
Circuit after the grant of certiorari in KSR, the court applied its rule 
that the motivation to combine need not be explicit in the prior art.590  
The invention was a series of retainers to progressively move teeth 
and instructions to a patient regarding the order of use of the 
retainers.591  The court held that providing the medical devices in one 
package as opposed to multiple packages did not make the claim 
distinct, based on the well-known practice of packaging things in the 
most convenient manner.592  Also, adding the instructions was obvious 
based on a general practice of providing instructions on how to use 
medical devices, along with regulations under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act that generally require such instructions.593  Additionally, 
                                                          
 583. Id. at 982-83, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
 584. Id. at 988-99, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336. 
 585. Id. at 988-89, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336. 
 586. Id. at 989, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
 587. Id. at 990, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338 (quoting In re Heck, 699 F.2d 1331, 
1333, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1038, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 588. Id. at 990, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338. 
 589. 463 F.3d 1299, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1931 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 590. Id. at 1313, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 591. Id. at 1302, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933-34. 
 592. Id. at 1309, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 593. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
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the court ruled that there were no secondary consideration of 
commercial success to rebut the prima facie case of obviousness.594 
In Alza Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.,595 the Federal Circuit upheld 
a bench trial finding of obviousness.596  The court explained that a 
motivation to combine need not be found in the prior art, and it 
ruled that the district court did not make a clear error in finding 
motivation based on expert testimony, which the Federal Circuit 
found consistent with the prior-art references.597  In DyStar Textilfarben 
GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.,598 the court ruled that 
the patent claims were invalid as a matter of law for obviousness, 
notwithstanding a jury finding of non-invalidity.599  Both Alza and 
DyStar, too, came after the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in 
KSR, and both took pains to claim that the indictment of the 
teaching-suggestion-motivation test offered in the Supreme Court by 
KSR and its amici curiae was unfounded.600  (Notably, all four 
decisions resulted in appellate holdings of obviousness.) 
One way in which patentees “negate” a motivation to combine is to 
show that one prior art reference teaches away from the 
modifications required to reach the claimed invention.601  “A 
reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, 
upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following 
the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction 
divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.”602  In 
Optivus Technology, Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications S.A.,603 the court found 
that the prior art disclosing a neutron beam for cancer therapy did 
not teach away from an invention involving a proton beam.604  The 
patentee argued that if the neutron beam, which worked by shooting 
a proton beam at beryllium to produce neutrons, were modified so 
                                                          
 594. Id. at 1312, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941 (noting that while the requirement 
that “the commercial success [be] due to the patented invention” is presumed when 
the product is successful, in this case “the evidence clearly rebuts the presumption 
that [the] success was due to the claimed and novel features”). 
 595. 464 F.3d 1286, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 596. Id. at 1290-91, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006-07. 
 597. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006-07 (also finding that there exists clear and 
convincing evidence a person having ordinary skill in the art would have perceived a 
reasonable likelihood of success). 
 598. 464 F.3d 1356, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 599. Id. at 1372, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 600. Dystar, 464 F.3d at 1364-71, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648-53; Alza, 464 F.3d at 
1290-91, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006-07. 
 601. Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1308, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1931, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 602. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (citations omitted). 
 603. 469 F.3d 978, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 604. Id. at 991, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848. 
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that it was directed at a patient in the fashion of the claimed proton 
beam, it would be a “death ray,” and thus the neutron beam teaches 
away from such a modification.605  The court rejected the argument, 
responding that a person having ordinary skill in the art would know 
to adjust the intensity of the beam.606  On the other hand, in Eli Lilly 
the court accepted a “teach away” argument, ruling that the prior art 
showed a preference for halogenated compounds to treat 
schizophrenia, and therefore taught away from the present invention, 
which used a hydrogen atom instead of a halogen atom.607 
The Federal Circuit also had occasion in 2006 to address issues 
other than the “motivation to combine” and related questions.  The 
court at least twice addressed the issue of rendering claimed ranges 
obvious.  In Ormco, the court held that a prior-art range of 14-21 days 
for using a particular device rendered obvious the claimed range of 2-
20 days.608  The court explained:  “Where a claimed range overlaps 
with a range disclosed in the prior art, there is a presumption of 
obviousness.  The presumption can be rebutted if it can be shown 
that the prior art teaches away from the claimed range, or the 
claimed range produces new and unexpected results.”609  Applying 
this principle in DyStar, the court ruled that a reference disclosing a 
thirty-percent aqueous solution of leuco indigo renders obvious a 
claimed range of ten to thirty-five percent.610  Also, it ruled that expert 
testimony that a reference discloses a solution containing 5.1% alkali 
and claim language from the reference disclosing at least 6.5% alkali 
render obvious a claimed range of two to ten percent.611 
The Federal Circuit also addressed a threshold question as to what 
references can serve as prior art for obviousness purposes.  In one 
case, the court noted that while a prior art reference must be enabled 
to anticipate a claim,612 it need not be enabled to be used in an 
obviousness analysis.613  In another, the court concluded that a 
Canadian patent application was valid prior art for obviousness 
                                                          
 605. Id. at 989, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848. 
 606. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848. 
 607. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1378, 81 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 608. Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1309-11, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1931, 1940 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 609. Id. at 1311, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940. 
 610. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 
F.3d 1356, 1372, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 611. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 612. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 457 F.3d 1293, 1306, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1705, 1714 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 613. Id. at 1307-08, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715-16 (noting its reason for remand 
in a previous order in the same case) (citing Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 
Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1357, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1417-18 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
870 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
purposes, because a reasonably diligent person of ordinary skill in the 
art could have located the application based on the information 
provided in the patent issuing from it.614  In a third case, the court 
held that there was no evidence that a prior invention was suppressed 
or concealed, which would exclude the device as prior art under 35 
U.S.C. § 102(g)(2).615 
F. Enablement 
Section 112, paragraph one, requires a patent application to 
describe the invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms so 
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with 
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .”616  
“In order to enable the claims of a patent pursuant to § 112, the 
patent specification must teach those of ordinary skill in the art ‘how 
to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without 
undue experimentation.’  Some experimentation is permissible 
although it cannot be unduly excessive.”617  In Falko-Gunter Falkner v. 
Inglis,618 the Federal Circuit explained that whether undue 
experimentation is required is a 
conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations . . . 
includ[ing] (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the 
amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or 
absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, 
(5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, 
                                                          
 614. Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1375, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1684, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding the application qualifies as a “printed 
publication” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000)).  
 615. Flex-Rest, LLC v. Steelcase, Inc., 455 F.3d 1351, 1358-60, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1620, 1624-25 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that no evidence supports a jury 
instruction that prior invention was abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, either 
intentionally or by inference).  The jury found the claims invalid for anticipation as 
well as obviousness.  Id. at 1354, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621. 
 616. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 617. Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 1209, 1224, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 
681, 686, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1934, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).  See Monsanto Co. v. 
Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1338, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(noting that the fact that some experimentation may be required does not invalidate 
the patent); Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (accepting United States PTO Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interference analysis that “the mere fact that experimentation may have 
been difficult and time consuming does not mandate a conclusion that such 
experimentation would have been considered ‘undue’ in this art”). 
 618. Id. 1357, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1006. 
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(7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the 
breadth of the claims.619 
“Enablement is a question of law involving underlying factual 
inquiries.”620  The ultimate determination of enablement is reviewed 
de novo.621  The Federal Circuit reviews jury determination of the 
factual inquiries to determine whether substantial evidence supports 
the verdict,622 and judge determinations of the inquiries for clear 
error.623  For decisions of the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interference, the court will “set aside actions of the Board if they are 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law, and . . . set aside factual findings that are 
unsupported by substantial evidence.”624 
In Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,625 the Federal Circuit dealt with 
enablement in the context of genetic material.  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of validity, 
explaining that “because of the level of skill in the art and the 
publicly available information about [the claimed genetic material], 
no specific gene sequence needed to be claimed for someone of 
ordinary skill in the art to understand how to make and use the 
invention.”626  The court also addressed the issue of undue 
experimentation, holding that the “fact that some experimentation 
may be necessary to produce the invention does not render the 
[claims] invalid for lack of enablement.”627 
G. Utility 
The Federal Circuit did not meaningfully address the utility 
requirement of § 101 in any precedential opinions in 2006.628  The 
                                                          
 619. Id. at 1363, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.  The court went on to note that 
“[a] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.”  Id., 
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 620. Id. at 1363, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 621. Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1320, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1713 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Enablement is a matter of law that 
we review without deference . . .”). 
 622. Id. at 1320, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713 (“[T]his court reviews the factual 
underpinnings of enablement to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support a verdict by jury.”). 
 623. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1307, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1715 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that “the underlying factual 
inquiries made by the district court are reviewed for clear error” in dealing with the 
issue of enablement with respect to an alleged anticipating reference). 
 624. Falko-Gunter Falkner, 448 F.3d at 1363, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 625. 459 F.3d 1328, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 626. Id. at 1338, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819. 
 627. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819. 
 628. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (granting patent protection only to 
“new and useful” inventions). 
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court, however, considered the issue in Classified Cosmetics, Inc. v. Del 
Laboratories, Inc.,629 a non-precedential opinion in which the court 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the alleged infringer.630  
Under the § 101 utility requirement, an invention must be operable 
to achieve useful results.631  In Classified Cosmetics, the Federal Circuit 
noted that “[a] claim is inoperable when it contains a limitation that 
is impossible to meet.”632  The court ruled that the expert opinion 
relied upon by the alleged infringer did not establish inoperability as 
a matter of law.633 
In another case, Impax Laboratories, Inc. v. Aventis Pharmaceuticals 
Inc.,634 the Federal Circuit commented on the close relationship 
between utility and enablement issues.635  In Impax Labs., the court 
considered, inter alia, whether a prior-art reference anticipated a 
claim.636  The court noted that, to anticipate, a prior art reference 
must be enabling,637 and explained that “[p]rior art is not enabling so 
as to be anticipating if it does not enable a person of ordinary skill in 
the art to carry out the invention.”638  The court, however, stressed 
that “[t]he enablement requirement for prior art to anticipate under 
[§ 102] does not require utility, unlike the enablement requirement 
for patents under [§ 112].”639  The Federal Circuit vacated the district 
court’s determination that the claims at issue were not invalid by 
reason of anticipation.640  The court held that the effectiveness of the 
prior art was not relevant to whether it was enabling for anticipation 
purposes and remanded the issue to the district court to determine 
whether the prior art satisfied the enablement requirement by 
                                                          
 629. No. 06-1010, 2006 WL 3615511 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 12, 2006). 
 630. Id. at *3. 
 631. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 4.04 (2005) (adding that the inventor 
must also disclose how an invention is operable, and an element of prior reduction 
to practice). 
 632. Classified Cosmetics, slip op. at *2 (citing Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim 
Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 633. Id. 
 634. 468 F.3d 1366, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see 3 DONALD S. 
CHISUM, PATENTS § 7.03[6] (2005) (“There is a close relation between the how-to-use 
aspect of the enablement requirement under Section 112 and the utility requirement 
under Section 101.”). 
 635. 468 F.3d at 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011-12. 
 636. See Impax Labs., 468 F.3d at 1380-83, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010-13. 
 637. Id. at 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011-12. 
 638. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 639. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012 (citing Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1326, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A] 
prior art reference need not demonstrate utility in order to serve as an anticipating 
reference under section 102.”)). 
 640. Id. at 1384, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014. 
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describing the claimed invention sufficiently to permit a person of 
ordinary skill in the art to carry it out.641 
In Zoltek Corp. v. United States,642 an infringement and Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause case under the Tucker Act, Judge 
Gajarsa wrote a concurring opinion in which he distinguished, as 
“fundamentally different,”643 the concept of utility for a device from 
that for a process.644  As Judge Gajarsa explained, “[w]hereas utility 
can be extracted from a device only after it has been ‘made,’ utility is 
extracted from a process concurrent with its being ‘practiced.’”645 
H. Adequate Written Description 
The requirement that a patent contain an adequate written 
description of an invention is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, 
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.646 
The purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure 
that the scope of the exclusion right does not exceed the ambit of the 
inventor’s contribution to the field of art.647  “[T]he applicant 
must . . . convey to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date 
sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.”648  Although 
“‘reduction to practice ordinarily provides the best evidence that an 
invention is complete[,] . . . it does not follow that proof of reduction 
to practice is necessary in every case.’ . . . Pfaff makes clear that an 
invention can be ‘complete’ even where an actual reduction to 
                                                          
 641. Id. at 1383-84, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013-14. 
 642. 442 F.3d 1345, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 643. Id. at 1365, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
 644. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495. 
 645. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495 (“Because a process is nothing more than 
the sequence of actions of which it is comprised, the use of a process necessarily 
involves doing or performing each of the steps recited.  This is unlike use of a system 
as a whole, in which the components are used collectively, not individually.”) (citing 
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1763, 1790 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 646. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 647. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813, 
1818 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The written description requirement helps to ensure that the 
patent applicant actually invented the claimed subject matter and was in possession 
of the patented invention at the time of filing.”). 
 648. Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1001, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 
1563-64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
874 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
practice is absent.”649  Additionally, it is not necessary to provide 
examples in the specification explicitly covering the claims as long as 
the specification describes the claimed invention to one of ordinary 
skill in the art.650 
The adequacy of a written description is “a question of fact, judged 
from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the 
relevant filing date.”651  The court reviews a trial court’s 
determination for clear error.652 
In 2006, the Federal Circuit twice addressed the written description 
requirement in the context of biotechnology inventions.  The 
invention in Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis653 related to making vaccines 
safer by deleting or inactivating an essential gene from a viral vector’s 
genome.654  The case came to the Federal Circuit as an appeal by a 
patentee who lost an interference; the subject matter of the 
interference was specifically related to the case where the vector virus 
was a poxvirus.655  The court resolved whether the interference 
winner’s application described the invention, addressing three 
written description-related questions.656  First, it held that the absence 
of examples involving poxviruses did not render the written 
description inadequate.657  Second, it held that a patentee may meet 
the written description requirement even without an actual reduction 
to practice.658  Third, it held that there is “no per se rule that an 
adequate written description of an invention that involves a biological 
macromolecule must contain a recitation of a known structure.”659  
The court explained that “where, as in this case, accessible literature 
sources clearly provided, as of the relevant date, genes and their 
nucleotide sequences . . ., satisfaction of the written description 
                                                          
 649. Id. at 1367, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (quoting Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 
U.S. 55, 66 (1998)) (emphasis omitted). 
 650. Id. at 1366, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (“A claim will not be invalided . . . 
simply because the embodiments of the specification do not contain examples 
explicitly covering the full scope of the claim language . . . because the patent 
specification is written for a person of skill in the art . . . .”) (quoting LizardTech, 
Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, PTY, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1724, 1732 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 651. Id. at 1363, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005; see also Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., 
Inc., 441 F.3d 963, 967, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(explaining that “compliance with the written description requirement is a question 
of fact”). 
 652. Id. at 967, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
 653. 448 F.3d 1357, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001. 
 654. Id. at 1360, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 655. Id. at 1359-60, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1001-02. 
 656. Id. at 1366, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 657. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 658. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 659. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
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requirement does not require either the recitation or incorporation 
by reference . . . of such genes and sequences.”660 
In a second biotechnology case, Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,661 the 
invention related to genetically modified soybean and cotton seeds.662  
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment of no invalidity, ruling that the written description was 
sufficient.663  The infringer argued that the asserted claims failed the 
written description requirement for not disclosing specific gene 
sequences.664  The court first stated a general rule for applying the 
requirement to inventions involving DNA:  the disclosure must 
provide “sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics . . . 
i.e., complete or partial structure, other physical and/or chemical 
properties, functional characteristics when coupled with a known or 
disclosed correlation between function and structure, or some 
combination of such characteristics.”665  Then, as it did in Falko-
Gunter,666 the court found that “[g]iven the knowledge in the art, it 
was unnecessary . . . to include specific gene sequences.”667 
I. Best Mode 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, a patent specification must set forth 
the “best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his 
invention.”668  In Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp.,669 the 
court stated the traditional two-part factual inquiry used to determine 
compliance with the “best mode” requirement.670  Under the 
subjective prong of that inquiry, “[f]irst, the fact-finder must 
determine whether at the time an applicant filed an application for a 
patent, [the applicant] had a best mode of practicing the 
invention.”671  Under the next, objective prong, “if the inventor had a 
                                                          
 660. Id. at 1368, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008-09. 
 661. 459 F.3d 1328, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 662. Id. at 1332-33, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817. 
 663. Id. at 1332, 1337, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817-18. 
 664. Id. at 1337, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818. 
 665. Id. at 1336, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (quoting Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Gen-
Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(citation omitted)). 
 666. See Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1001, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding, inter alia, that the patentee did not need to 
provide examples or demonstrate actual reduction to practice to meet the written 
description requirement). 
 667. Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1337, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818. 
 668. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2005 & Supp. 2005). 
 669. 448 F.3d 1309, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 670. Id. at 1321, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 671. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v. Implant 
Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1064, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (citations omitted)). 
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best mode of practicing the invention, the fact-finder must determine 
whether the best mode was disclosed in sufficient detail to allow a 
skilled artisan to practice it without undue experimentation.”672 
Old Town Canoe involved a challenge to a patent covering a 
technique and device for making plastic laminate boat hulls by 
rotational molding.673  The challenging party alleged that “at the time 
of [the] filing of the patent application, the inventor had a preferred 
way of using the invention” that was not disclosed, and further that “it 
would not have been clear to a person of ordinary skill in the art” 
how to implement the invention.674  In support of that allegation, the 
challenging party offered a document, drafted by the inventor before 
the patent filing, in which he described the process at issue.675  The 
Federal Circuit determined that a reasonable juror could have found 
a violation of the “best mode” requirement, and vacated the district 
court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to the inventor on that 
ground.676 
In Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,677 a jury found that 
Vaughan had infringed a patent for a system of pumps in storage 
tanks, and that Vaughan had failed to prove that the patent was 
invalid.  The district court denied Vaughan’s motion for judgment as 
a matter of law on the issues of invalidity, infringement, and 
willfulness.678  In upholding that determination on the “best mode” 
issue, the Federal Circuit pointed to evidence from the proponent of 
the patent that the improvements alleged by Vaughan would not 
change the patented process or invention, as well as evidence that the 
alleged improvements did not need to be disclosed to a person of 
ordinary skill in the art.679 
However, in Go Medical Industries Pty. Ltd. v. Inmed Corp.,680 the 
patent applicant was deemed to be in violation of the “best mode” 
requirement.  In its analysis of the first prong of the inquiry—
whether the inventor had a “best mode” for practicing the invention 
when the patent application was filed—the court observed that the 
patent applicant had altered his usage of the urinary catheter design 
in dispute before he had filed the application with the PTO, and that 
                                                          
 672. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 673. Id. at 1312, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707. 
 674. Id. at 1320, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 675. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 676. Id. at 1321, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 677. 449 F.3d 1209, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 75 
U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2006). 
 678. Id. at 1213, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1096. 
 679. Id. at 1224, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104. 
 680. 471 F.3d 1264, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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he considered the new usage “the preferred embodiment at that 
stage.”681  As for the objective component of the inquiry, the applicant 
did not clearly disclose the preferred design.682  On the basis of these 
rulings, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment and its determination of invalidity for failure to 
meet the “best mode” requirement.683 
J. Indefiniteness 
A determination of whether a claim adequately recites the subject 
matter of a claimed invention and is sufficiently definite to satisfy 35 
U.S.C. § 112 is a legal conclusion that the Federal Circuit reviews de 
novo.684  A patent is presumed valid, and the party asserting invalidity 
as to any claim of a patent bears the burden of establishing it by clear 
and convincing evidence.685 
If a claim cannot be construed, it is indefinite under § 112.686  
However, if a claim is amenable to construction, “even though the 
task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which 
reasonable persons will disagree,” the claim is not indefinite.687  Claim 
definiteness is analyzed “not in a vacuum, but always in light of the 
teachings of the prior art and of the particular application disclosure 
as it would be interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of skill 
in the pertinent art.”688 
In Energizer Holdings v. International Trade Commission,689 a case 
concerning a patent for mercury-free alkaline batteries, the patent 
was found to be invalid for indefiniteness by the U.S. International 
Trade Commission on the grounds that the term “said zinc anode” in 
a claim had no antecedent basis.690  The requirement of antecedent 
basis is a rule of patent drafting, administered during patent 
examination.691  The Federal Circuit noted that “[t]he Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure states that ‘[o]bviously, however, the 
                                                          
 681. Id. at 1271, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634. 
 682. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633. 
 683. Id. at 1272, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633. 
 684. Aero Prods. Int’l Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., 466 F.3d 1000, 1015, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1491 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 685. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91. 
 686. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91. 
 687. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491 (citing Exxon Res. & Eng’g Co. v. United 
States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 688. Energizer Holdings v. Int’l Trade Comm., 435 F.3d 1366, 1370, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1625, 1628 (Fed Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236, 238 (C.C.P.A. 1971)). 
 689. Id. at 1366, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1625. 
 690. Id. at 1370, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628. 
 691. Id. at 1370, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626. 
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failure to provide explicit antecedent basis for terms does not always 
render a claim indefinite.’”692  The court then made clear that where 
the meaning of the claim would reasonably be understood by persons 
of ordinary skill when read in light of the specification, the claim is 
not subject to invalidity from the patent-drafting protocol of 
“antecedent basis.”693  Despite the absence of an explicit antecedent 
basis for the term at issue, the court held that the claim could be 
construed by implication and that “a claim that is amenable to 
construction is not invalid on the ground of indefiniteness.”694 
In Aero Products International Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp.,695 the 
Federal Circuit considered whether the terms “complete hermetic 
seal” and “substantially hermetic seal” appearing in a claim 
containing only one seal rendered that claim indefinite.696  Both the 
district court and Federal Circuit accepted Aero’s explanation that 
the term “complete hermetic seal” referred to the mechanical 
completeness of the seal, while the term “substantially hermetic seal” 
referred to the quality of the seal, and determined that “[t]hese terms 
when read in combination and in light of the specification of the 
[patent], would be understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the 
art.”697 
Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp. was an appeal from a district court’s 
holding that a patent for a computerized handwritten text 
interpretation system was invalid for indefiniteness.  The Federal 
Circuit reversed, stating that the term “sloppiness space,” and 
accompanying descriptions, “[w]hile not rigorously 
precise[,] . . . provide adequate guidance . . . particularly in light of 
articulating a more exact standard for the concept.”698 
                                                          
 692. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628, (citing MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2173.05(e) (8th ed. Rev. 2, May 2004)). 
 693. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628 (“Whether this claim, despite lack of 
explicit antecedent basis for ‘said zinc anode,’ nonetheless has a reasonably 
ascertainable meaning must be decided in context.”). 
 694. Id. at 1371, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628; see id. at 1371, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1628 (holding that “the term ‘anode gel’ is by implication the antecedent 
basis for ‘said zinc anode’”). 
 695. 466 F.3d 1000, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 696. Id. at 1009, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. 
 697. Id. at 1016, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491. 
 698. Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1323, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1916, 
1927 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Bancorp Servs. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 
1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1996, 1998 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a claim will not 
be held invalid if the “meaning of the claim is discernable, even though the task may 
be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will 
disagree”)). 
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K. Dependent Claims 
The statutory requirements for dependent claims are set forth in 
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 4: 
Subject to the following paragraph, a claim in dependent form 
shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then 
specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim 
in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference 
all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.699 
In 2006, for the first time,700 the Federal Circuit held a claim invalid 
for failing to meet the requirements of this section, as the dependent 
claim at issue, claim six, did not “narrow the scope” of the dependent 
claim to which it directly depended, claim two; “instead, the two 
claims deal[t] with non-overlapping subject matter.”701  While the 
court recognized that “the patentee was attempting to claim what 
might otherwise have been patentable subject matter” and “claim 
[six] could have been properly drafted either as dependent from 
claim [one] or as an independent claim,” it explained that it “‘should 
not rewrite claims to preserve validity.’”702  The court explained that 
invoking the fourth paragraph of § 112 as an invalidating provision 
“does not exalt form over substance,” and “is consistent with the 
overall statutory scheme that requires applicants to satisfy certain 
requirements before obtaining a patent, some of which are more 
procedural or technical than others.”703 
                                                          
 699. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 700. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1583, 1589 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the district court that at the time 
the district court wrote its opinion, “there was no applicable Federal Circuit 
precedent,” and noting that after the district court decision, the Federal Circuit 
issued an opinion where it “suggested that a violation of a § 112 ¶ 4 renders a patent 
invalid”).  In the prior opinion that suggested such invalidity, Curtiss-Wright Flow 
Control Corp. v. Velan Inc., the court did not actually hold a patent invalid under § 112 
¶ 4, but merely suggested it might be possible.  438 F.3d 1374, 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1988, 1993 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  Note:  Two of the authors were counsel to 
Pfizer, Inc. in this case. 
 701. Pfizer, 457 F.3d at 1291, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589. 
 702. Id. at 1292, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590 (quoting Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
 703. Id. at 1292, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590.  The court also cited to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 282(3), noting that “‘[i]nvalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to 
comply with any requirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title’ is expressly included 
among the available defenses to an infringement suit.”  Id. at 1292, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1589-90 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 282(3) (2000)). 
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L. Patent Ownership 
An issue of standing to sue in a patent case is a jurisdictional one,704 
and one that the Federal Circuit reviews de novo.705  “A patentee shall 
have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”706  The 
term “patentee encompasses not only the patentee to whom the 
patent was issued but also to the successors in title to the patentee.”707  
A patentee may transfer title to a patent by assignment, and the 
assignee may be deemed the effective patentee under § 285 for 
purposes of standing to sue another for patent infringement.708  
While a licensee normally does not have standing to sue without 
joinder of the patentee, an exclusive license may amount to an 
assignment if it conveys to the licensee all substantial rights to the 
patent at issue.709  As the Federal Circuit stated in Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. 
Miracle Optics, Inc.,710 “the essential issue regarding the right to sue on 
a patent is who owns the patent.”711 
In Aspex Eyewear, the Federal Circuit found that Contour (the 
licensor) transferred to Chic (the licensee) certain rights with respect 
to a patented eyeglass frame.712  Chic, the licensee, received:  (1) the 
exclusive right to make, use, and sell products covered by the patent, 
(2) the right to sue for infringement of the patent, and (3) a virtually 
unrestricted authority to sublicense its rights under the agreement.713  
Despite the transfer of these rights, the court held that the agreement 
“did not constitute a transfer of all substantial rights to the 
[patent]”714 and hence it was not an assignment.715  The Federal 
Circuit held that the licensee’s rights, “however substantial in other 
respects, were unquestionably valid for only a limited period of time” 
pursuant to the licensing agreement.716  Because the licensor would 
regain all of the rights under the patent as of a specific date, it 
remained the “unquestioned owner of the patent”—it had conferred 
a limited license, not an assignment, of the patent.717   
                                                          
 704. See also  supra notes 172-83, and accompanying text.. 
 705. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1339, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 706. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000)). 
 707. Id. at 1340, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) 
(2000)). 
 708. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 709. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 710. 434 F.3d 1336, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456. 
 711. Id. at 1341, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460. 
 712. Id. at 1342, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460. 
 713. Id. at 1338, 1341, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457, 1460. 
 714. Id. at 1341, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460. 
 715. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460. 
 716. Id. at 1342, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460. 
 717. Id. at 1342-43, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460-61. 
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Aspex Eyewear distinguished the license agreement from an 
exclusive license with all substantial rights that was only defeasible in 
the event of a default or bankruptcy, or some other condition 
subsequent.718  In holding that the licensee, Chic, did not have 
standing to sue for patent infringement despite the clear wording of 
the contract, the Federal Circuit referred to its decision in Vaupel 
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., stating that “while 
considering the importance of an agreement’s right to sue provision, 
we noted the public policy in favor of preventing multiple lawsuits on 
the same patent against the same accused infringer.”719  The court 
expressed concern that if it considered Chic an assignee instead of a 
licensee, Chic could assert that patent against an accused infringer 
during the term of the agreement without Contour’s (the 
licensor/assignor) participation in the lawsuit, leaving Contour 
unconstrained by principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata to 
later assert the patent against the same accused infringer once the 
agreement expired.720  Conversely, the court undertook to prevent, as 
a matter of policy, a party with lesser rights from bringing a lawsuit 
that may put the licensed patent at risk of being held invalid or 
unenforceable without the involvement of the patentee.721  Citing its 
opinion in Evident Corp. v. Church & Dwight Co.,722 the Federal Circuit 
stated that “policy counsels against allowing Chic, who only putatively 
had rights under the patent for a limited time, to bring a patent 
infringement action without Contour, who would own the patent 
rights for a much longer period of time, and thereby unilaterally 
jeopardize Contour’s future enjoyment of the [patent].”723 
M. Inequitable Conduct 
Patent applicants have a duty of candor and good faith when 
making disclosures to the PTO, “including a duty to disclose 
information known to the applicants to be material to 
patentability.”724  If an application contains a false material fact or an 
affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact (or omits a material 
                                                          
 718. Id. at 1342, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 719. Id. at 1343, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461 (citing Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG 
v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875-76, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045, 
1048-49 (Fed. Cir. (1991)). 
 720. Id. at 1343, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 721. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461 (citing Evident Corp. v. Church & Dwight 
Co., 399 F.3d 1310, 1314, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910, 1912-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 722. 399 F.3d 1310, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910. 
 723. Id. at 1343, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 724. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm., L.P., 438 F.3d 1123, 1128, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1771 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). 
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fact), and if this defective disclosure is made with an intent to deceive 
or mislead the PTO, a court may set aside the application or find the 
patent invalid on the grounds of inequitable conduct.725 
A threshold showing of inequitable conduct must be made by clear 
and convincing evidence, both as to the materiality and intent 
requirements.726  Once this threshold is satisfied, the court must 
weigh the evidence “to determine whether the equities warrant a 
conclusion that inequitable conduct occurred.”727  The inquiries into 
materiality and intent are not independent; that is, when a 
misrepresentation or omission is highly material, less evidence of 
intent is required.728  Likewise, “the less material the information, the 
greater the proof must be.”729  If the district court makes findings 
after a trial, factual findings regarding materiality and intent are 
reviewed for clear error, while the overall finding of inequitable 
conduct is reviewed for abuse of discretion.730  At the summary 
judgment stage,731 all rulings on the issue of inequitable conduct are 
reviewed de novo.732 
The standard for the materiality of a misrepresentation or omission 
is set forth in PTO rule 56.733  Under this rule, a misrepresentation or 
omission is material when it is not cumulative of information already 
given, and it “establishes, by itself or in combination with other 
information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim, . . . [or] 
refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes 
in . . . [o]pposing an argument of unpatentability relied upon by the 
[PTO], . . . or [when] asserting an argument of patentability.”734 
As for the intent requirement, “the involved conduct, viewed in the 
light of all the evidence, including evidence of good faith, must 
indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to 
deceive.”735  Although a finding of intent does not require direct 
                                                          
 725. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 726. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 727. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 728. Id. at 1128-29, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 729. Id. at 1129, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 730. Digital Control Inc. v. The Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 731. See also supra notes 291-316, and accompanying text. 
 732. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826. 
 733. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2006).  This rule was amended on January 17, 1992, and 
the current discussion reflects the amended standard.  See Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 2,021 (Jan. 17, 1992) (incorporating the prima facie elements of unpatentability 
into the section 1.56(b) standard). 
 734. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b). 
 735. M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335, 
1341, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). 
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evidence,736 and may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of 
the patent application, there still must be a factual basis for a finding 
of intent.737  Thus, “intent to deceive cannot be inferred simply from 
the decision to withhold the reference where the reasons given for 
the withholding are plausible.”738 
In Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,739 the Federal 
Circuit considered whether the patentee of OxyContin® pain 
medication had engaged in inequitable conduct when it represented 
to the PTO that it had “surprisingly discovered” that its medication 
was effective over a four-fold dosage range instead of an eight-fold 
dosage range, without disclosing that it based this discovery on 
insight rather than scientific proof.740  The Federal Circuit declined to 
disturb the district court’s finding of materiality, given the applicant’s 
use of language that “suggested the existence of clinical results 
supporting the reduced dosage range.”741  However, the Federal 
Circuit vacated the district court’s finding of intent because it had 
considered documents prepared in the course of the FDA approval 
process (and not designated for the patent application), and because 
it failed to properly balance the low level of materiality of this 
evidence in its intent calculus.742 
In Digital Control Inc. v. The Charles Machine Works,743 an applicant 
was found guilty of inequitable conduct by virtue of misstatements 
made in his rule 131 declaration,744 and a failure to appropriately 
                                                          
 736. Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1375, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1001, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 737. L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1321, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1198 
(Fed. Cir. 2006); M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, 439 F.3d at 1341, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1234. 
 738. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1382, 81 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
 739. 438 F.3d 1123, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 740. Id. at 1130, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 741. Id. at 1133, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774; see id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1774 (noting that the level of materiality was not especially high, in that the applicant 
had not expressly misrepresented that it had obtained experimental results supporting 
the claims but merely “impl[ied] that an empirical basis existed for its discovery”). 
 742. See id. at 1134-35, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (“In a case such as this, when 
the materiality of the undisclosed information is relatively low, there is less basis for 
inferring intent from materiality alone.”).  The district court was directed to 
reconsider its intent finding, and if a threshold showing of intent were to be found 
on remand, to reweigh the factors of materiality and intent in determining whether 
the sanction of inequitable conduct was appropriate.  Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1775. 
 743. 437 F.3d 1309, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 744. A declaration under PTO Rule 131 is a sworn statement that an invention 
predates a prior art reference.  37 C.F.R. § 1.131; see Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1312, 
77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826 (affirming a district court determination of inequitable 
conduct predicated upon material misstatements made in a rule 131 declaration). 
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disclose prior art.745  Although the Federal Circuit agreed that the 
applicant had made material misrepresentations in connection with 
his rule 131 declaration, in that it contained a number of false 
statements (such as a demonstration of the invention which did not 
occur), it vacated the district court’s finding of inequitable conduct 
because it was based both on the rule 131 declaration and non-
disclosure of prior art.746  With regard to the latter issue, the Federal 
Circuit held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether 
the applicant’s disclosures cumulated the allegedly omitted prior art, 
such that the lower court improperly decided the issue on a summary 
judgment motion.747 
In M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co.,748 the Federal 
Circuit considered whether a district court appropriately found an 
intent to deceive when no direct or circumstantial evidence indicated 
that the applicants had intentionally withheld prior art, and when the 
applicants insisted they had been unaware of its relevance.749  The 
district court found inequitable conduct because the applicants had 
not shown that their failure to disclose the prior art was inadvertent, 
and did not proffer a good faith explanation for their failure.750  
However, the Federal Circuit ruled that the patentee’s lack of a good 
faith explanation did not rise to the level of an intent to deceive the 
PTO, and vacated the lower court’s finding.751 
In Kao Corp. v. Unilever United States, Inc.,752 the district court found 
that although the inventing entity had made material omissions when 
it “selectively disclosed only the most positive available data,”753 the 
applicant lacked the intent to deceive because it eventually supplied 
the omitted data to the PTO—even though the supplemental 
                                                          
 745. Id. at 1319, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831. 
 746. Id. at 1318-19, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833. 
 747. See id. at 1317, 1319, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826, 1829 (stating generally 
that it is difficult to decide the scope of prior art at the summary-judgment stage in 
that it is an inherently fact-intensive inquiry). 
 748. 439 F.3d 1335, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 749. See id. at 1340-41, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 750. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 751. See id. at 1343, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236 (reiterating that there must be a 
factual basis for a finding of intent, whether direct or circumstantial).  The Federal 
Circuit observed that “[t]he district court’s finding of inequitable conduct based on 
the non-disclosure of the Model 220 essentially amounted to a finding of strict 
liability for nondisclosure . . . [s]uch is not the law.”  Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1236. 
 752. 441 F.3d 963, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 753. Id. at 971, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.  The inventors failed to disclose that 
they had also tested a product variant, and did not reveal their margin for testing 
error, while affirmatively (and untruthfully) asserting that “there is no reason to 
expect any significant difference . . . for other polymers within the claimed genus.”  
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. 
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disclosure occurred over one year after the original application.754  
The Federal Circuit ruled that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in making this determination, stating that “although there 
certainly was evidence from which the trial court could have 
concluded that [the applicant] acted with intent to deceive, we are 
very reluctant to question the judgment of the finder of fact.”755 
In Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp.,756 the Federal Circuit 
reviewed a district court finding that a patent for the manufacture of 
difluoromethane was invalid due to inequitable conduct.757  The 
district court found that the patent applicants had an English 
translation of a Japanese publication that included every limitation of 
the claims contained in the patent,758 and that the applicants had 
misrepresented and mischaracterized the Japanese publication to the 
PTO.759  However, the Federal Circuit held that the district court 
clearly erred in its findings and therefore abused its discretion when 
it found inequitable conduct.760  Noting parenthetically that “the duty 
at issue in this case is the duty of candor, not the duty of 
translation,”761 the court ruled that the disclosures actually made to 
the PTO were consistent with the full translation of the Japanese 
documents, noting only minor and immaterial discrepancies (such as 
the use of the descriptor “mainly” versus the undisclosed term 
“chiefly”).762 
In Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp.,763 the 
challenging party alleged that a patent applicant’s usage of a 
technique for manufacturing canoes before filing for patent 
protection constituted inequitable conduct, and also demonstrated a 
failure to disclose the “best mode” of practicing the manufacture 
technique.764  In rejecting this argument and affirming the district 
court, the Federal Circuit stated that “since the failure to disclose the 
                                                          
 754. See id. at 972, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. 
 755. Id. at 971-71, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.  The Federal Circuit noted in 
dicta that “[g]iven a blank slate, we might weigh the evidence differently [than did 
the district court].”  Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. 
 756. 441 F.3d 991, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 757. Id. at 992, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418. 
 758. Id. at 995, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.  According to the district court, that 
the publication anticipated every claim satisfied the materiality requirement.  Id., 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420. 
 759. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.  According to the district court, this 
misrepresentation and mischaracterization amply demonstrated the required intent.  
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420. 
 760. Id. at 1003, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426. 
 761. Id. at 1001, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425 (citation omitted). 
 762. Id. at 1002, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417. 
 763. 448 F.3d 1309, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 764. Id. at 1321-22, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714-15. 
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best mode is not excused even if unintentional, but inequitable 
conduct requires a ‘threshold’ level of intent, the failure to disclose 
the best mode will not constitute inequitable conduct in every 
case.”765  In this case, since no evidence of intent to deceive the PTO 
was alleged, the claim of inequitable conduct necessarily failed.766 
In Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,767 the analysis again turned 
on intent to deceive, and the court again decided in favor of the party 
seeking to defend the validity of a patent from allegations of 
inequitable conduct.  Although the Federal Circuit disagreed with 
the district court’s reasoning on the materiality issue,768 it ruled that 
the district court did not commit reversible error in finding that the 
patentee did not act with an intent to deceive.769 
However, the court found an intent to deceive and upheld a 
determination of inequitable conduct in Agfa Corp. v. Creo Products, 
Inc.770  Specifically, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s 
finding that there were numerous instances of intentionally 
undisclosed prior art and the patent applicant’s position was 
inconsistent with the undisclosed prior art.771  Additional evidence 
supported that determination, including that the applicant had 
submitted misleading answers to direct queries by the patent 
examiner, and had “admitted that he could not have made the 
arguments he did make in response to the Examiner’s request if he 
had disclosed the [prior art].”772 
In Kemin Foods L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A. de C.V.,773 a 
patent challenger argued that an article in a trade journal constituted 
prior art in that it “[taught] all the limitations of claim [one] of the 
                                                          
 765. Id. at 1322, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715. 
 766. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714-15. 
 767. 449 F.3d 1209, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 75 
U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2006). 
 768. Id. at 1226-27, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106 (noting that the inventor had 
used previous iterations of a design for pumps in storage tanks, before seeking to 
patent the design).  The challenging party alleged that these iterations constituted 
prior art which were required to have been disclosed.  Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1106.  The Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he [district] court focused on whether the 
prior installations actually embody the invention, when the correct analysis asks 
whether a reasonable examiner would find it important”.  Id. at 1226-27, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 769. See id. at 1227, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106 (declining to reweigh the 
credibility of testimony from the patent applicant on the issue of intent to deceive, 
and reminding that the applicant asserted that he lacked awareness of the need to 
disclose the prior iterations because they were not “embodiments of the invention 
and were similar to other disclosures”). 
 770. 451 F.3d 1366, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 771. Id. at 1377, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392. 
 772. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393. 
 773. 464 F.3d 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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[patent].”774  The challenger further argued that the patent applicant 
knew of this article and of its materiality to the patent prosecution, 
and withheld the article from the PTO with deceptive intent.775  The 
district court found that the article was not “highly” material, because 
there was “little persuasive . . . evidence [that] the method disclosed 
[in the article] actually produces the composition disclosed.”776  On 
the issue of intent, the district court found credible the patent 
applicant’s testimony that he believed the trade journal article to be 
merely another paper that was irrelevant to the prosecution of the 
patent.777  The Federal Circuit declined to disturb these findings on 
appeal.778 
Lastly, in Eli Lilly and Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,779 
the Federal Circuit reviewed a finding by the district court that 
inequitable conduct had not occurred.  The challenger argued that 
the patent applicant had made different (but not inconsistent) 
statements to Swedish authorities and to the PTO, in response to 
questions regarding the effects of a pharmaceutical.780  These 
statements and other alleged non-disclosures were not deemed 
“material omission[s] nor done with an intent to deceive,” because 
the PTO had received all of the information it had requested.781 
N. Inventorship 
The Federal Circuit adheres to the principle that one must 
“contribute to the conception of an invention” to be considered an 
inventor for purposes of a patent claim.782  “Conception is defined as 
‘the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and 
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it [will] 
be applied in practice.’”783  Furthermore, the process of conception is 
only “complete when ‘the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor’s 
mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the 
                                                          
 774. Id. at 1344, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 775. Id. at 1345, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 776. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 777. Id. at 1346, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
 778. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
 779. 471 F.3d 1369, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 780. Id. at 1382, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (detailing that while the Swedish 
Board had inquired about idiosyncratic blood toxicity as the inventor sought to 
conduct human clinical studies in Scandinavia, the PTO had inquired only about 
blood cholesterol levels). 
 781. Id. at 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334. 
 782. Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 434 F.3d 1375, 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1702, 1704 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating further that “conception is the touchstone of 
inventorship”). 
 783. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (internal citations omitted). 
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invention to practice, without extensive research or 
experimentation.’”784  A putative joint inventor must have 
corroborating evidence of his alleged contribution to the conception 
of an invention.785  Inventorship itself is “a question of law that is 
reviewed de novo,” but factual findings made in connection with an 
analysis of an inventorship claim are reviewed for clear error if made 
after a trial.786 
In Stern v. Trustees of Columbia University,787 a Columbia professor 
employed a research assistant to investigate the effects of 
prostaglandins on the intraocular pressure of various animals.  The 
research assistant’s efforts helped establish that topical application of 
prostaglandins reduced intraocular pressure (“IOP”) in rhesus 
monkeys and cats.788  After the assistant’s departure from the 
university, the professor’s work eventually led to the issuance of a 
patent for glaucoma treatment, and the assistant challenged the 
patent on the basis of joint inventorship.789 
The research assistant’s claim of co-ownership failed for several 
reasons.790  First, his experiments were duplicative of the professor’s 
earlier work.791  In addition, the court found that the assistant “did 
not have an understanding of the claimed invention,” that he “did 
not conceive of the idea of the use of prostaglandins to reduce IOP in 
primates,” and that “there was no collaboration between [the 
assistant and the professor] in developing a glaucoma treatment.”792  
The claimant also proffered no corroborated evidence of co-
ownership.793 
In Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc.,794 the district court found that the 
named inventor had already completed his invention by the time he 
had engaged in discussions with the purported joint inventor on the 
topic, and that those discussions had not “contributed in [a] 
significant manner”795 to the invention—thus necessarily precluding a 
                                                          
 784. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (internal citations omitted). 
 785. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (explaining that unwitnessed laboratory 
books and journals are insufficient on their own to corroborate a claim of 
inventorship). 
 786. Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1373, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 787. 434 F.3d at 1377, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703. 
 788. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703. 
 789. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703. 
 790. Id. at 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704. 
 791. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704. 
 792. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704. 
 793. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704. 
 794. See Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1381, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1876 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 795. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
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finding of joint inventorship.796  The district court’s rulings on these 
issues were affirmed by the Federal Circuit.797 
O. Double Patenting 
In Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc.,798 Sanofi successfully obtained a 
preliminary injunction against Apotex on the basis of an 
infringement of its patent for clopidogrel bisulfate, a pharmaceutical 
designed to inhibit blood platelet aggregation and reduce the risk of 
heart attack or stroke.799  Apotex appealed the district court’s grant of 
a preliminary injunction, alleging that the patent was invalid on a 
number of grounds, including obviousness and obviousness-type 
double patenting.800  In considering Apotex’s claim that the district 
court had “committed clear error in concluding that the double 
patenting inquiry was subsumed by the broader obviousness 
inquiry,”801 the Federal Circuit pointed out that Apotex had “fail[ed] 
to set forth any arguments on appeal that raise[d] a substantial 
question with respect to the validity of claim 3 based on that defense,” 
and declined to reverse the grant of the preliminary injunction.802  
Due to this infirmity on appeal, the court did not address Apotex’s 
contention that “an obviousness inquiry is distinct from the double 
patenting inquiry and should have been independently analyzed.”803 
P. Recapture Doctrine 
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Guidant Corp.,804 the Federal Circuit considered 
whether certain claims of a reissue patent were “invalid by reason of 
violation of the rule against recapturing surrendered subject 
matter.”805  The court explained that 35 U.S.C. § 251 permits a 
patentee to broaden the scope of an existing patent to include 
subject matter that had been erroneously excluded from the patent.806  
                                                          
 796. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 797. Id. at 1382, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877. 
 798. 470 F.3d 1368, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 799. Id. at 1372, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 800. Id. at 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 801. Id. at 1380, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104. 
 802. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
 803. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104. 
 804. 465 F.3d 1360, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1558 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 805. Id. at 1364, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.  The court also considered the 
issue in Kim v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006), and Medrad, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group L.P., 466 F.3d 1047, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir. 2006), which are discussed below. 
 806. See 465 F.3d at 1372, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 251) 
(finding the reissue of a patent permissible where “the patent is, through error 
‘without any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or 
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The Federal Circuit recognized that this rule “is ‘based on 
fundamental principles of equity and fairness, and should be 
construed liberally.’”807 The court further recognized that “attorney[] 
failure to appreciate the full scope of [an] invention” is one of the 
most common sources of patent defect and that such error is 
generally sufficient to justify reissue.808 
Reissue proceedings, however, cannot be used to obtain subject 
matter that could not have been included in the original patent. 
Under the “recapture” rule, the deliberate surrender of a claim to 
certain subject matter during the original prosecution of the 
application for the patent “made in an effort to overcome a prior art 
rejection” is not such “error” as will allow the patentee to recapture 
that subject matter in a reissue.809  The court explained that surrender 
can occur by argument or amendment.810 
The Federal Circuit applied the three-step analysis for the 
recapture rule:  (1) “whether, and in what respect, the reissue claims 
are broader in scope than the original patent claims;” (2) “whether 
the broader aspects of the reissue claims relate to subject matter 
surrendered in the original prosecution;” and (3) “whether the 
reissue claims were materially narrowed in other respects . . . [to] 
avoid the recapture rule.”811  The court noted that whether the claims 
of a reissued patent violate § 251 is a question of law, however, the 
legal conclusion of whether a particular applicant has met the 
statutory requirements of § 251 is based on underlying findings of 
fact, which the court will sustain unless they are shown to be clearly 
erroneous.812 
In Medtronic, the challenger argued that the reissue patent 
improperly recaptured two subject matters covered in the claims at 
issue.813  The Federal Circuit recognized that the first subject matter 
was disclosed in the initial patent application, but was removed 
before filing.814  The court explained that cancellation “alone does 
                                                                                                                                      
invalid, . . . by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to 
claim in the patent. . . .’”). 
 807. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein, 
Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1479, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 808. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 
1519, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369, 371 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (other citations omitted)). 
 809.  See id. at 1372-73, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting In re Clement, 131 
F.3d 1464, 1468-69, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 810. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 811. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting N. Am. Container, Inc. v. 
Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 1349, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1556 
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 812. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (citations omitted). 
 813. See id. at 1370, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564. 
 814. See id. at 1375, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
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not mean that the [subject matter] was surrendered.”815  Whether 
recapture applies is fact-specific and depends “particularly on the 
reasons for the cancellation.”816  The Federal Circuit concluded that 
“no deliberate surrender of subject matter to obtain allowance of the 
claims” occurred, because the prosecution history made clear that 
neither the examiner nor the prosecuting attorney considered the 
subject matter a part of the invention.817  The court agreed with the 
district court that, because the claims at issue were not amended over 
prior art and because the amendments were clarifying amendments, 
there was no clear admission that the amended claims were not 
patentable.818 
On the second issue, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district 
court that the amendment was never disclosed in the original 
application, and that it thus it could not have been surrendered by 
amendment.819  The Federal Circuit noted that during prosecution of 
the original claim, the patentee’s attorney argued that the art at issue 
was distinguishable and more narrow from prior art.820  “[W]hen a 
reissue claim, while broader in certain respects than the original 
patent claim, is materially narrowed in other respects, the recapture 
rule does not apply.”821  The court affirmed the district court’s 
determination and held that the reissue patent was not invalid, 
because the subject matter of the claims at issue was not surrendered 
by amendment or by argument during the prosecution of the original 
patent application.822 
In another case, Kim v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,823 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, in pertinent part, the district court’s determination that 
certain patent claims were not invalid.824  The court held that the 
patentee’s amending limitations were not added to overcome 
rejection.825  In so holding, the court applied only the second step of 
the three-step recapture rule, because the patentee conceded that the 
                                                          
 815. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 816. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 817. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568 (“This is the kind of inadvertence that the 
reissue doctrine was meant to remedy.”).  The Federal Circuit also agreed with the 
district court that the patentee’s attorney did not surrender the subject matter by 
argument.  Id., 80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1568. 
 818. Id. at 1375-76, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 819. Id. at 1377, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569. 
 820. Id. at 1378, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 821. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570 (citing N. Am. Container, 415 F.3d 1335, 
1349, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (BNA) 1556 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 822. Id. at 1379, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571. 
 823. 465 F.3d 1312, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 824. Id. at 1316, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.   
 825. Id. at 1323-24, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502. 
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reissue claims were broader than the original patented claims.826  
Thus, the Federal Circuit considered only whether the broader 
aspects of the claims concerned surrendered subject matter.827  
Notably, the court rejected the patentee’s argument for increased 
deference due to her pro se status during some parts of the 
prosecution and her argument “that she was not responsible for the 
original amendment made with her acquiescence by the examiner.”828 
The Federal Circuit reiterated the well-established rule that the 
challenger to a reissue patent must establish surrender “by clear and 
convincing evidence.”829  The court, however, rejected the district 
court’s suggestion that the patentee’s subjective intent bears on the 
surrender determination.  The Federal Circuit noted: 
Some of our recapture decisions explain that “error under the 
reissue statute does not include a deliberate decision to surrender 
specific subject matter in order to overcome prior art,” and that the 
prerequisite error for a reissue can exist if “there is no evidence 
that the applicant intentionally omitted or abandoned the claimed 
subject matter.”830 
The court, however, made it clear that “these cases do not suggest 
that the patentee’s subjective intent is pertinent to the question of 
surrender,” but rather “simply distinguish between a patentee’s 
inadvertent ‘error’ (for which the reissue statute provides a remedy), 
and a patentee’s ‘surrender’ (for which the recapture rule prevents a 
reissue).”831 
Finally, in Medrad, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group LP,832 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of 
invalidity.833  In Medrad, the patentee filed an application for reissue 
stating that it had claimed less than it had a right to claim in the 
original application (an “underclaiming” error).834  “During 
prosecution of the reissue, [the patentee] narrowed the scope of 
various claims (correcting an ‘overclaiming’ error) and corrected 
inventorship in addition to correcting the underclaiming error.”835  
                                                          
 826. Id. at 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501. 
 827. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501. 
 828. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501. 
 829. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501. 
 830. Id. at 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501 (quoting, respectively, Mentor 
Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 996, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521, 1525 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993) and Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1435, 221 U.S.P.Q. 289, 
294 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 831. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501-02 (citation omitted). 
 832. 466 F.3d 1047, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 833. Id. at 1049, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526-27. 
 834. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527. 
 835. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527. 
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The patentee, however, failed to “submit supplemental reissue 
declarations regarding the overclaiming or inventorship errors as 
required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.175.”836 
The district court ruled that the reissue patent was invalid because 
the error that the patentee corrected was “procedural,” and not one 
of the four errors statutorily defined by § 251.837  At issue on appeal 
was whether the language of § 251 limits corrections to the 
specifications, drawings, or claims; or whether the statute permits the 
correction of any defect that results in invalidity.838  The Federal 
Circuit stressed that § 251 “is remedial in nature, based on 
fundamental principles of equity and fairness, and should be 
construed liberally.”839  The court then ruled that § 251 provides for 
the correction of all errors made without deceptive intent. 
Although such an error may result from the language used in a 
claim, the express terms of the statute do not refer only to errors in 
the claim language itself . . . . Rather, the highlighted language in 
section 251 can be read to encompass any error that causes a 
patentee to claim more or less than he had a right to claim.840 
The Federal Circuit held that the language in § 251—“by reason of 
the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the 
patent”—does not require that the error occur in the actual language 
of the claims.841 
                                                          
 836. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527. 
 837. See id. at 1049-50, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.  On motion for summary 
judgment, the patent challenger argued that the reissue was defective pursuant to 
§ 251 because it did not correct one of four statutorily defined errors:  (1) a defect in 
the specification; (2) a defect in the drawings; (3) an overclaiming error; or (4) an 
underclaiming error.  Id. at 1049, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.  The district “court 
construed section 251 as requiring ‘that some error in the specification, drawings, or 
a claim of the patent be corrected as a result of the reissue process.’”  Id., 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525 (citing Medrad Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group LP, 391 F. 
Supp. 2d 374, 378 (W.D. Pa. 2005)). 
 838. See id. at 1050-51, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.  Specifically, at issue was the 
phrase “by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim 
in the patent.”  Id. at 1051, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528. 
 839. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528 (citing In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 1579, 
229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 840. Id. at 1052, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529. 
 841. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.  The Federal Circuit refused to consider 
additional arguments raised by the challenger concerning compliance with reissue 
regulations 37 C.F.R. § 1.171-.179, which require an applicant to file an oath or 
declaration with an application for reissue.  Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.  
Because the district court did not reach this issue, the Federal Circuit declined to 
consider it in the first instance and noted that it would be more appropriately 
addressed by the district court on remand.  See id. at 1052-53, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1530. 
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IV.  INFRINGEMENT 
“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention, within the United States . . . during the term of 
the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”842  “[P]atent infringement 
analysis involves two steps.”843  First, the claim must be properly 
interpreted or “construed” to determine its meaning and scope.844  
Second, a court should compare the properly construed claim to the 
accused product to determine whether the accused product contains 
every element of the properly construed claim.845 
There were several iterative but still notable developments this past 
year with respect to infringement analysis.  In July 2005, the Federal 
Circuit issued its en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.,846 which 
comprehensively summarized and clarified its law on claim 
construction, focusing on the proper role, in claim construction, of a 
patent’s specification and prosecution history in relation to general 
or field specific dictionaries.847  This year, the Federal Circuit further 
refined and applied the teachings of Phillips.848 
Another important development in infringement law over the past 
several years has been the prevalence of summary judgment rulings.849  
This year, the Federal Circuit again addressed numerous cases where 
district courts had granted summary judgment as to infringement or 
non-infringement.850  The past year also occasioned further 
consideration and refinement of the limitations on the doctrine of 
equivalents as set forth in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co.851  And among the more notable developments in the 
area of infringement was the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in 
DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co.,852 which clarified that a party can be held 
                                                          
 842. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (defining infringement). 
 843. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 
1322, 1326, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). 
 844. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385. 
 845. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385; see also Flex-Rest, LLC v. Steelcase, Inc., 
455 F.3d 1351, 1361-62, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1620, 1627 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(explaining that every element of a claim is material for this analysis). 
 846. 415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 847. Id. at 1319-24, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331-35. 
 848. See infra notes 864-873 and accompanying text. 
 849. See, e.g., Adamo et al., supra note 14, at 1609-12. 
 850. See infra notes 291-325 and accompanying text. 
 851. 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002) (noting that “[a] patentee’s decision to narrow his 
claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of the 
territory between the original claim and the amended claim,” and holding “that the 
patentee should bear the burden of showing that the amendment does not 
surrender the particular equivalent in question”). 
 852. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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liable for inducing infringement only upon a determination that it 
specifically intended that another party infringe a patent.853 
A. Claim Construction 
Prior to 2005, there had been some confusion as to the hierarchy 
of tools that may be used to construe or interpret a patent claim.  It 
had long been settled that “[i]t is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law 
that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the 
patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’”854  And the Federal Circuit 
has “frequently stated that the words of a claim ‘are generally given 
their ordinary and customary meaning,’” which is “the meaning that 
the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in 
question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing 
date of the patent application.”855  Difficulties arise, however, because 
it is not always easy to ascertain the “ordinary and customary 
meaning” of a particular claim term.856  Thus, it has also been well 
accepted that “the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to 
read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in 
which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire 
patent, including the specification.”857  Accordingly, “‘the best source 
for understanding a technical term is the specification from which it 
arose, informed, as needed, by the prosecution history.’”858  The 
Federal Circuit has also noted that “[c]onsistent with that general 
principle, our cases recognize that the specification may reveal a 
special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs 
from the meaning it would otherwise possess.  In such cases, the 
inventor’s lexicography governs.”859 
                                                          
 853. See id. at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (stating that “inducement 
requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s 
infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer’s 
activities”). 
 854. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, 
Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 855. Id. at 1312-13, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326 (citing numerous cases). 
 856. Id. at 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 857. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 858. Id. at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. 
v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)) (citing several additional cases). 
 859. Id. at 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. 
Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1662-63 (Fed. Cir. 
2002)). 
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Notwithstanding these basic principles, there had been confusion 
regarding the role in claim construction of general-purpose or field-
specific dictionaries.860  The court explained: 
In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as 
understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent 
even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves 
little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of 
commonly understood words.  In such circumstances, general 
purpose dictionaries may be helpful.  In many cases that give rise to 
litigation, however, determining the ordinary and customary 
meaning of the claim requires examination of terms that have a 
particular meaning in a field of art.861 
The court also noted: 
Within the class of extrinsic evidence, the court has observed that 
dictionaries and treatises can be useful in claim construction.  We 
have especially noted the help that technical dictionaries may 
provide to a court “to better understand the underlying 
technology” and the way in which one of skill in the art might use 
the claim terms.  Because dictionaries, and especially technical 
dictionaries, endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms 
used in various fields of science and technology, those resources 
have been properly recognized as among the many tools that can 
assist the court in determining the meaning of particular 
terminology to those of skill in the art of the invention.  Such 
evidence, we have held, may be considered if the court deems it 
helpful in determining “the true meaning of language used in the 
patent claims.”862 
The main source of difficulty had been in reconciling the role of 
dictionaries with the role of the specification and prosecution history: 
The main problem with elevating the dictionary to [excessive] 
prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning 
of words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the 
context of the patent.  Properly viewed, the “ordinary meaning” of 
a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the 
entire patent.  Yet heavy reliance on the dictionary divorced from 
the intrinsic evidence risks transforming the meaning of the claim 
term to the artisan into the meaning of the term in the abstract, 
out of its particular context, which is the specification.863 
                                                          
 860. See id. at 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (noting that court’s previous 
discussions of “the use of dictionaries in claim construction . .   require[] 
clarification”). 
 861. Id. at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (internal citation omitted). 
 862. Id. at 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (internal citations omitted). 
 863. Id. at 1321, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
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Therefore, the court held in Phillips that a court may consult 
dictionaries as part of construing patent claims, but must “attach the 
appropriate weight” to the specification and the prosecution history 
in its analysis.864  The court explained: 
A claim should not rise or fall based upon the preferences of a 
particular dictionary editor, or the court’s independent decision, 
uninformed by the specification, to rely on one dictionary rather 
than another.  Finally, the authors of dictionaries or treatises may 
simplify ideas to communicate them most effectively to the public 
and may thus choose a meaning that is not pertinent to the 
understanding of particular claim language.865 
While this guidance is certainly helpful, it is also exceedingly 
general.  The court made clear that it was “not attempt[ing] to 
provide a rigid algorithm for claim construction.”866  As a result of this 
limited guidance, as well as the belief of some of the court’s judges 
that claim construction is not the purely legal endeavor that the 
court’s majority has described,867 Judges Mayer and Newman 
dissented, urging that: 
[w]hat we have wrought . . . is the substitution of a black box, as it 
so pejoratively has been said of the jury, with the black hole of this 
court.  Out of this void we emit “legal” pronouncements by way of 
“interpretive necromancy”; these rulings resemble reality, if at all, 
only by chance.  Regardless, and with a blind eye to the 
consequences, we continue to struggle under this irrational and 
reckless regime, trying every alternative—dictionaries first, 
dictionaries second, never dictionaries, etc., etc., etc.868 
The dissent construed the majority opinion as stating nothing 
more than a rule “that [the court] will decide cases according to 
whatever mode or method results in the outcome we desire, or at 
least allows us a seemingly plausible way out of the case.”869  The 
dissent concluded by warning that “[e]loquent words can mask much 
mischief.  The court’s opinion today is akin to rearranging the deck 
chairs on the Titanic—the orchestra is playing as if nothing is amiss, 
but the ship is still heading for Davey Jones’ locker.”870  It is too soon 
to tell if the dissenters’ concerns will continue to manifest themselves 
                                                          
 864. See id. at 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335. 
 865. Id. at 1322, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (citation omitted). 
 866. Id. at 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335. 
 867. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (clarifying that 
claim construction is a legal issue reserved exclusively for the court). 
 868. 415 F.3d at 1330, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339 (Mayer & Newman, JJ., 
dissenting). 
 869. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339. 
 870. Id. at 1334-35, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342. 
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in the court’s decisions, but this year’s decisions do provide 
significant guidance as to the principles set forth in Phillips. 
1. Claim language 
As noted above, claim construction starts with examining the words 
of the patent claim, and ascertaining the “ordinary and customary 
meaning” of those words to “a person of ordinary skill in the art in 
question at the time of the invention.”871  The court in Phillips noted 
that in some circumstances the claim language is easily interpreted, 
particularly with the aid of dictionaries: 
In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as 
understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent 
even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves 
little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of 
commonly understood words.  In such circumstances, general 
purpose dictionaries may be helpful.872 
The court also recognized, however, that “in many cases that give 
rise to litigation, . . .  determining the ordinary and customary 
meaning of the claim requires examination of terms that have a 
particular meaning in a field of art.”873  This year’s cases demonstrate 
several principles relevant to construing claim terms that lack 
obvious, facially plain meanings. 
All words in a claim must be given effect.  “[C]laims are interpreted 
with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim.”874  In Bicon, 
Inc. v. Straumann Co., the court explained the rationale for this 
principle: 
The purpose of a patent claim is to define the precise scope of a 
claimed invention, thereby ‘giving notice both to the examiner at 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office during prosecution, and to 
the public at large, including potential competitors after the patent 
has issued.  Allowing a patentee to argue that physical structures 
and characteristics specifically described in a claim are merely 
superfluous would render the scope of the patent ambiguous, 
leaving examiners and the public to guess about which claim 
language the drafter deems necessary to his claimed invention and 
which language is merely superfluous, nonlimiting elaboration.875 
                                                          
 871. Id. at 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326 (majority opinion) (citations 
omitted). 
 872. Id. at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 873. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 874. Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267, 
1272 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 875. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272. 
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Thus, in Bicon, the court held that a claim for a dental implant that 
included language describing an abutment that lays above the 
gumline to which a crown can be attached was limited to implants 
that contain such an abutment.876  Similarly, in Flex-Rest, LLC v. 
Steelcase, Inc.,877 the court determined that it had to give effect to the 
term “sidewall” in a claim for a computer keyboard positioning 
system.878  The court rejected the patentee’s argument that the term 
was “‘minor,’ ‘inconsequential,’ and ‘unimportant,’” because that 
argument “disregards the basic patent law doctrine that every 
limitation of a claim is material.”879  Likewise, in Aero Products 
International, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp.,880 the court refused to read 
the term “substantially hermetic seal” in a claim for an inflatable 
support system, such as an air mattress, to require a “complete 
hermetic seal,” because doing so would “render the term 
‘substantially’ illusory.”881 
Separate claims should not be read to be redundant.  A corollary to the 
principle that all words in a claim should be given effect is that 
separate claims in a patent should each be given separate effect.  In 
nCube Corp. v. SeaChange International, Inc.,882 the Federal Circuit 
construed the term “upstream manager” in a claim for storage of 
multimedia sources over a network.883  The court rejected the 
construction put forth by SeaChange that the upstream manager 
term requires routing of information by using “only logical,” virtual 
addresses assigned by the storage apparatus, rather than “physical” 
addresses that reflect the information’s actual location in the 
connection manager.884  The court reasoned that “[t]he creation of a 
virtual circuit, or ‘virtual connection,’ appears only in dependent 
claim 2 as a ‘further’ function of the connection service.”885  The 
claim at issue (claim 1), however, “does not describe an upstream 
manager that requires routing only with logical addresses.”886  
Accordingly, the court concluded that “[t]o read a requirement for 
use of logical addresses into claim 1 would impermissibly read the 
                                                          
 876. See id. at 946-52, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269-74. 
 877. 455 F.3d 1351, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1620 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 878. Id. at 1361-62, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627. 
 879. Id. at 1361, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626-27. 
 880. 466 F.3d 1000, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 881. Id. at 1012-13, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-89. 
 882. 436 F.3d 1317, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 883. Id. at 1321-22, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85. 
 884. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85. 
 885. Id. at 1321, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85. 
 886. Id. at 1321-22, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
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‘virtual connection’ limitation of claim 2 into claim 1, making these 
claims redundant.”887 
The same words generally have the same meaning throughout the patent 
claims.  A complementary principle is that the same words in a patent 
generally should be construed to have the same meaning even where 
the words are contained in different claims.  In Schoenhaus v. Genesco, 
Inc.,888 the court examined two possible constructions of the term 
“orthotic device” in a patent for a portion of, or insert into, certain 
shoes.889  The court noted that both claims 1 and 2 of the patent 
included the “orthotic device” term, and referred to the 
“‘presumption that the same terms appearing in different portions of 
the claims should be given the same meaning unless it is clear from the 
specification and prosecution history that the terms have different meanings at 
different portions of the claims.’”890  Even though only claim 1 was at 
issue, the court examined whether a possible construction of 
“orthotic device”—“a ‘shoe built to have the shape of the interior of 
the insert’”—would make sense if applied to claim 2, which claims “a 
footwear product having as an element thereof an orthotic device as 
claimed in claim 1.”891  The court concluded that the possible 
construction of “‘orthotic device’ renders claim 2 nonsensical,” 
because it would lead claim 2 to be construed to mean “‘a footwear 
product having an element thereof a shoe built to have the shape of 
the interior of the insert as claimed in claim 1,’” and thus “cannot be 
correct.”892 
A similar analysis was undertaken in Semitool, Inc. v. Dynamic Micro 
Systems Semiconductor Equipment GmbH,893 where the court addressed 
the significance of a claim term in a prior, related patent 
application.894  In that case, the claim term “processing chamber” had 
been defined in a parent application, which had ultimately led to a 
different patent, as “a processing vessel defining a process chamber 
therewithin.”895  Even though such a clear definition was lacking in 
the patent at issue, the court reasoned that “the same definition of 
the processing chamber” should likely apply to both the patent 
                                                          
 887. Id. at 1322, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 888. 440 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 889. Id. at 1356-57, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253-54. 
 890. Id. at 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254 (quoting Fin Control Sys. Pty., Ltd. 
v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1318, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
 891. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254. 
 892. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254. 
 893. 444 F.3d 1337, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 894. Id. at 1345-48, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444-46. 
 895. Id. at 1346, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444-45. 
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resulting from the “parent application” and that resulting from the 
“continuation application,” which led to the patent at issue.896 
The context in which a claim term is placed may be critical.  The 
appropriate construction of a claim term may be informed by the 
“context of the surrounding words of the claim.”897  Thus, in Wilson 
Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,898 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the claim term “gap” in a patent for a softball bat.899  The 
court noted the principle that claim terms should generally “have the 
same meaning” in different claims of the same patent, but 
emphasized that the term “gap” had been modified differently in 
claim 1 and claim 15 of the patent.900  In claim 1, the term “gap” was 
modified by the phrase, “forming at least part of an annular shape,” 
whereas in claim 15 the term was modified by the preceding phrase, 
“annular.”901  Since the term “annular” was construed to mean “of or 
relating to an area formed by two concentric circular or curved 
regions,” the court determined that claim 1 does not require 
concentricity of the gap between the frame of the bat and an insert 
into that frame, and permits “some contact between the insert and 
frame.”902  In contrast, because it features an “annular gap,” claim 15 
requires concentricity of both the frame and the insert.903 
The language of a preamble to a claim can be limiting.  In Bicon, Inc. v. 
Straumann, Co.,904 the Federal Circuit addressed the effect of language 
in the preamble to a claim.905  The court explained that, as a general 
matter, “‘whether to treat a preamble as a claim limitation is 
determined on the facts of each case in light of the claim as a whole 
and the invention described in the patent.’”906  “Preamble language 
that merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention is 
generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim.”907  “However, 
the preamble is regarded as limiting if it recites essential structure 
                                                          
 896. Id. at 1346-47, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445. 
 897. ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1516, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 898. 442 F.3d 1322, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 899. Id. at 1328-29, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 900. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 901. Id. at 1324-25, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 902. Id. at 1328, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 903. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (explaining that “a claim without the 
‘annular’ requirement or with only a partial annular requirement . . . do[es] not 
require concentricity”). 
 904. 441 F.3d 945, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 905. Id. at 948-53, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267-74. 
 906. Id. at 952, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273 (quoting Storage Tech. Corp. v. 
Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 831, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 
2003)). 
 907. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273 (citations omitted). 
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that is important to the invention or necessary to give meaning to the 
claim.”908  The court evaluated a preamble to a claim for a dental 
implant prosthesis providing that: 
An emergence cuff member for use in preserving the interdental 
papilla during the procedure of placing an abutment on a root 
member implanted in the alveolar bone of a patient in which the 
abutment has a frusto-spherical basal surface portion and a conical surface 
portion having a selected height extending therefrom comprising . . . .909 
The court concluded that the emphasized language “recites essential 
elements of the invention pertaining to the structure of the abutment 
that is used with the claimed emergence cuff,” and thus limits the 
patent claim.910 
Similarly, in On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc.,911 
the Federal Circuit addressed the effect of a claim preamble stating:  
“A method of high speed manufacture of a single copy of a book 
comprising the steps of . . . .”912  The district court had determined 
that the preamble did not limit the claim; on appeal, the Federal 
Circuit reversed, and ruled that “the preamble in this case necessarily 
limits the claims, in that it states the framework of the invention, 
whose purpose is rapid single-copy printing of a customer’s selected 
book . . . .”913  Thus, the Federal Circuit held that a jury instruction 
stating that the preamble did not limit the claim to the “high speed 
manufacture of a single copy” of a book, was erroneous.914 
2. Specification (written description) 
A fundamental part of the intrinsic evidence critical to claim 
construction is the patent specification or written description that 
accompanies patent claims.915  In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the court 
explained that “the specification ‘is always highly relevant to the 
claim construction analysis.  Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single 
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”916  Thus, a “person of 
                                                          
 908. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273 (citations omitted). 
 909. Id. at 948, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270 (emphasis added). 
 910. Id. at 952, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274. 
 911. 442 F.3d 1331, 1343-44, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428, 1436-37 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 912. Id. at 1336, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431. 
 913. Id. at 1343, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437. 
 914. See id. at 1343-44, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437 (explaining that “[t]he 
preamble embraces the totality of these limitations”). 
 915. Philips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (remarking that it is “entirely appropriate for a court, when conducting 
claim construction, to rely heavily on the written description for guidance as to the 
meaning of claims”). 
 916. Id. at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)). 
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ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in 
the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term 
appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the 
specification.”917  “The importance of the specification in claim 
construction derives from its statutory role.  The close kinship 
between the written description and the claims is enforced by the 
statutory requirement that the specification describe the claimed 
invention in ‘full, clear, concise, and exact terms.’”918  Ultimately, 
“[t]he claims are directed to the invention that is described in the 
specification; they do not have meaning removed from the context 
from which they arose.”919  Indeed, as noted above, an inventor may 
craft in the specification a “special definition” given to a claim term, 
which will govern.920  Moreover, “the specification may reveal an 
intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor.  
In that instance as well, the inventor has dictated the correct claim 
scope, and the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification, 
is regarded as dispositive.”921 
One of the greatest difficulties in properly using the specification 
to construe a claim is adhering to the important principle that 
limitations not present in the claims should not be read into the 
claim terms.922 
[W]e recognize that the distinction between using the specification 
to interpret the meaning of a claim and importing limitations from 
the specification into the claim can be a difficult one to apply in 
practice.  However, the line between construing terms and 
importing limitations can be discerned with reasonable certainty 
and predictability if the court’s focus remains on understanding 
how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the 
claim terms.  For instance, although the specification often 
describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have 
repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those 
embodiments.  In particular, we have expressly rejected the 
contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the 
                                                          
 917. Id. at 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 918. Id. at 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)). 
 919. Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1076, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 920. Philips, 415 F.3d at 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 921. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (citing SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343-44, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1064-65 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 922. See id. at 1323-24, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334-35. 
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claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that 
embodiment.923 
In all events, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged that 
“interpretation of descriptive statements in a patent’s written 
description is a difficult task, as an inherent tension exists as to 
whether a statement is a clear lexicographic definition or a 
description of a preferred embodiment.”924 
This year, the Federal Circuit has decided several cases in which 
the district courts have grappled with the appropriate use of the 
specification in interpreting patent claims. 
Using the specification to clarify ambiguous claim language.  In 
Schoenhaus v. Genesco, Inc.,925 the court ruled that the specification 
cannot trump the clear meaning of claim language.926  There, the 
court addressed the construction of the term “rigid” in a claim for a 
shoe insert.927  The patentee argued that “rigid” is properly construed 
to encompass material that is “semi-rigid,” and pointed to language in 
the specification stating that the “insert . . . is formed by molding 
semi-rigid material.”928  The district court had rejected this argument, 
and the Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that while “[t]he 
patentee is free to act as his own lexicographer,” the reference in the 
written description to “semi-rigid material” that is “to be used in the 
manufacture of the orthotic device generally” is insufficient to 
overcome the claim language that requires the portion of the insert 
to itself be “rigid.”929 
In Semitool, Inc. v. Dynamic Micro Systems,930 the court looked to the 
patent’s specification to verify its conclusion that the claim term 
“processing chamber” is coextensive with the term “processing 
vessel,” also present in the claim.931  The court emphasized several 
statements in the specification that supported its conclusion, noting 
that “the specification treats the three terms processing bowl, 
processing chamber, and processing vessel synonymously.”932  
Ultimately, the court concluded that “[t]he specification makes no 
                                                          
 923. Id. at 1323, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
 924. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1374, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1443, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 
F.3d 1364, 1369, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 925.  440 F.3d 1354, 1357-58, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 926. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254-55. 
 927. Id. at 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 928. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255 (ellipses in original). 
 929. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 930. 444 F.3d 1337, 1347, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 931. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445. 
 932. Id. 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445. 
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meaningful distinction between the vessel, bowl, or the chamber and 
therefore reinforces that the entire interior of the processing vessel 
and the processing chamber should be interpreted to be 
coextensive.”933  Similarly, in Panduit Corp. v. Hellermanntyton Corp.,934 
the court relied on the specification to verify its construction of the 
term “opening” in a claim for a power box.  The court tentatively 
concluded from the claim language that the opening must descend 
from the “abutment portion” described in the claim.935  The 
specification more completely described “‘an opening formed in the 
abutment portion of the projection which is in communication with 
an aperture formed in a side wall’ and an abutment portion ‘which 
depends from the furthest extent of the top portion.’”936  Since the 
“abutment portion” is “described consistently” in “the written 
description as depending—i.e., extending downward—from a top 
portion of the projection” the court concluded that the “opening” 
must descend as well.937 
In Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp.,938 the Federal 
Circuit looked to the specification to clarify whether the term 
“completion of coalescence” in a claim for a method for making 
plastic laminate boat hulls required that the plastic particulate reach 
its “optimum state.”939  Although it found the claim language itself to 
be ambiguous, the court emphasized that the written description 
described the method as involving “coalescence” that “continues” 
beyond the point at which the molding process is completed and 
describes the invention as an improvement over a prior art patent 
that resulted in coalescence without reaching the particulate’s 
optimum state.940  The court therefore concluded that the term does 
require the plastic particulate to reach its optimum state.941  Similarly, 
in Planet Bingo, LLC v. GameTech International, Inc.,942 the court found 
that the specification clarified the meaning of the term 
“progressive . . . predetermined winning combination” in a claim for 
a bingo machine.943  The court emphasized that the specification 
repeatedly explains that “the game determines a ‘winning 
                                                          
 933. Id. at 1347-48, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446. 
 934. 451 F.3d 819, 829, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1053, 1059-60 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 935. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060. 
 936. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060. 
 937. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060. 
 938. 448 F.3d 1309, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 939. See id. at 1316-17, 1321, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11,1714. 
 940. See id. at 1316-17, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11. 
 941. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11. 
 942. 472 F.3d 1338, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 943. See id. at 1342-43, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
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combination’ before the first bingo ball is drawn, thus making it 
‘predetermined.’”944  As such, the claim would not encompass a 
machine that determines the winning combination after the first 
bingo ball is drawn.945 
As noted above, a special definition set forth in the specification 
will govern the patent claims.  Thus, in Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc.,946 
the Federal Circuit held that the term “urinary bladder submucosa” 
in a claim for a tissue composition used for tissue reconstruction was 
limited by a definition in the specification.947  The specification 
defined the term as “‘urinary bladder submucosa delaminated from 
abluminal muscle cell layers and at least the luminal portion of the 
tunica mucosa of the urinary bladder tissue,’” and the court therefore 
held that it could not include what the definition specifically 
excluded—the delaminated “abluminal muscle cell layers and at least 
the luminal portion of the tunica mucosa” of the urinary bladder 
tissue.948 
Cook Biotech949 also involved the related principle that the 
specification may specifically incorporate by reference limiting 
language from a different patent.950  “‘To incorporate material by 
reference, the host document must identify with detailed particularity 
what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that 
material is found in the various documents.’”951  With respect to the 
claim term “the luminal portion of the tunica mucosa,” the 
specification specifically incorporated the method for preparing 
intestinal submucosa detailed in a prior art patent.952  Therefore, the 
court held that the mucosa defined in the prior art patent was an 
equivalent structure to the tissue claimed by the patent at issue.953 
It is notable that the members of a particular panel often strongly 
disagree as to the appropriate consideration to be afforded 
statements in a patent’s specification.  In Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc.,954 the court addressed the meaning of the term 
“therapeutically effective amount” in a claim for an erythropoietin 
                                                          
 944. See id. at 1343, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
 945. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
 946. 460 F.3d 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 947. See id. at 1373-75, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870-71. 
 948. Id. at 1374, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 949. 460 F.3d 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865. 
 950. See id. at 1376, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 951. Id. at 1376, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (quoting Advanced Display Sys., 
Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000)). 
 952. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 953. See id. at 1377, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 954. 457 F.3d 1293, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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(“EPO”) synthetic hormone.955  The district court had held that the 
term requires one of four biological effects and also an increase in 
hematocrit levels.956  Determining that the claim language itself was 
unclear, the majority looked to the specification for guidance and 
noted that a passage in the specification indicated that the synthetic 
hormone when effective would produce “any or all” of certain 
biological effects:  “e.g., stimulation of reticulocyte response, 
development of ferrokinetic effects (such as plasma from iron 
turnover effects and marrow transmit time effects), erythrocyte mass 
changes, stimulation of hemoglobin C synthesis . . . and, as indicated 
in Example 10, increasing hematocrit levels in mammals.”957  The 
majority determined that the phrase regarding hematocrit levels was 
merely one of the effects listed that would be therapeutically 
effective, but that increased hematocrit levels were not an absolute 
requirement for effectiveness.958 
Chief Judge Michel dissented, contending that the term 
“therapeutically effective” requires more than merely the trigger of 
certain biological effects, but instead requires an effect that will 
actually “heal” or “cure” patients who need the synthetic hormone.959  
Looking to other passages in the specification, Chief Judge Michel 
reasoned that the purpose of the synthetic hormone was to increase 
red blood cells and thus requires that the hematocrit level increase.960  
Accordingly, this case illustrates a pronounced difficulty with relying 
on a patent’s specification—it is often unclear which part of the 
specification is the most probative of the meaning of an ambiguous 
claim term. 
Similarly, in Kim v. Conagra Foods, Inc.,961 the court addressed the 
meaning of the term “potassium bromate replacer” in a claim for an 
oxidizing agent used to strengthen bread dough.962  The district court 
had held that the term required that the replacer must be effective 
and “perform essentially the same function in the production of that 
bread as would potassium bromate.”963  The Federal Circuit panel 
majority affirmed, emphasizing that a passage in the specification 
explained that the claimed potassium bromate replacer is an 
“oxidizing agent” that is “effective and functional throughout the entire 
                                                          
 955. See id. at 1296-97, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707. 
 956. See id. at 1301, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 957. Id. at 1302, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 958. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 959. See id. at 1318, 1319, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724 (Michel, C.J. dissenting). 
 960. See id. at 1318-19, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724. 
 961. 465 F.3d 1312, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 962. See id. at 1316, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496. 
 963. Id. at 1317, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498 (emphasis ommitted). 
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manufacturing process.”964  Thus, the majority held that the claim 
does not encompass an ineffective or inert compound.965 
Judge Schall dissented, urging that the majority had read the 
specification too narrowly.966  Judge Schall looked to other portions of 
the specification that indicate that the “potassium bromate replacer” 
is “a slow acting oxidant that is functional throughout the entire 
manufacturing process.”967  Because the majority had relied on other 
language in the specification that did not mention the “slow acting” 
quality of the compound, Judge Schall contended that it had 
overlooked a critical part of the appropriate claim construction.968  
Accordingly, Judge Schall would have vacated the district court’s 
claim construction and remanded for further analysis.969  Again, this 
case demonstrates the difficulty of selecting the appropriate portion 
of the specification upon which to rely for assistance in claim 
construction. 
Likewise, in Ventana Medical Systems, Inc. v. Biogenex Laboratories, 
Inc.,970 the court did not agree on what portion of the specification 
was most probative in construing the term “dispensing” in a claim for 
a biological assay method.971  The district court had ruled that the 
term was limited only to “direct dispensing.”972  Reviewing the 
specification, the majority concluded that the district court’s 
construction was erroneous because the specification included 
descriptions of multiple dispensing methods, some direct and some 
indirect.973  The majority also noted that while the preferred 
embodiments did contain a “direct dispensing feature,” other 
portions of the specification indicated that the claims were not 
limited only to direct dispensing.974 
Judge Lourie dissented, urging that when properly read, the 
specification made clear that the term is limited to “direct 
dispensing.”975  He emphasized that language other than the language 
relied upon by the majority describes a process that could only be 
completed through direct dispensing.976 
                                                          
 964. See id. at 1318, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498 (emphasis added). 
 965. See id. at 1318-19, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498-99. 
 966. See id. at 1326-28, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504-06. 
 967. See id. at 1326-27, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505. 
 968. See id. at 1327-28, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505-06. 
 969. See id. at 1329, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506. 
 970. 473 F.3d 1173, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 971. See id. at 1176, 1177, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315, 1316. 
 972. See id. at 1178, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317. 
 973. See id. at 1180, 1183, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318, 1320. 
 974. See id. at 1182, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1320. 
 975. See id. at 1185, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322. 
 976. See id. at 1185-86, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322-23 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
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These cases suggest that the meaning one derives from the 
specification may be different depending upon how one approaches 
evaluating the specification.  In Cook Biotech,977 Kim,978 and Ventana,979 
the majorities looked to specific language of the specifications that in 
their view provided an express “definition” of the ambiguous claim 
language.  In each of the dissents in those cases, however, the 
dissenting judge looked more broadly at the specification to 
determine whether the majority’s construction would allow the 
invention to realize the advantages and benefits described in the 
specification.  It is noteworthy that the “specific definition” approach 
carried the day in all three cases. 
The binding effect of specific definitions in the specification.  While it is a 
basic principle of claim construction that a specific definition 
contained in the specification will control the claim language, it is 
not always easy to determine whether language in the specification 
constitutes such a definition.  In Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. 
Velan, Inc.,980 the district court had construed the term “adjustable” as 
having its ordinary meaning of “capable of making a change to 
something or capable of being changed.”981  The Federal Circuit 
vacated and remanded, emphasizing that the specification made 
clear that the “adjustment” called for by the invention occurs only 
“during operation and without removal of the head unit.”982  The 
court noted that the district court’s construction effectively rendered 
the “adjustable” claim term “meaningless” because every mechanical 
device would be “adjustable” under the district court’s definition; the 
court therefore held that the more limited definition set forth in the 
specification had to control.983 
In On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc.,984 the district 
court had construed the term “sales information” in a claim for a 
method of manufacturing a book copy to generally mean “‘data 
stored in a computer which is involved in the promoting and selling 
of a book,’” including purely descriptive information like a book’s 
title or ISBN number.985  The Federal Circuit reversed this claim 
                                                          
 977. Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 978. Kim v. ConAgra Foods Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006). 
 979. 473 F.3d 1173, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314. 
 980. 438 F.3d 1374, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 981. See id. at 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992. 
 982. See id. at 1379, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992. 
 983. See id. at 1379-80, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1993. 
 984. 442 F.3d 1331, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 985. See id. at 1338, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
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construction, emphasizing that the specification identified 
promotional information as “descriptive material such as a synopsis, 
plot outline, author’s biographical summary, etc.,” which “sales 
information” necessarily required be “stored in the computer that is 
made available to the customer.”986  The court held that identifying 
data such as a book’s title and ISBN number were not promotional 
information.987 
In Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc.,988 the district 
court had construed the term “edetate” in a claim for an anesthetic 
compound as “EDTA as well as compounds structurally related to 
EDTA regardless of how they are synthesized.”989  The Federal Circuit 
reversed, emphasizing that the specification described an “edetate” as 
EDTA and “derivatives” of EDTA, rather that structural analogs.990  
The court also noted several statements in the specification that 
indicated that the advantages of the invention are unique to EDTA 
and its derivatives or salts, rather than structural analogs.991  The court 
thus held that the term “edetate” could not encompass structural 
analogs to EDTA.992 
In SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Engineering, Inc.,993 the district court had 
construed the term “shift actuator” as requiring “precision indexed 
downshifting.”994  The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the 
district court had improperly applied a limitation from the 
specification that was relevant to patent claims other than the one at 
issue.995  This case demonstrates the importance of linking statements 
in the specification to the specific claim (indeed, the specific claim 
limitation) one is attempting to construe. 
Non-limitation to preferred embodiments.  A fundamental principle of 
claim construction maintains that it is improper to limit “the claimed 
invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the 
specification.”996  In practice, however, it is often difficult to 
                                                          
 986. See id. at 1338, 1339, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433. 
 987. See id. at 1339, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433. 
 988. 467 F.3d 1370, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 989. See id. at 1375, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (quoting Astrazeneca Pharms., 
LP v. Mayne Pharma (USA), Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 403, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
 990. See id. at 1378, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 991. See id. at 1377-78, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709-10. 
 992. See id. at 1378, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 993. 465 F.3d 1351, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 994. See id. at 1357, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367. 
 995. See id. at 1358-59, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368-69. 
 996. Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., 436 F.3d 1368, 1375, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1948, 1954 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1980)). 
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determine whether particular language in a specification describes a 
claim term in general or merely a preferred embodiment. 
In nCube,997 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
construction of the “upstream manager” claim term as not limited by 
an embodiment that routed messages only using logical, rather than 
physical addresses.998  In Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.,999 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of the term 
“structural formula I” as not limited by specific examples of 
compounds of that formula, particularly because the specification 
stated that “‘[t]hese examples are illustrative and are not to be read 
as limiting the scope of the invention as it is defined by the appended 
claims.’”1000  And in Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Abacus 
Software,1001 the Federal Circuit considered the term “scanner” as not 
being limited by the preferred embodiment that includes a “close 
proximity” requirement.1002 
In contrast, in Varco,1003 the Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court’s construction of the term “relay” because the district court had 
improperly limited that term to its description in a preferred 
embodiment as requiring the use of pneumatically operated valves.1004  
In Wilson Sporting Goods,1005 the court reversed the district court’s 
construction of the term “insert” as “hollow” because the district 
court had improperly limited that term to the preferred embodiment 
and because the term “insert” could encompass both hollow and solid 
inserts and have a consistent meaning in all the claims of the 
patent.1006  And in LG Electronics,1007 the Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court’s construction of the term “requesting agent” as limited 
to the definition in an industry standard incorporated into the 
specification because the district court had failed to appreciate that 
the industry standard was incorporated only “as a preferred 
embodiment” and not to limit the claims.1008 
                                                          
 997. nCube Corp. v. SeaChange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 998. See id. at 1321-22, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85. 
 999. 457 F.3d 1284, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1583 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1000. See id. at 1290, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588. 
 1001. 462 F.3d 1344, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1002. See id. at 1352-53, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230-31. 
 1003. Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., 436 F.3d 1368, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1948 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1004. See id. at 1375-76, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954. 
 1005. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 
F.3d 1322, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1006. See id.  at 1329, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 1007. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1008. See id. at 1374-75, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451-52. 
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A related principle is that claim language should virtually never be 
read to exclude the preferred embodiment.1009  Thus, in Primos, Inc. v. 
Hunter’s Specialties, Inc.,1010 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s construction of the term “engaging” to mean “to come into 
contact with.”1011  The court rejected the construction urged by one of 
the parties that the term had to mean “interlocking” because such a 
construction was not supported by the specification and in fact would 
have excluded a preferred embodiment.1012  Conversely, in Lava 
Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Management, LLC,1013 the Federal Circuit 
disagreed with the district court’s construction of the term 
“distributing and displaying” in a claim for software for securities 
trading as meaning “distribution of the whole combined order book 
to the trader.”1014  The court emphasized that “the specification 
discloses embodiments that distribute and display information for 
only a subset of the combined order book” and concluded that the 
claims should be read to cover those embodiments.1015 
Specific disavowals or disclaimers of claim coverage.  A final principle 
that frequently arises when using the specification to aid in claim 
construction is that specific statements disclaiming coverage will be 
binding.  Thus, in Honeywell International, Inc. v. ITT Industries, Inc.,1016 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the 
claim term “‘fuel injection system component’ is limited to a fuel 
filter.”1017  The court emphasized that the specification several times 
described “the present invention” as comprising “a fuel filter.”1018  In 
light of these repeated statements, the court concluded that “[t]he 
public is entitled to take the patentee at his word and the word was 
that the invention is a fuel filter,” notwithstanding that the court’s 
construction limited the claim term to the preferred embodiment.1019 
                                                          
 1009. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 USPQ2d (BNA) 
1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Such an interpretation is rarely, if ever, correct and 
would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.”).  But see Elekta Instrument 
S.A. v. O.U.R. Sci. Int’l Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (holding that overwhelming evidence demonstrated that claim term could not 
encompass preferred embodiment). 
 1010. 451 F.3d 841, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1011. See id. at 847, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1134. 
 1012. See id. at 848, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135. 
 1013. 445 F.3d 1348, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1624 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1014. See id. at 1353-54, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627-28. 
 1015. See id. at 1354, 1355, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628-29. 
 1016. 452 F.3d 1312, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1017. See id. at 1318, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299. 
 1018. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299. 
 1019. See id. at 1318-19, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299-1300. 
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In LG Electronics,1020 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s 
construction of the term “cache memory” as requiring “at least two 
caches.”1021  The court noted that “the specification may reveal an 
intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by an inventor.  
In that instance, . . . the inventor has dictated the correct claim scope, 
and the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification, is 
regarded as dispositive.”1022  Nevertheless, the court held that there 
had been no specific disavowal of a cache memory with a single 
cache, noting that the portion of the specification that the district 
court had relied upon related to multi-cache systems that were 
severed from the patent at issue during its prosecution history.1023  
This case again demonstrates that it is critical to match statements 
relied upon in the specification with the specific claim at issue. 
3. Prosecution history 
“In addition to consulting the specification, we [the Federal 
Circuit] have held that a court ‘should also consider the patent’s 
prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’”1024  “‘[A]n invention is 
construed not only in the light of the claims, but also with reference 
to the file wrapper or prosecution history in the Patent Office.’”1025  
“[T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the 
claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the 
invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the 
course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it 
would otherwise be.”1026  In 2006, the Federal Circuit decided several 
cases in which the prosecution history played a significant role in 
claim construction. 
Use of prosecution history in construing ambiguous terms.  Prosecution 
history can often be helpful in construing unclear claim terms.  For 
instance, in Amgen,1027 the court turned to the prosecution history to 
confirm its construction that the term “therapeutically effective” did 
                                                          
 1020. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1021. See id. at 1377, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453. 
 1022. Id. at 1378, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1023. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 1024. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 
(Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 1025. Id. at 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (quoting Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966)). 
 1026. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 1027. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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not require an increase in hematocrit.1028  The court noted that 
during prosecution of the patent, the patentee stated that the 
claimed invention had several uses relating to low red-blood-cell 
counts, but there was no indication that the scope of the invention 
should be limited only to such uses.1029  Likewise, in Aero Products 
International, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp.,1030 the Federal Circuit 
examined the prosecution history to aid in its construction of the 
claim term “substantially hermetic seal.”1031  The court affirmed the 
district court’s construction that the term did not require a 
“complete hermetic seal,” based in part upon the prosecution history 
which showed that language in the claim suggesting that the 
invention provides “a complete hermetic seal” when a valve is in 
closed position was added without regard to the “quality of the 
seal.”1032  Therefore, the court concluded that the “complete hermetic 
seal” language did not limit the “substantially hermetic seal” claim 
term.1033 
In Old Town Canoe,1034 the court relied on the prosecution history to 
support its conclusion that the term “completion of coalescence 
means progress of coalescence to the optimum state.”1035  The court 
noted that the claim had been amended to make clear that 
coalescence is completed such that it produces a “coherent fused 
layer” of material.1036  Indeed, the claim had originally been rejected 
because it had not made clear whether the “cooling” part of the claim 
method was concurrent with the “completion” of coalescence— 
“whether coalescence would reach a point of completion.”1037  
Accordingly, the court found that this prosecution history compelled 
such a construction. 
Role of the prosecution history of other patent applications.  In certain 
circumstances, like in Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, 
Inc.,1038 the prosecution history of related patent applications may be 
useful in construing patent claims.  In that case, the court examined 
the prosecution history of the first application in a series of 
                                                          
 1028. See id. at 1303, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 1029. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 1030. 466 F.3d 1000, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1031. See id. at 1012-15, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1488-90. 
 1032. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-90. 
 1033. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-90. 
 1034. Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1035. See id. at 1317, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1036. See id. at 1317-18, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1037. See id. at 1317, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1038. 450 F.3d 1350, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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applications, one of which led to the patent at issue.1039  In a claim for 
PDA devices, the court affirmed the district court’s construction of 
the term “host interface” to mean “a direct parallel bus interface.”1040  
The prosecution history of the first application made clear that one 
of the key innovations of the invention was to create a “direct” bus 
connection.1041  Therefore, the court concluded: 
Although arguments in the prosecution of related applications 
should not receive undue weight, for claims and issues and 
inventions vary from case to case, here the applicant was describing 
the broad technologic basis of these related applications; the usage 
in each application is consistent with the district court’s view of 
“host interface” as requiring “a direct parallel bus interface.”  That 
interface excludes the serial connection of the prior art, and 
requires direct parallel connection.  The district court’s 
interpretation of this term is correct, and is affirmed.  1042 
In contrast, the court in Pfizer1043 affirmed the district court’s 
conclusion that the prosecution histories of several foreign 
counterpart patents and a later, unrelated U.S. patent, were 
irrelevant to claim construction in that case.1044  The court noted that 
the statements at issue were irrelevant because they “were made in 
response to patentability requirements unique to Danish and 
European law.”1045  Further, statements made in the prosecution of an 
unrelated U.S. patent were “irrelevant to claim construction ‘absent a 
formal relationship or incorporation during prosecution’ of the 
patent at issue.”1046  Thus, just as it is important to match language in 
the specification with the relevant patent claim or claim term, it is 
also critical to match statements in prosecution histories with the 
correct patent or patents to which they are relevant. 
Amendments overcoming a rejection or distinguishing prior art.  Where a 
patentee has amended a claim to overcome a rejection or distinguish 
the prior art, any limitation imposed by that amendment is binding 
and will control construction of the claim.  Thus, in Schoenhaus,1047 the 
court relied on the prosecution history to confirm its conclusion that 
                                                          
 1039. See id. at 1356, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1789-90. 
 1040. See id. at 1353, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788. 
 1041. See id. at 1356-57, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789-90. 
 1042. Id. at 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790. 
 1043. Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1583 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1044. See id. at 1290, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588. 
 1045. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1588. 
 1046. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (quoting Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., 
373 F.3d 1158, 1167-68 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 1047. Schoenhaus v. Genesco, Inc., 440 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006). 
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the term “rigid” in a claim for a portion of an orthotic shoe insert 
could not be construed to include a “semi-rigid” insert.1048  The court 
noted that the claim had been rejected as obvious in light of the prior 
art; to overcome this rejection, the applicants were required to use 
the term “rigid” as part of the claim language.1049  Even though the 
patent examiner did not specifically explain why he insisted on the 
inclusion of the term “rigid,” the court reasoned that there was a 
presumption that “the PTO had a substantial reason related to 
patentability for including the limiting element added by 
amendment,” and that this presumption had not been overcome by 
the patentee.1050  The court concluded that the term “rigid” was 
necessary to secure patentability and could not encompass an insert 
that was only “semi-rigid.”1051 
In DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd.,1052 the court examined 
whether an amendment to avoid a prior patent limited the scope of 
the term “slot” in a claim for a medical needle guard.1053  The court 
emphasized that the amendments did not “limit the size of the slot” 
but “concerned only the orientation of the needle wings that moved 
back and forth through the slot.”1054  Therefore, the court concluded 
that “[t]o distinguish the Hughes patent, the patentee did not have 
to, and did not actually, limit the width of the slot.  Thus, the trial 
court correctly construed ‘slot’ as not requiring a defined 
width . . . .”1055 
As with the other intrinsic evidence of claim meaning, these cases 
demonstrate that there must be a specific match between a claim 
amendment and the supposedly limiting language that the 
amendment required.  If in fact the amendment did limit the 
relevant language, that limitation should be given effect in claim 
construction.  However, if the amendment did not limit the specific 
language at issue, the claim term should not be limited by the 
amendment. 
Express disavowals or disclaimers in the prosecution history.  Just as an 
express disclaimer in the language of the specification will limit the 
claim term, such an express disclaimer in the prosecution history will 
generally have a similar effect.  In Purdue Pharma, L.P. v. Endo 
                                                          
 1048. See id. at 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 1049. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 1050. See id. at 1359, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255-56 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson 
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32-33 (1997)). 
 1051. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256. 
 1052. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1053. See id. at 1301, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 1054. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 1055. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
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Pharmaceuticals Inc.,1056 the court examined whether statements in the 
prosecution history had expressly limited the scope of the term 
“controlled release oxycodone formulation” such that it was limited 
to “a four-fold dosage range that controls pain for 90% of 
patients.”1057  The district court had required such a limitation based 
on statements in the prosecution history that the “four-fold dosage 
range” was an improvement over the prior art.1058  The Federal Circuit 
held that the term should not be so limited because the statements in 
the prosecution history did not present the four-fold dosage range as 
“a necessary feature of the claimed oxycodone formulations.”1059  
Therefore, the court concluded that the district court had 
“impermissibly imported a limitation into the claims” from the 
prosecution history.1060 
Whether the prosecution history expressly disclaims certain subject 
matter was an issue that divided the court in Ventana.1061  In that case, 
the majority held that the district court had erroneously ruled that 
various statements in the prosecution history related to the claim 
term “dispensing” had disclaimed coverage of all types of dispensing 
except “direct dispensing.”1062  The court reasoned that the allegedly 
disclaiming language was not directly relevant because it related to 
claims of an ancestor application that used different claim language 
than the claims at issue; indeed, “the allegedly disclaiming statements 
were made with respect to claim language that expressly required 
reagent in the reagent container to be ‘dispensable directly to a 
sample.’”1063  The court also held that statements made in the 
prosecution of two subsequent patent applications were made with 
respect to claim language critically different from that in the claims at 
issue.1064 
Judge Lourie took a different view in his dissent, as he urged that 
the relevant language in the prosecution history of the ancestor 
application did disclaim all dispensing that is not “direct.”1065  Judge 
Lourie did not, however, explain why that prosecution history should 
                                                          
 1056. 438 F.3d 1123, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1057. See id. at 1135, 1136-37, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776, 1777. 
 1058. See id. at 1135, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 1059. See id. at 1136, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777. 
 1060. See id. at 1136-37, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777. 
 1061. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biogenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1062. See id. at 1182-83, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1320. 
 1063. See id. at 1182, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1320. 
 1064. See id. at 1183, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1321. 
 1065. See id. at 1186, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
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govern when applied to claims with different language from that in 
the claims at issue.1066 
4. Extrinsic evidence 
All materials other than the claim terms, specification, written 
description, and prosecution history are “extrinsic evidence” for the 
purposes of claim construction, and generally carry less weight than 
evidence in the intrinsic record. 
Dictionaries.  As noted above,1067 in Phillips1068 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the role of general purpose and field specific dictionaries 
as part of claim construction.1069  In 2006, several decisions attempted 
to apply the guidance set forth in that case. 
In Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp.,1070 the court ruled that the 
district court had properly consulted “scientific and technical 
dictionaries” to construe the term “catalyst” as “a substance that alters 
the velocity of a chemical reaction without being consumed.”1071  In 
doing so, the Federal Circuit emphasized that there was “no 
suggestion that the intrinsic evidence defines the term ‘catalyst.’”1072  
In On Demand,1073 the court indicated that is it appropriate to use 
general-purpose dictionaries for definitions of terms such as 
“information” and “sales” so long as the definitions are consistent 
with the intrinsic record.1074  Ultimately, however, the court held that 
the intrinsic record precluded the district court’s construction that it 
had based on general dictionaries.1075  Thus, these cases suggest that 
use of general dictionaries may be appropriate and useful but only if 
there is no conflict with evidence from the intrinsic record. 
In Old Town Canoe,1076 the court relied heavily on the specification 
and prosecution history to reject one party’s argument that the term 
“completion of coalescence” could refer to bringing the chemical 
process at issue “to a halt.”1077  The party had relied on a dictionary 
definition that included the term “brought to an end” as a definition 
                                                          
 1066. See id. at 1186-87, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 1067. See supra Part IV.A. 
 1068. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 1069. See supra Part IV.A. 
 1070. 441 F. 3d 991, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1071. See id. at 996, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421. 
 1072. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421. 
 1073. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1074. See id. at 1338, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432-33. 
 1075. See id. at 1344, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437. 
 1076. Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1077. See id. at 1315, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
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for “complete”; the court reasoned, however, that the dictionary 
definition could not trump the strong contrary evidence in the 
written description and prosecution history.1078 
In Cook Biotech,1079 the Federal Circuit evaluated the district court’s 
use of a medical dictionary to help define the term “tunica 
mucosa.”1080  The court determined that the district court had 
misunderstood the medical dictionary’s definition, which listed 
several layers that comprised the tunica mucosa, in a manner that 
would not permit the definition to encompass all of the constituent 
layers.1081  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s 
construction in favor of that put forth by the appellant.1082 
In Abacus Software,1083 the court approved of the district court’s use 
of dictionary definitions for the terms “scan” and “scanner” as of the 
time the relevant patent application was filed in 1982.1084  The court 
reasoned that contemporary dictionary definitions were useful to 
determine how “a person of ordinary skill in 1982” would understand 
what the patent claims as a scanner.1085  Notably, the intrinsic evidence 
confirmed the dictionary definitions, further indicating that this was 
the appropriate construction of the terms at issue.1086 
Other extrinsic evidence.  There was very little consideration in 2006 
of other sources of extrinsic evidence.  In Inpro,1087 the court affirmed 
the district court’s decision to exclude expert testimony relevant to 
claim construction.1088  The court noted that a trial court has broad 
discretion in determining whether to admit expert testimony 
regarding claim construction, and it found there was no abuse of 
discretion in the district court’s decision.1089 
                                                          
 1078. See id. at 1315, 1317-18, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709, 1711-12. 
 1079. Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1080. See id. at 1377-78, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873-74. 
 1081. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873-74. 
 1082. See id. at 1378, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 1083. Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elecs. For Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 
1344, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1084. See id. at 1351-52, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 1085. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 1086. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229-30. 
 1087. Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1088. See id. at 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791. 
 1089. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791. 
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5. Canons of construction 
There are several canons or rules of construction that courts 
sometimes employ as an aid to claim construction.  In 2006, the 
Federal Circuit addressed only a few of these. 
Claim Differentiation. 
In the most specific sense, “claim differentiation” refers to the 
presumption that an independent claim should not be construed 
as requiring a limitation added by a dependent claim. . . .  Beyond 
the independent/dependent claim scenario, this court has 
characterized claim differentiation more generally, i.e., as the 
“presumption that each claim in a patent has a different scope.”  
Different claims with different words can, of course, define 
different subject matter within the ambit of the invention.  On the 
other hand, claim drafters can also use different terms to define 
the exact same subject matter.  Indeed this court has acknowledged 
that two claims with different terminology can define the exact 
same subject matter.1090 
Like any other general rule or principle, this canon of construction 
should be applied only where it makes sense in the context of a 
particular case.  In Curtiss-Wright,1091 the court rejected claim 
differentiation as controlling with respect to the appropriate 
construction of the term “adjustable” in a claim for a device used in 
oil refining.1092  The district court had held that the term “adjustable” 
had to mean “capable of making a change to something or capable of 
being changed” because a narrower construction of “adjustable” 
would be inconsistent with other claims in the patent.1093  The Federal 
Circuit relied on the specification to conclude that “adjustable” 
should in fact have a narrower meaning than that construed by the 
district court.1094  The court also found that the district court had 
misapplied the doctrine of claim differentiation because the 
narrower construction would not have rendered superfluous any of 
the other claims of the patent.1095  Furthermore, the court emphasized 
that claim differentiation does not control when it would contradict 
the construction of a term compelled by the specification.1096 
                                                          
 1090. Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1988, 1993-94 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Versa Corp. v. Ag-Bag 
Int’l Ltd., 392 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 1091. Id. at 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988. 
 1092. See id. at 1379-81, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992-94. 
 1093. See id. at 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992. 
 1094. See id. at 1379-81, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992-94. 
 1095. See id. at 1381, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994. 
 1096. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994. 
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Similarly, in SRAM,1097 the court rejected the appellant’s claim 
differentiation argument with respect to the term “precision index 
downshifting.”1098  The appellant had argued that the district court’s 
construction would render superfluous a different claim in the 
patent.1099  However, the Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that 
the two claims had different scopes, with one reciting a “series of 
shifts” and the other reciting a single “down-shifting event.”1100  The 
court thus concluded that the district court’s construction would not 
render the other claim superfluous.1101 
In Inpro,1102 the Federal Circuit likewise concluded that claim 
differentiation did not prescribe a definition of the term “host 
interface” in a claim for a PDA module.1103  The court maintained that 
even though different claims of the patent had used the terms “host 
interface,” “parallel bus interface,” and “direct access” parallel bus, 
the use of those terms did not prevent the term “host interface” from 
requiring a “direct” interface; instead, the specification and 
prosecution history compelled a construction requiring a “direct” 
interface.1104 
In LG Electronics,1105 the Federal Circuit agreed with the appellant 
that the district court’s construction of a claim for a microprocessor 
component was incorrect because it violated the canon of claim 
differentiation.1106  The court explained that requiring the limitation 
of “at least two high speed memories” for claims 1 and 14 of the 
patent could not be reconciled with claim 5 which expressly required 
“at least two cache memory means.”1107  Thus, the court held that 
claim differentiation precluded the district court’s construction.1108 
Role of the accused device in claim construction.  One long-standing 
canon of claim construction is that “construction of the claim is 
independent of the device charged with infringement.”1109  
                                                          
 1097. SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng’g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1098. See id. at 1357-58, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367-68. 
 1099. See id. at 1358, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368. 
 1100. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368. 
 1101. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368. 
 1102. Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1103. See id. at 1353-54, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788. 
 1104. See id. at 1353-57, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788-90. 
 1105. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1106. See id. at 1377, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453. 
 1107. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453. 
 1108. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453. 
 1109. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1327, 
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Pall Corp. v. Hemasure 
Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
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Nevertheless, in several recent decisions, most of them authored by 
Judge Rader, the Federal Circuit has stated that knowledge of the 
accused device may be helpful as part of the claim construction 
analysis:1110  “While a trial court should certainly not prejudge the 
ultimate infringement analysis by construing claims with an aim to 
include or exclude an accused product or process, knowledge of that 
product or process provides meaningful context for the first step of 
the infringement analysis, claim construction.”1111 
Thus, in Wilson Sporting Goods,1112 the court criticized the state of the 
record, in which, based upon a disputed claim construction, there 
was entered a stipulated final judgment of non-infringement: 
In this case, despite entry of a final judgment, neither the trial 
court nor the parties supplied this court with any information 
about the accused products.  Thus, this record affords this court no 
opportunity to compare the accused products to the asserted 
claims.  Accordingly, this court cannot assess the accuracy of any 
infringement or validity determination.  Furthermore, this sparse 
record lacks the complete context for accurate claim 
construction.1113 
In Lava Trading,1114 the court echoed such sentiments: 
Without knowledge of the accused products, this court cannot 
assess the accuracy of the infringement judgment under review and 
lacks a proper context for an accurate claim construction. . . .  
Without the vital contextual knowledge of the accused products or 
processes, this appeal takes on the attributes of something akin to 
an advisory opinion on the scope of the ‘982 patent.1115 
It is therefore unsurprising that in Aero Products,1116 the court 
rejected the defendants’ argument that the district court had “erred 
by construing the term ‘inflation input’ in light of the accused 
device.”1117  The court insisted that the district court’s awareness was 
permissible and explained that “[o]f course the particular accused 
product (or process) is kept in mind, for it is efficient to focus on the 
                                                          
 1110. See supra notes 355-63 and accompanying text. 
 1111. 442 F.3d at 1326-27, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 1112. 442 F.3d 1322, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382. 
 1113. See id. at 1327, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 1114. Lava Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC, 445 F.3d 1348, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1624 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1115. Id. at 1350, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625. 
 1116. Aero Products Int’l, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., 466 F.3d 1000, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1117. See id. at 1012 n.6, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 n.6. 
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construction of only the disputed elements or limitations of the 
claims.”1118 
6. Means-plus-function claim limitations 
An area of claim construction that is often thorny is that involving 
so-called “means-plus-function” or “step-plus-function” claim 
elements.1119  “Claim construction of a means-plus-function limitation 
includes two steps.  First, the court must determine the claimed 
function.  Second, the court must identify the corresponding 
structure in the written description that performs that function.”1120  It 
can be difficult, however, both to determine whether a term written 
without the traditional “means” or “step” language can be construed 
as such a claim element and to identify the “corresponding structure” 
the performs the claimed function. 
In Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,1121 the Federal 
Circuit adopted the district court’s constructions of means-plus-
function claim elements that were mostly undisputed by the parties 
below.1122  In doing so, the court noted several relevant principles for 
construing such claim elements.  First, the court criticized the parties’ 
apparent view that a district court’s construction of a means-plus-
function claim could be binding under collateral estoppel when the 
parties disputed the meaning of the function in that clause:  
“Construction of a means-plus-function term requires first identifying 
the function and then determining the structure disclosed for 
performing that function.  Thus, an attempt to reargue the scope of 
the function would inherently require a new analysis to determine 
the structures disclosed to permit the function.”1123  Second, the court 
noted that the use of different words in a claim creates a presumption 
that those claims have different “meanings,” but in a means-plus-
function claim, it does not create a presumption that those words 
implicate different structures; in other words, where a means-plus-
function claim has more than one “means” clause, those means 
                                                          
 1118. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 n.6 (quoting Scripps Clinic & Research 
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 1119. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be 
expressed as a means or a step for performing a specified function without the recital 
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof . . . .”). 
 1120. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1332, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). 
 1121. 448 F.3d 1324, 78 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1122. See id. at 1332-33, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812-13. 
 1123. Id. at 1332 n.2, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812 n.2. 
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clauses could all refer to the same corresponding structure in the 
specification.1124 
In LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc.,1125 the court 
addressed whether a claim term that does not use the “means” 
language could nevertheless be construed as a means-plus-function 
claim:  “[A] claim term that does not use ‘means’ will trigger the 
rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply.”1126  The court 
held that the trial court had erroneously construed the term “control 
unit” as a means-plus-function limitation, noting that the 
presumption against construing such a term as a means-plus-function 
claim “is a strong one” that can only be rebutted “‘by showing that 
the claim element recites a function without reciting sufficient 
structure for performing that function.’”1127  The court concluded 
that the “control unit” element referred to a “sufficient structure” 
that was contained within the claim itself, namely “a CPU and a 
partition memory system” for performing the stated function of 
“controlling the communication unit.”1128 
Conversely, in Abacus Software, the Federal Circuit agreed with the 
district court’s conclusion that the term “colorant selection 
mechanism” was properly construed as a means-plus-function 
limitation, even though it did not contain the term “means.”1129  After 
noting the presumption against such a construction, the court noted 
that the term “mechanism” contained in the claim limitation did not 
connote a “sufficiently definite structure” to avoid treatment as a 
means-plus-function element.1130  The court explained that where a 
term like “mechanism” is further defined such that it refers to a 
definite structure, treatment as a means-plus-function element may 
be inappropriate, but the court reasoned that the term “mechanism” 
in the patent at issue was not so modified; therefore, the court 
affirmed the district court’s findings with respect to the functions of 
the “colorant selection mechanism” element and the corresponding 
structures in the specification as components of an “ink correction 
module (ICM).”1131 
                                                          
 1124. See id. at 1333 n.3, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813 n.3. 
 1125. 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1126. Id. at 1372, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449 (quoting Lighting World, Inc. v. 
Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344, 1348 
(Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 1127. Id. at 1372, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449 (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., 232 F.3d 
877, 880, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1838 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 1128. See id. at 1372, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449. 
 1129. See Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 
1344, 1353-55, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230-32 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1130. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230-32. 
 1131. Id. at 1355, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. 
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Finally, in DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,1132 the 
Federal Circuit ruled that the district court had properly refused to 
construe the term “compression member” as a means-plus-function 
limitation.1133  After noting the presumption against construing such a 
term as a means-plus-function element, the court determined that the 
claim language and specification make clear “that the term 
‘compression member’ refers to a particular cylindrical insert and is 
not simply a general reference to any structure that will perform a 
particular function.”1134  Accordingly, the court concluded that one of 
ordinary skill in the art would have understood that “compression 
member” referred to a definite structure.1135 
Nonetheless, there is room for further clarity with respect to the 
application of the “‘means’ presumption.”  The Federal Circuit’s case 
law speaks in terms of “presumptions”—which are primarily thought 
of as legal constructs that organize the presentation of factual 
evidence1136—yet the court’s precedents treat construction of means-
plus-function claim elements as a question of law.1137  Thus, there is 
no case law that sets forth any explication of the quantum of 
“evidence” necessary to overcome this “presumption,” which leaves it 
to the judges in a given case to decide, as a matter of law, whether the 
“presumption” has been overcome. 
7. Other issues 
In 2006, the Federal Circuit addressed a handful of other issues 
related to claim construction.  First, the court noted that a party can 
waive appellate review of a claim construction by proposing a 
construction on appeal different from the construction that the party 
had proposed in the trial court.  In Exigent Technology, Inc. v. Atrana 
Solutions, Inc.,1138 the Federal Circuit noted that the claim construction 
one of the parties had asserted on appeal was not made “to the 
district court”; “as a result,” the court stated that it would “not 
disturb” the district court’s construction at issue.1139  In Lava Trading, 
                                                          
 1132. 469 F.3d 1005, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1133. See id. at 1023-24, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877-78.  One of the authors was 
counsel to the DePuy Spine parties in this case. 
 1134. Id. at 1023, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 1135. See id. at 1024, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 1136. See, e.g., IX WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2491, at 304 (James H. Chadborn rev. 
1981) (“A presumption . . . is in its characteristic feature a rule of law laid down by 
the judge and attaching to one evidentiary fact certain procedural consequences as to the 
duty of production of other evidence by the opponent.”). 
 1137.  See, e.g., Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1332, 
78 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1138. 442 F.3d 1301, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1139. See id. at 1306-07, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324-25. 
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however, the court refused to find that a party had waived the claim 
construction it asserted on appeal where that party’s original counsel 
had proposed one claim construction before the district court but 
where the party had obtained new counsel in the district court who 
had asserted in a motion for reconsideration in the district court the 
same construction argued on appeal.1140 
Second, the Federal Circuit noted in Kim v. Conagra Foods, Inc.,1141 
that it is “hesitant” to adopt a claim construction that was not asserted 
by either party in the district court or on appeal.1142  The panel 
majority acknowledged its authority to “adopt claim constructions 
which have not been proposed by either party,” but determined that 
it would be inappropriate to do so with respect to the term 
“potassium bromate replacer” in light of the claim language and 
specification.1143  Judge Schall dissented, urging that the court should 
have adopted a construction not asserted by either of the parties that 
he believed was compelled by explanations of the advantages of the 
invention that were disclosed in the specification.1144 
Finally, the Federal Circuit has been involved in an internal debate 
whether the court should evaluate the district court’s claim 
constructions that are not necessary to resolve a pending appeal.  
Judge Newman has urged that the court should review “all of the 
claim terms whose construction was decided by the district court and 
challenged on appeal,” even where it is not necessary to address some 
of those constructions to decide the appeal.1145  Judge Newman has 
stated: 
I believe we have the obligation to review the construction of the 
three appealed terms, for the interests of the parties and the 
public, as well as judicial economy, require final disposition of the 
issues of claim construction that were decided by the district court, 
and raised on appeal.  This panel’s resolution of this infringement 
action based solely on the construction of “host interface” does not 
resolve, or render moot, the interpretation of the other disputed 
terms. . . . My colleagues’ decision not to review the other disputed 
issues of claim construction leaves unresolved the scope and 
                                                          
 1140. Lava Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC, 445 F.3d 1348, 1352-53, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1624, 1626-27 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1141. 465 F.3d 1312, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1142. See id. at 1319, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499. 
 1143. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499. 
 1144. See id. at 1326-29, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504-06 (Schall, J., dissenting). 
 1145. See Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1358, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1791 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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viability of the claims, for these aspects are relevant to the validity 
and further applicability of the patent in suit.1146 
On the other hand, Judge Dyk has expressed the view that review 
of claim constructions not necessary to decide an appeal is not 
appropriate, at least where the claim construction did not directly 
affect the final judgment in a district court: 
This case once again involves an effort by parties to a patent 
infringement case to have this court opine on a range of claim 
construction issues even thought the judgment of the district court 
is not based on the resolution of those issues.  We decline that 
invitation and limit our consideration to issues presented by the 
judgment under review.  An appeal is not an opportunity to bring 
before the appellate court every ruling with which one of the 
parties disagrees without regard to whether the ruling has in any 
way impacted the final judgment.  The fact that this is a patent case 
does not invoke a different legal regime.1147 
It is difficult to tell precisely how divergent the views of Judge 
Newman and Judge Dyk really are.  It does seem that Judge Newman 
would be much more likely than her colleagues to entertain claim 
construction issues not necessary to resolving an appeal.  It is less 
clear under what circumstances, if any, Judge Dyk or the other 
Federal Circuit judges would address such claim-construction issues.  
At a minimum, however, reaching out to decide issues not germane 
to the judgment under review would appear to raise case-or-
controversy issues under Article III of the Constitution. 
B. Infringement 
1. Literal infringement 
As noted above, a determination of literal infringement requires 
two steps—legal claim construction, followed by factual comparison 
of the accused device or method to the terms of the properly 
construed claim.1148  Resolution of questions of literal infringement 
often follows from claim construction.  Therefore, because literal 
infringement is often determined on summary judgment, the Federal 
Circuit’s disposition of claim construction issues will often lead to a 
corresponding resolution of literal-infringement questions.1149  
Nevertheless, in 2006 there were several decisions in which fact issues 
                                                          
 1146. Id. at 1358-59, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791. 
 1147. Mass. Inst. of Tech. and Elecs. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1350, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1148. See supra note 932. 
 1149. See, e.g., Adamo, supra note 14, at 1608-09. 
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precluded summary judgment as to literal infringement for 
resolution of literal infringement solely as a matter of law. 
Affirmance of summary judgment with respect to literal infringement.  Not 
surprisingly, in 2006 the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment 
with respect to literal infringement in several cases in which it also 
affirmed the district court’s claim constructions.  Thus, in Bicon, the 
court affirmed summary judgment of non-infringement after 
determining that the district court had properly construed a claim for 
a dental implant prosthesis.1150  In Panduit, the court similarly 
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement 
after affirming its construction of a claim for a power box.1151  
Likewise, in Flex-Rest, the court affirmed summary judgment of non-
infringement after affirming the district court’s construction of a 
claim for a computer keyboard positioning system where there was 
“no dispute” that the accused devices did not infringe under the 
district court’s construction.1152  And, in 02 Micro International, Ltd. v. 
Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.,1153 the court affirmed a grant of summary 
judgment after determining that there was no evidence presented 
that could support the only theory of literal infringement properly 
presented to the district court.1154 
In Semitool, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of non-
infringement, but did so based on a claim construction different 
from that adopted by the district court.1155  The district court had 
determined that it was not necessary to decide “whether the 
condenser is part of the process chamber or a separate unit” in 
construing the phrase “supplying drying gas to the process chamber” 
in a claim for a semiconductor wafer carrier cleaning system.1156  The 
Federal Circuit, however, determined that it did need to decide that 
issue to evaluate whether summary judgment was properly granted 
because the specification compelled the conclusion that the 
condenser must be outside the process chamber, and because the 
accused products had a condenser inside the process chamber.1157   
                                                          
 1150. Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 953-56, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1267, 1274-77 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1151. Panduit Corp. v. HellermannTyton Corp., 451 F.3d 819, 829-30, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1053, 1060-61 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1152. Flex-Rest, LLC v. Steelcase, Inc., 455 F.3d 1351, 1362, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1620, 1627 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1153. 467 F.3d 1335, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1154. See id. at 1369, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779. 
 1155. See Semitool, Inc. v. Dynamic Micro Sys. Semiconductor Equip. GmbH, 444 
F.3d 1337, 1345-48, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1444-46 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1156. See id. at 1345, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444. 
 1157. See id. at 1347-48, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446. 
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Reversal of judgment based upon reversed claim constructions.  Just as the 
Federal Circuit has affirmed summary judgments as to literal 
infringement where it has affirmed the district court’s underlying 
claim constructions, it has also reversed outright and granted 
judgment to the losing party below where it has reversed the district 
court’s claim constructions.  Thus, in On Demand, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s construction of the term “sales 
information” and determined that under the correct claim 
construction “no reasonable jury could find infringement”; 
accordingly, the court reversed a jury verdict of infringement and 
ordered judgment of non-infringement.1158 
Similarly, in Cook Biotech, the court reversed the district court’s 
construction of the term “urinary bladder submucosa” in a patent for 
a biological tissue composition and held that under the correct 
construction there could be no literal infringement.1159  Therefore, 
the court reversed the judgment of literal infringement.1160  In Abraxis 
Bioscience, the court reversed the district court’s judgment of literal 
infringement after determining that its construction of the claim 
term “edetate” was incorrect and that under the correct construction 
there could be no literal infringement.1161 
Affirmance of judgments as to literal infringement after trial.  In a 
number of cases, the Federal Circuit affirmed judgments as to literal 
infringement after a jury or bench trial.  In nCube, the court affirmed 
the district court’s construction of the term “upstream manager” in a 
computer system and then affirmed the jury verdict of infringement 
based upon substantial record evidence that the accused product 
infringed.1162  In Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,1163 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed a jury verdict of infringement based upon substantial 
evidence including significant expert testimony as to infringement.1164  
And in Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A.,1165 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a jury verdict of literal infringement based 
upon substantial evidence of literal infringement.1166 
                                                          
 1158. See On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1344-45, 
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428, 1437-38 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1159. See Cook Biotech, Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1378-79, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1874-75 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1160. See id. at 1382, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877. 
 1161. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370, 
1378, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1162. See nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1323, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1481, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1163. 449 F.3d 1209, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1164. See id. at 1219-23, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100-04. 
 1165. 464 F.3d 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed Cir. 2006). 
 1166. See id. at 1348-50, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391-93. 
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In Alza Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.,1167 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a judgment of infringement after a bench trial.1168  The court 
determined that the district court had properly evaluated the 
evidence presented of non-infringement and thus there was no basis 
to overturn the court’s judgment.1169 
Reversal of summary judgment because of disputed issues of fact.  In a few 
cases in 2006, the Federal Circuit reversed or vacated grants of 
summary judgment because of disputed issues of fact.  Thus, in LG 
Electronics, after having determined that the district court’s claim 
constructions as to certain claim terms was incorrect, the Federal 
Circuit determined that the record was incomplete as to evidence 
that would establish or disprove literal infringement under the 
correct claim constructions.1170  The court therefore remanded for 
further evaluation of those claims of infringement.1171  Similarly, in L 
& W, Inc. v. Schertech, Inc.,1172 the court determined that issues of fact 
precluded summary judgment as to literal infringement and that the 
record needed to be more fully developed to determine whether L & 
W’s products in fact met all of the limitations of the claim at issue.1173 
Literal infringement of a means-plus-function claim.  In Applied Medical, 
the Federal Circuit discussed and applied the requirements for literal 
infringement of a means-plus-function claim: 
Literal infringement of a means-plus-function claim limitation 
requires that the relevant structure in the accused device perform 
the identical function recited in the claim and be identical or 
equivalent to the corresponding structure in the specification.  
Once the relevant structure in the accused device has been 
identified, a party may prove it is equivalent to the disclosed 
structure by showing that the two perform the identical function in 
substantially the same way, with substantially the same result.1174 
The court proceeded to analyze both the supporting function and 
relevant structure of the accused device, finding that the district 
court had erroneously determined “the way in which the disclosed 
structure” performed the defined function because the district court 
had determined that the relevant “ring-levers-teeth structure” was 
                                                          
 1167. 464 F.3d 1286, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1168. See id. at 1297, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009. 
 1169. See id. at 1295-97, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007-09. 
 1170. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1376, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1443, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1171. See id. at 1381, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
 1172. 471 F.3d 1311, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1173. See id. at 1318, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203. 
 1174. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1807, 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
2007] 2006 PATENT SUMMARY 931 
required to perform functions in addition to “holding the valve 
portions” function of the claim term.1175  The court also found that 
the district court had erroneously imported extraneous functions 
when it determined how the disclosed embodiment performed the 
claimed “permit to float” function.1176  Judge Dyk dissented, urging 
that the accused device did in fact perform the required function in 
substantially the same way as the patented device.1177  He disagreed 
with the majority’s interpretation of the functions that the district 
court had required for the relevant ring-levers-teeth structure, urging 
that the supposedly extraneous functions defined by the majority 
were really just explanations as to how the relevant structure 
performed the different, required functions.1178 
Given the differences between the majority and the dissent as to 
how one defines the “function” associated with a means-plus-function 
claim element, Applied Medical demonstrates the difficulties in 
resolving issues of infringement of such claims.  It is difficult to 
determine both what the precise functions are and exactly how the 
structures in the patented and accused devices perform those 
functions. 
Design patent infringement.  In 2006, the court also addressed the 
less-commonly confronted doctrine of design patent infringement.  A 
design-patent-infringement claim requires a different procedure for 
comparing the patent claim to the accused design than that used in 
utility-patent infringement: 
In comparing a design patent claim to the accused design to 
determine infringement, a court must apply “two distinct tests, 
both of which must be satisfied in order to find infringement:  
(a) the ‘ordinary observer’ test, and (b) the ‘point of novelty’ test.”  
The “ordinary observer” test requires comparison of the two 
designs from the viewpoint of the ordinary observer to “determine 
whether the patented design as a whole is substantially the same as 
the accused design.”  Under the “point of novelty” test, a court 
must determine whether “the accused device . . . appropriates the 
novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it from the prior 
art.”1179 
In Lawman Armor, the court affirmed the district court’s summary 
judgment ruling of non-infringement under the “point of novelty” 
                                                          
 1175. See id. at 1334-35, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 1176. See id. at 1336-37, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815-16. 
 1177. See id. at 1337-40, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816-19 (Dyk, J., 
 dissenting). 
 1178. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816-19 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 1179. Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int’l, LLC, 437 F.3d 1383, 1384-85, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2017, 2018 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citations and quotations omitted). 
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test, rejecting the patentee’s argument that, even though all of the 
“points of novelty” proffered by the patentee were encompassed by 
the prior art, the combination of those elements created an 
additional point of novelty.1180  The court explained: 
“The purpose of the ‘points of novelty’ approach . . . is to focus on 
those aspects of a design which render the design different from 
prior art designs.”  “New” designs frequently involve only relatively 
small changes in the shape, size, placement, or color of elements of 
old designs.  It is those changes in and departures from the old 
designs that constitute the “points of novelty” in the patented new 
design. 
If the combination of old elements shown in the prior art is itself 
sufficient to constitute a “point of novelty” of a new design, it would 
be the rare design that would not have a point of novelty.  The 
practical effect of Lawman’s theory would be virtually to eliminate 
the significance of the “points of novelty” test in determining 
infringement of design patents, and to provide patent protection 
for designs that in fact involve no significant changes from the 
prior art.1181 
In Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc.,1182 the court 
reversed a grant of summary judgment of non-infringement of a 
design patent because there were genuine issues of material fact.1183  
The court reasoned that the district court had misapplied the 
“ordinary observer” test because it had “perhaps focused too 
narrowly” on “isolated ornamental features” of a claimed design for a 
carved, ornamental woodwork for furniture; the court stated that the 
patent claims are directed to the use of the furniture “as a whole” and 
that the appropriate infringement inquiry would examine how an 
ordinary observer would view the “design as a whole.”1184  Therefore, 
the court remanded for a reexamination of the design patent 
infringement claims.1185 
Infringement by offering to sell.  In 1994, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) was 
amended to include “offer to sell” as a ground of infringement in 
order to harmonize that aspect of United States law with that of other 
nations.1186  In FieldTurf Int’l, Inc. v. Sprinturf, Inc.,1187 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the accused infringer’s 
                                                          
 1180. See id. at 1384-86, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2018-20. 
 1181. Id. at 1385-86, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2019. 
 1182. 439 F.3d 1365, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1183. Id. at 1371-72, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150-52. 
 1184. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151-52. 
 1185. Id. at 1372, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152. 
 1186. See, e.g., FieldTurf Int’l, Inc. v. Sprinturf, Inc., 433 F.3d 1366, 1369, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1187. 433 F.3d 1366, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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response to a request for proposal (“RFP”) that had specified features 
that characterized a patented product by offering its own 
noninfringing product was not an infringing “offer to sell.”1188  The 
court rejected the patentee’s argument that by responding to an RFP 
that specifically requested its patented product “or approved equal” 
and described its patented features, the defendant had necessarily 
infringed; the court emphasized that the requester was “aware” of the 
differences between the patented product and the defendant’s 
product and chose to purchase the noninfringing product.1189 
“Joint Infringement.”  The Federal Circuit addressed, without 
extended discussion, the issue of “joint” or “divided infringement,” 
which implicates possible joint liability for infringement of a method 
claim, where multiple entities perform different steps of a claimed 
method.1190  In On Demand, the court addressed the argument that 
Amazon, which interfaced directly with consumers, and Lightning 
Source, which took orders for books from Amazon, could be liable 
for “joint infringement,” even though neither, by itself, completed all 
of the steps required to infringe a claim for a high-speed process to 
create a single copy of a book.1191  The court examined the following 
jury instruction: 
It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement to be 
performed by one person or entity.  When infringement results 
from the participation and combined action(s) of more than one 
person or entity, they are all joint infringers and jointly liable for 
patent infringement.  Infringement of a patented process or 
method cannot be avoided by having another perform one step of 
the process or method.  Where the infringement is the result of the 
participation and combined action(s) of one or more persons or 
entities, they are joint infringers and are jointly liable for the 
infringement.1192 
The court stated that it discerned “no flaw in this instruction as a 
statement of law,” and went on to rule that neither Amazon nor 
Lightning Source could be held liable for infringement under that 
standard:  “Each of these components of the claimed invention is in 
the prior art; their combination is the patentable invention, and it is 
the practice of the combination that is essential to infringement.”1193 
                                                          
 1188. See id. at 1369-70, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470-71. 
 1189. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470-71. 
 1190. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1344-45, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428, 1437-38. 
 1191. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38. 
 1192. See id. at 1344-45, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38. 
 1193. See id. at 1345, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438. 
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Decisional law from district courts provides some support for 
aggregation in the performance of steps of a method claim among 
different parties, and those cases have generally agreed that 
aggregation is permissible when there is a sufficient connection 
between or among the entities whose conduct is aggregated.1194   
District court cases have explicated this “connection” requirement in 
different ways.1195  Nonetheless, it was not until On Demand that the 
Federal Circuit took up this theory of infringement, albeit without 
discussing the governing standards.    
Taken at face value, On Demand suggests a general acceptance of 
the joint-infringement theory.  But litigation will continue on the 
issue, as the jury instruction endorsed by the Federal Circuit can be 
argued as support for a nearly indiscriminate aggregation of steps 
performed by different parties, so long as “the infringement is the 
result of the participation and combined action(s) of one or more 
persons or entities.”1196  The paucity of analysis and brief treatment of 
the issue might also lessen the likelihood that panels in future cases 
will uncritically adopt the most expansive reading of the case. 
The court’s treatment of this issue in On Demand (and the 
controversy the issue generated with respect to that case, and with 
respect to another notable case raising joint-infringement issues that 
was settled in 2006)1197 leaves several questions unanswered.  Is the 
“connection” standard the appropriate standard?  If it is, what sort of 
“connection” should be required?  When can the steps practiced by 
others, whether or not defendants, be imputed to a single defendant?  
It is possible that a pending case presenting issues of “joint 
infringement” will provide some of the answers to these questions.1198 
                                                          
 1194. See, e.g., Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 WL 
111788, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999) (summarizing case law as requiring that there 
be “some connection between the different entities” in order to support 
aggregation). 
 1195. Compare, e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 323, 349-
50 (D. Del.) (finding connection standard satisfied based upon facts such as a 
“relationship between [the defendant] and the medical community”), modified on 
rehearing in other respects, 2002 WL 1022509 (D. Del. May 15, 2002), rev’d on other 
grounds, 339 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003), with Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., 
Inc., No. 02 C 2855, 2003 WL 1989640, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2003). 
 1196. On Demand, 432 F.3d at 1344-45, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38. 
 1197. See Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Commc’ns Group, Inc., No. 2006-1237, 
2006 WL 3358367, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 2006) (noting dismissal of appeal because 
of “[t]he parties having so agreed”). 
 1198. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., No. 06-1503 (Fed. Cir., scheduled for 
argument Apr. 5, 2007). 
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2. Infringement by equivalents 
The doctrine of equivalents (sometimes abbreviated as the “DOE”) 
prevents an accused infringer from avoiding liability for patent 
infringement by making only minor or insubstantial changes to an 
invention covered by the claims of the patent, thereby avoiding literal 
infringement while retaining the invention’s “essential identity.”1199 
The doctrine recognizes that “[t]he language in the patent claims 
may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe with 
complete precision the range of its novelty.  If patents were always 
interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly 
diminished.  Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain 
elements could defeat the patent, and its value to inventors could 
be destroyed by simple acts of copying.”1200 
“Infringement may be found under the doctrine of equivalents if 
every limitation of the asserted claim, or its ‘equivalent,’ is found in 
the accused subject matter, where an ‘equivalent’ differs from the 
claimed limitation only insubstantially.”  An accused device that 
“performs substantially the same function in substantially the same 
way to obtain the same result” as the patented invention may 
infringe under this doctrine.1201 
The test quoted above is often referred to as the “function-way-
result” test.  In Abraxis Bioscience, the district court had applied that 
test to hold that the accused product’s use of 
diethylenetriaminepentaacetic acid (“DTPA”) rather than the 
claimed compound ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (“EDTA”) 
infringed a claim for a pharmaceutical composition under the 
doctrine of equivalents.1202  Although the Federal Circuit had reversed 
the district court’s finding of literal infringement based on its 
disagreement with the district court’s claim construction, it affirmed 
the finding of infringement by equivalents; the Federal Circuit 
reasoned that DTPA and EDTA are structurally analogous 
polyaminocarboxylic acids that both work in the same way to retard 
microbial growth.1203  The court held that the record supported the 
                                                          
 1199. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 
558, 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 1200. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1016, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)). 
 1201. Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d at 1370, 1379, 
80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710-11 (Fed Cir. 2006) (quoting Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 
Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F. 3d 1309, 1315, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 
(Fed. Cir. 1998), and Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 
608 (1950)). 
 1202. See id. at 1379-83, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-13. 
 1203. See id. at 1380-82, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711-13. 
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finding of infringement and emphasized that the patentee had not 
surrendered coverage of DTPA in the specification, “particularly in 
light of the unforseeability of calcium trisodium DTPA as an 
equivalent” at the time the patent was issued.1204 
Although the court in Abraxis Biochemical had reversed the district 
court’s claim construction and literal-infringement rulings, but 
affirmed its finding of infringement by equivalents, it did so in light 
of specific and independent arguments in favor of infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents.1205  That is important because the 
Federal Circuit has warned that “[t]he party asserting infringement 
must present ‘evidence and argument concerning the doctrine [of 
equivalents] and each of its elements.’  The evidence and argument on 
the doctrine of equivalents cannot merely be subsumed in plaintiff’s 
case of literal infringement.”1206  Thus, in nCube, the court affirmed 
the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law of non-
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents notwithstanding the 
jury’s contrary verdict, because the patentee had not presented any 
evidence of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents at trial.1207 
It should also be noted that, just as one can disavow in the 
specification literal coverage of a patent claim, it is also possible to 
disavow equivalents in the specification.  “The scope of equivalents 
may [ ] be limited by statements in the specification that disclaim 
certain subject matter.”1208  Thus, in Honeywell, the court affirmed the 
district court’s conclusion that the use of “carbon fibers” had been 
specifically disavowed from the scope of the “electrically conductive 
fibers” claim limitation at issue.1209 
There are several legal limitations upon application of the doctrine 
of equivalents that the Federal Circuit addressed in 2006. 
a. Prosecution-history estoppel 
The doctrine of prosecution-history estoppel (archaically known as 
“file-wrapper estoppel”) precludes a patentee from using the doctrine 
of equivalents to obtain coverage of subject matter that the patentee 
has relinquished during the prosecution of the patent application.1210  
                                                          
 1204. See id. at 1380-81, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711-13. 
 1205. See id. at 1381-82, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 1206. nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1325, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1207. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488. 
 1208. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1321, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1294, 1301-02 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 
 1209. See id. at 1320-21, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301-02. 
 1210. See, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 
1376, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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Prosecution-history estoppel is a purely legal issue and is based on the 
logic that “the patentee, during prosecution, has created a record 
that fairly notifies the public that the patentee has surrendered the 
right to claim particular matter as within the reach of the patent.”1211  
There are two varieties of prosecution-history estoppel:  estoppel by 
argument and estoppel by amendment.  “Arguments made 
voluntarily during prosecution may give rise to prosecution history 
estoppel if they evidence a surrender of subject matter.”1212  The 
Supreme Court addressed estoppel by amendment in its decision in 
Festo:  “A patentee’s decision to narrow his claims through 
amendment may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of a 
territory of the original claim and the amended claim.”1213 
In 2006, the Federal Circuit addressed a handful of cases involving 
estoppel by amendment.  In Old Town Canoe, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling of no infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents; the court found that the relevant patent 
claims were “narrowed, triggering a presumption that subject matter 
was surrendered” in light of an amendment in response to a rejection 
by the examiner.1214  The court reasoned that the amendment 
disclaimed the methods for “coalescence” as part of a chemical 
process for which coverage was sought under the doctrine of 
equivalents.1215 
In Primos, the court affirmed a jury verdict of infringement by 
equivalents, rejecting the argument that amendments to the term 
“plate” in a claim for a device that simulates animal sounds narrowed 
the scope of the claim and were made for reasons relating to 
patentability.1216  The Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme Court 
in Festo held that “when a patent claim is amended during 
prosecution for reasons relating to patentability, there is a 
presumption that the patentee surrendered all the territory between 
the original claim limitation and the amended claim limitation,” but 
acknowledged that the presumption may be overcome when the 
“rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a 
                                                          
 1211. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 
564-65, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 1212. Id. at 568, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1213. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 
(2002). 
 1214. Old Town Canoe Co. v. Conflunece Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1314-15, 
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1709 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1215. See id. at 1315, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 1216. See Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialities, Inc., 451 F.3d 841, 848-50, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1134-36 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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tangential relation to the equivalent in question.”1217  The court 
reasoned that the amendments to the term “plate” did not surrender 
the equivalent of a “dome” that functions identically to the “plate” 
literally claimed; the relevant amendments addressed the “length” of 
the “plate” and its relationship to a different portion of the device, 
but did not relate to its shape, i.e., whether it is a flat plate or dome 
shaped.1218 
The Festo presumption and the situations where it may be rebutted 
were the focus of analysis in Amgen, where the Federal Circuit 
evaluated the district court’s ruling that the Festo presumption did not 
apply to a claim amendment because the presumption had been 
rebutted.1219  The district court had determined that an amendment 
limiting the claims of a patent for an erythropoietin (“EPO”) product 
that limited the EPO to one with a particular amino acid sequence 
was “tangential” and did not prevent an equivalent having a 165-
amino acid sequence.1220  The Federal Circuit had previously 
determined that the amendment at issue was related to patentability, 
and thus that the Festo presumption was triggered.1221  The court then 
noted that “[t]he burden of rebutting the Festo presumption lies with 
the patentee” and that “[t]he presumption that equivalents are 
surrendered may be rebutted if a patentee shows that ‘one skilled in 
the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that 
would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.’”1222  The 
court further explained: 
[I]n Festo II, the Supreme Court listed three ways in which a 
patentee may make this showing.  First, the patentee may 
demonstrate  that “the equivalent would have been unforeseeable 
at the time of the amendment.”  Second, the patentee may show 
that “the rationale underlying the amendment bears no more than 
a tangential relation to the equivalent in question.”  Third, a 
patentee may demonstrate that “there [is] some other reason 
suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to 
have described the insubstantial substitute in question.1223 
                                                          
 1217. Id. at 849, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135 (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 740-41). 
 1218. See id. at 849-50, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135-36. 
 1219. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1308-16, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1716-22 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1220. See id. at 1311, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719. 
 1221. See id. at 1310-12, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717-19. 
 1222. Id. at 1312, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719 (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 741) 
(other citations omitted). 
 1223. Id. at 1312-13, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719 (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 740-
41). 
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The court then summarized the guidance it had previously had 
given in its decision on remand in Festo as to the showings necessary 
to rebut the Festo presumption: 
We suggested that after-arising technology is more likely to be 
unforeseeable than old technology, but did not set forth any hard 
or fast rule on foreseeability.  We stated that “if the alleged 
equivalent were known in the prior art in the field of the invention, 
it certainly should have been foreseeable at the time of the 
amendment.”  With regard to the tangentiality of an amendment to 
an equivalent, we did not set forth any concrete definition, but we 
did note that an amendment “made to avoid prior art that contains 
the equivalent in question is not tangential; it is central to 
allowance of the claim.”  Thus, an amendment is tangential when 
the “reason for it was peripheral, or not directly relevant, to the 
alleged equivalent.”  The determination of whether or not an 
amendment is merely tangential to the equivalent is based on the 
“patentee’s objectively apparent reason for the narrowing 
amendment.”  Thus, the inquiry must be based on the intrinsic 
record alone and, if necessary, expert testimony to aid in 
interpretation of that record.  Finally, we noted that the third way 
to rebut the Festo presumption, the “some other reason” route, is a 
narrow one.  We stated that “the third criterion may be satisfied 
when there was some reason, such as the shortcomings of 
language, why the patentee was prevented from describing the 
alleged equivalent when it narrowed the claim.”1224 
Applying this guidance, the court in Amgen reasoned that an EPO 
with 165 amino acids was a foreseeable equivalent and that the 
addition of the reference to the different amino acids sequence “was 
not merely tangential” to the alleged equivalent.1225  The court 
emphasized that the sequence amendment appeared to have been 
“central to overcoming a double patenting rejection” in light of a 
prior patent with a different amino acid sequence.1226  Finally, the 
court examined whether there was “some other reason” or 
“shortcoming of language” that prevented the patentee from 
describing the 165-amino acid sequence when it narrowed the claim, 
the court found that no such reason or short coming existed.1227  
Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court had erred in 
                                                          
 1224. Id. at 1313, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719-20 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1372, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 
 1225. Id. at 1313-15, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720-21. 
 1226. See id. at 1314-15, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720-21. 
 1227. See id. at 1316, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722. 
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finding that the Festo presumption had been overcome and reversed 
the judgment of infringement by equivalents.1228 
b. The all-elements/anti-vitiation rule 
“Application of the doctrine of equivalents is limited by the ‘all-
elements rule,’ which provides that ‘the doctrine of equivalents does 
not apply if applying the doctrine would vitiate an entire claim 
limitation.’”1229 
Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to 
defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine 
of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, 
not to the invention as a whole.  It is important to ensure that the 
application of the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not 
allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that element in 
its entirety.1230 
Application of this rule, however, can be difficult. 
In Panduit, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
determination that application of the doctrine of equivalents was 
forbidden because the claim required wires to pass through “an 
opening in an abutment portion” in a wire box, but the accused 
device had wires that did not go through such an opening.1231  The 
court concluded that “[t]o extend the scope of the claim to 
encompass an accused device in which wires bypass the abutment 
portion all together would necessarily read the ‘opening’ limitation 
out of the claim.”1232 
In Primos, the court rejected the argument that application of the 
doctrine of equivalents would have vitiated the limitation “plate” in 
the relevant claim.1233  The court reasoned that it would not vitiate the 
“plate” limitation to permit a dome-shaped equivalent because the 
term “plate” does not necessarily convey a definitive, geometric shape 
or structure; thus, the court concluded that permitting the claimed 
equivalent would not “effectively eliminate” the plate limitation in its 
entirety.1234 
                                                          
 1228. See id. at 1316, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722. 
 1229. Panduit Corp. v. HellermannTyton Corp., 451 F.3d 819, 830, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1053, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 402 
F.3d 1188, 1195, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1230. DePuy Spine v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1016-17, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. Inc. v. 
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997)). 
 1231. Panduit, 451 F.3d at 830, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060-61. 
 1232. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060-61. 
 1233. See Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc., 451 F.3d 841, 849-50, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1234. See id. at 850, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
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Conversely, in Planet Bingo, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s conclusion that the doctrine of equivalents could not apply to 
a device that performs the critical calculation “after” the first bingo 
ball is drawn, where the claim requires that calculation “before” the 
first bingo ball is drawn.1235  The court reasoned that the “before” 
limitation was critical to the invention, and thus that the doctrine of 
equivalents could not apply without entirely vitiating that claim 
limitation:  “Here, the patents contain a distinct limitation, which was 
part of the bargain when the patent issued.  This court cannot 
overlook that limitation or expand the doctrine of equivalents 
beyond its purpose to allow recapture of subject matter excluded by a 
deliberate and foreseeable claim drafting decision.”1236 
In DePuy Spine, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s 
determination that applying the doctrine of equivalents would vitiate 
the limitation “spherically-shaped” in a patent for a surgical screw if a 
“cylindrical-conical” equivalent were permitted.1237  The court 
emphasized that “DePuy’s expert presented particularized” evidence 
that the claimed equivalent was “insubstantially different from the 
corresponding ‘spherically-shaped’ limitation.”1238  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit held that the district court had erred by granting 
summary judgment of non-infringement, and remanded for a trial.1239 
While these cases can be rationalized as situation-specific 
determinations of whether a particular claim term would be read out 
of the claim by application of the doctrine of equivalents, it could 
also be argued that these cases show how arbitrary the anti-vitiation 
rule can appear.  It does not necessarily follow that, if “before” can 
not equal “after,” that “plate” can equal “dome” and that “spherical” 
can equal “conical.”  Of course, the devil is always in the details, and 
the Federal Circuit claims to make such distinctions based on the 
precise language of the claims, specification and prosecution history.  
But at a more basic level, these decisions are best understood as case-
by-case applications of an extremely general rule. 
                                                          
 1235. Planet Bingo, LLC v. GameTech Int’l, Inc., 472 F.3d 1338, 1345, 81 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1236. Id. at 1344, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1237. See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1019-
20, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1874-75 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1238. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874-75. 
 1239. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874-75. 
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c. Specific exclusion of equivalents 
The doctrine of equivalents may not apply where a claim recites 
detailed structure and thus implicitly disclaims arguably equivalent 
structures. 
A claim that contains a detailed recitation of structure is properly 
accorded correspondingly limited recourse to the doctrine of 
equivalents. . . . “[B]y defining the claim in a way that clearly 
excluded certain subject matter, the patent implicitly disclaimed 
the subject matter that was excluded and thereby barred the 
patentee from asserting infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents.”1240 
Thus, in Bicon, the court held that a claim reciting a very detailed 
“convex” structure excluded an equivalent with a correspondingly 
“concave” structure.1241  The court emphasized that permitting the 
claimed equivalent would be “clearly contrary to, and thus excluded 
by” the relevant patent claim.1242 
Similarly, in Cook Biotech, the court concluded that the claimed 
equivalent could not be permitted because it contained a structure 
“specifically excluded” from the composition covered by the patent 
claim.1243  The court noted that it is a “‘corollary to the ‘all limitations 
rule’” that “‘the concept of equivalency cannot embrace a structure 
that is specifically excluded from the scope of the claims.’”1244 
d. Other issues 
In 2006, the Federal Circuit addressed a handful of other 
significant issues with respect to the doctrine of equivalents.  First, the 
court emphasized that after-arising technology may be particularly 
appropriate for analysis under the doctrine of equivalents.  “An 
appropriate range of equivalents may extend to post-invention 
advances . . . in an appropriate case.”1245 
Second, the Federal Circuit made clear that summary judgment 
under the doctrine of equivalents is inappropriate where there are 
material questions of fact with respect to whether an accused product 
                                                          
 1240. Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 955, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267, 
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular 
Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1346, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 1241. See id. at 955-56, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276-77. 
 1242. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276. 
 1243. See Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1379, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1874-75 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1244. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875 (quoting Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince 
Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1582, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 1245. Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., 436 F.3d 1368, 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1948, 1955 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Travenol 
Labs., Inc., 745 F.2d 1, 9, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
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is an appropriate equivalent.  Thus, in LG Electronics, the court ruled 
that the district court had inappropriately granted summary 
judgment of no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
where there was a genuine issue of material fact “as to whether the 
accused device can function within the narrow range of equivalents” 
that the court ruled would be permissible.1246 
3. Other infringement doctrines 
a. Inducing infringement 
In one of the more significant infringement rulings of 2006, the 
Federal Circuit issued its en banc decision in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS 
Co.,1247 clarifying the level of intent necessary for inducing 
infringement.1248  Inducing infringement requires “both an 
underlying instance of direct infringement and a requisite showing of 
intent.”1249  Thus, the court must determine whether the party 
accused of inducing infringement acted with the requisite intent.  
Prior to the decision in DSU Medical, there was some question 
whether the accused inducer merely had to intend to commit certain 
acts that in fact would infringe a patent or whether the accused 
inducer had to actually know of a patent and intend that it be 
infringed.  In DSU Medical, the court explained that it was clarifying 
the 
intent requirement by holding en banc that, as was stated in 
Mansville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 554 
(Fed. Cir. 1990), “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing that the 
alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he 
knew or should have known his actions would induce actual 
infringements.”  The requirement that the alleged infringer knew 
or should have known his actions would induce actual 
infringement necessarily includes the requirement that he or she 
knew of the patent.1250 
Therefore, the court emphasized that 
the intent requirement for inducement requires more than just 
intent to cause the acts that produce direct infringement.  Beyond 
that threshold knowledge, the inducement must have an 
                                                          
 1246. See LG Elecs., Inc., v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1380-81, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1247. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1248. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1249. Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 1209, 1222, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation omitted). 
 1250. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd.,  471 F.3d 1293, 1304, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1238, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (other citations omitted). 
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affirmative intent to cause direct infringement.  In the words of a 
recent decision, inducement requires “‘that the alleged infringer 
knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to 
encourage another’s infringement.’”  Accordingly, inducement 
requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging 
another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer had 
knowledge of the direct infringer’s activities.1251 
Applying this standard, the court affirmed the jury’s determination 
that the accused inducer had not “purposefully and culpably” 
induced infringement.1252  The court noted that the record contained 
substantial evidence that the accused inducer did not believe that the 
device at issue infringed the patent.1253 
The court’s holding in DSU Medical is quite significant.  Earlier in 
2006, the court in nCube had affirmed a jury verdict of induced 
infringement based upon a jury instruction that merely stated that 
the accused inducer would be liable if it “actively and knowingly 
aided or abetted someone to make, use, sell, or offer to sell the entire 
product covered by the claims of the patent in suit.”1254  That 
instruction did not include the requirement that the accused inducer 
specifically know of and intend to infringe the patent.  Accordingly, 
under the law clarified in DSU Medical, it appears that it would have 
been harder to affirm the verdict in nCube under the Manville 
Sales/DSU Medical standard. 
On the other hand, the court in Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. 
Peterson Co.,1255 noted that the intent requirement had not been 
clarified by the court, and emphasized that even if specific intent to 
cause infringement were necessary to holding a party liable for 
inducing infringement, such specific intent was evident in the case 
before it.1256  The court emphasized that the accused inducer “had 
notice of the patent” and that he had provided instructions to 
customers “directing them to perform specific acts leading to the 
assembly of infringing devices, from which the district court could 
draw an inference of [specific] intent . . . .”1257 
In Liquid Dynamics, the court addressed inducement of 
infringement by foreign purchasers.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), a 
party may be an infringer if it: 
                                                          
 1251. Id. at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (citations omitted). 
 1252. See id. at 1307, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248. 
 1253. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248. 
 1254. nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324-25, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1481, 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1255. 438 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1256. See id. at 1364-65, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 1257. Id. at 1364 n.4, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012 n.4. 
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“supplies . . . in or from the United States all or a substantial 
portion of the components of a patented invention, where such 
components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner 
as to actively induce the combination of such components outside 
of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if 
such combination occurred within the United States . . . .”1258 
The court upheld a jury verdict of inducement because there was 
substantial evidence in the record that the accused inducer knew 
about the ‘414 patent at issue  and “intended for its . . . design to 
infringe the claims of the ‘414 patent.”1259 
An issue related to that addressed in Liquid Dynamics is whether 
§ 271(f) applies to process inventions.  That issue is apparently 
unresolved.  In Union Carbide Chemicals and Plastics Technology Corp. v. 
Shell Oil Co.,1260 Judge Lourie, joined by Chief Judge Michel and Judge 
Linn, dissented from the court’s denial of rehearing en banc because, 
in his view, § 271(f) cannot apply to process inventions.1261  Judge 
Lourie’s dissent emphasized that the statute “speaks of supplying 
‘components of a patented invention, where such components are 
uncombined . . . in such manner as to actively induce the 
combination of such components outside of the United States.’ 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f).  The whole tenor of that provision relates to physical 
inventions, i.e., apparatus or compositions, not methods.”1262  The 
majority, of course, had held that § 271(f) did in fact apply to method 
claims and thus, until and unless the Federal Circuit addresses that 
issue en banc, or the Supreme Court takes up the issue, § 271(f) does 
apply to method claims. 
In Kim, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment of 
no inducing infringement on the ground that the plaintiff had failed 
to prove underlying infringement.1263  The court emphasized that the 
plaintiff had presented “no testimony based on the accused products 
themselves that supported a finding of infringement,” and thus found 
no reason to disturb the district court’s ruling.1264 
                                                          
 1258. See Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 1209, 1222, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1259. See id. at 1222-23, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. 
 1260. 434 F.3d 1357, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1634 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1261. See id. at 1358-59, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635-36  (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 1262. See id. at 1358, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 1263. See Yoon Ja Kim v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1319-20, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495, 1499-1500 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1264. See id. at 1320, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
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b. Contributory infringement 
The court in DSU Medical also addressed the related doctrine of 
contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).  Under that 
section: 
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States . . . a 
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or 
composition . . . constituting a material part of the invention, 
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for 
use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, 
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.1265 
Thus, to prevail on contributory infringement, the plaintiff must 
show that the accused infringer knew that the component it sold 
would be used in an infringing product, was not suitable for 
substantial non-infringing uses and that the component was sold 
within the United States.  The court in DSU Medical determined that 
the district court had correctly refused to grant a new trial as to 
contributory infringement because the jury verdict of no contributory 
infringement could be sustained on the basis that there was no 
underlying infringement that occurred within the United States.1266  
The court found that substantial evidence showed that components 
that were shipped into the United States were already in an 
infringing configuration; thus, the court concluded that it was 
reasonable for the jury to determine that any infringing acts took 
place outside of the United States.1267 
c. Willful infringement 
“The extent to which the infringer disregarded the property rights 
of the patentee, the deliberateness of tortious acts, or other 
manifestations of unethical or injurious commercial conduct, may 
provide grounds for a finding of willful infringement.”1268  “A patentee 
bears the burden of persuasion and must prove willful infringement 
by clear and convincing evidence.”1269  A finding of willful 
infringement will permit the assessment of enhanced damages for 
infringement.1270 
                                                          
 1265. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) (quoted with emphasis in DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS 
Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1244-45 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1266. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1238, 1244-45 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1267. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245. 
 1268. Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1367-68, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). 
 1269. Id. at 1368, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015 (citation omitted). 
 1270. See infra notes 1366-1377. 
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In nCube, the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury verdict of willful 
infringement where the accused infringer claimed that it relied on an 
opinion of counsel of non-infringement.1271  The court concluded 
that the opinion-of-counsel defense was defective because the record 
showed “that at least one important technical document was not 
supplied to [the defendant’s] opinion counsel.  Thus, ‘the best 
information was intentionally not made available to counsel during 
the preparation of the opinion, so that the opinion can no longer 
serve its prophylactic purpose of negating a finding of willful 
infringement.”1272 
Similarly, in Liquid Dynamics, the Federal Circuit affirmed the jury’s 
verdict of willful infringement where the accused infringer argued 
that it had relied on an opinion of counsel of non-infringement.1273  
The court held that the jury verdict was sustainable because patent 
counsel “was not given” complete versions of necessary documents, 
and thus his opinion was flawed and was not a proper basis to avoid a 
finding of willful infringement.1274 
Likewise, the court in Applied Medical upheld a jury verdict of 
willfulness notwithstanding the accused infringer’s argument that it 
had relied on several opinions of counsel.1275  The court emphasized 
that there was substantial evidence that each of those opinions was 
defective and that the accused infringer “did not rely on the legal 
opinions as legitimate advice as to whether Versaport II infringed, but 
rather sought legal opinions for their potential evidentiary value on 
the issue of willful infringement in future litigation.”1276 
On a related issue, the court in Golden Blount addressed the effect 
on willfulness analysis of a failure to seek an opinion of counsel.  In 
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.,1277 the 
Federal Circuit had ruled that it is inappropriate to draw an inference 
that any opinion of counsel would have been unfavorable from the 
fact that a party did not seek an opinion of counsel as to 
infringement.1278  In Golden Blount, the accused infringer urged that 
                                                          
 1271. See nCube Corp v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1481, 1486-87 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1272. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487 (quoting Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris 
Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 1273. See Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1105-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1274. See id. at 1225-26, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
 1275. See Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp, 435 F.3d 1356, 1365, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1672-73 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1276. Id. at 1365, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673. 
 1277. 383 F.3d 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 1278. See id. at 1344, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565. 
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the district court had in fact drawn such an adverse inference.1279  The 
Federal Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that the district 
court had “considered all of the facts presented in assessing whether 
Peterson acted in reckless disregard of Golden Blount’s patent 
rights”; those facts included substantial evidence that Peterson had 
obtained several incomplete and plainly insufficient oral opinions as 
to infringement.1280  The court accordingly concluded that the district 
court had not drawn any improper inferences.1281 
V. REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY 
A. Damages 
In 2006, the Federal Circuit handed down a number of significant 
damages decisions.  It decided several cases clarifying plaintiffs’ 
ability to recover two separate damages awards based on putatively 
separate infringements or legal theories.  It also issued decisions 
reviewing district courts’ applications of the Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin 
Brothers Fibre Works, Inc.1282 lost-profits test, as well as reviewing an 
award of enhanced damages premised upon willful patent 
infringement. 
1. General Damages 
The Federal Circuit decided three cases in 2006 relating to the 
effect of an initial reasonable-royalty, patent-infringement damages 
award upon the plaintiff’s ability to obtain a second damages award 
under a different theory.  In this regard, the panel considered the 
collateral estoppel effect of rulings relating to a previous damages 
award upon a subsequent damages award relating to additional 
accused products, the interaction between an award of damages for 
direct infringement and a subsequent attempt to receive an award for 
indirect infringement for the same conduct, and the effect of a 
patent-damages award upon a plaintiff’s ability to obtain trademark-
infringement damages based upon conduct forming the basis of the 
patent-damages award. 
In Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,1283 Applied 
sued U.S. Surgical for infringement of a patent relating to surgical 
                                                          
 1279. See Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1367-69, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004, 1014-16 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1280. See id. at 1369, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016. 
 1281. See id. at 1369-70, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016. 
 1282. 575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 1283. 435 F.3d 1356, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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devices used in abdominal surgery.1284  A jury had found in a previous 
action that U.S. Surgical had willfully infringed the patent, and had 
awarded Applied a reasonable royalty of 7%.1285  After that verdict, 
U.S. Surgical began selling a redesigned device, and Applied brought 
this second lawsuit accusing the redesigned product of patent 
infringement.1286  The district court granted summary judgment of 
infringement in favor of Applied, and the Federal Circuit affirmed 
that liability ruling on appeal.1287 
The parties then tried damages in the second case involving the 
redesigned accused products.1288  U.S. Surgical argued that principles 
of collateral estoppel required that the seven percent royalty from the 
first lawsuit also be used in the second case.1289  The district court 
rejected this argument, and imposed a different and higher royalty 
amount.  U.S. Surgical appealed to the Federal Circuit.1290 
Applying the regional law of the Ninth Circuit to the collateral 
estoppel issue, the panel affirmed the district court’s rejection of U.S. 
Surgical’s claim that the original royalty percentage was binding in 
the second case.1291  The panel observed that collateral estoppel 
applies only where an issue is “identical” between two cases, and held 
that the doctrine was “not appropriate because the necessary 
reasonable royalty determination in [the second case wa]s not 
identical to that decided in [the first case].”1292  The panel noted that 
a reasonable royalty is based upon a hypothetical negotiation 
between the parties regarding terms of a license, and that this 
counterfactual analysis “must relate to the time infringement 
occurred.”1293  The panel rejected U.S. Surgical’s contention that the 
infringement in the two cases could be treated as a single, 
undifferentiated and ongoing infringement, holding instead that 
“the infringements requiring compensation began at separate and 
distinct times” in the two cases.1294  “Because [the first case] and [the 
second] caused two separate infringements, and each infringement 
commenced on a different date, it follows that the reasonable 
                                                          
 1284. See id. at 1357-58, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667. 
 1285. See id. at 1358, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. 
 1286. See id. at 1358-59, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. 
 1287. See id. at 1359, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. 
 1288. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. 
 1289. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. 
 1290. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668-69. 
 1291. See id. at 1360, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669. 
 1292. Id. at 1361, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 1293. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 1294. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
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royalties may well be different from each other,” thus precluding 
application of collateral estoppel.1295 
Moreover, the panel observed that, in defending against 
infringement in the second action, “U.S. Surgical ha[d] asserted that 
[the redesigned product at issue in that case wa]s a different product 
from the” accused product in the first case.1296  “Having conceded that 
[the two products] were different infringements, U.S. Surgical’s 
attempt to conflate the two products for purposes of damages 
fails.”1297  The panel further held that, “simply because the same 
company sold two different products which infringed a patent does not 
prevent the patentee from litigating and collecting separate damages 
for each infringement.”1298 
The panel cautioned, however, that despite its ruling in the case at 
hand, “there may be instances, which we do not address here, in 
which two products, even if not identical, may present the same 
damages analysis.”1299  Because “[t]he two infringements caused by 
[the products at issue in the two cases] began at different times, and 
require two different hypothetical negotiation dates,” the panel held 
that such a case of identical damages analyses was “not the case 
here.”1300 
In Glenayre Electronics, Inc. v. Jackson,1301 Jackson, a patent holder, 
claimed that Glenayre had infringed a patent relating to an apparatus 
for making certain control signals over telephone lines.1302  Glenayre 
brought the lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment of non-
infringement.1303  Jackson counterclaimed against Glenayre for 
indirect infringement based upon Glenayre’s sales of the accused 
products to Glenayre’s customers.1304  The district court stayed the 
counterclaims, and held a jury trial on direct infringement.1305  The 
jury returned a verdict of infringement and awarded reasonable 
royalty damages to Jackson in the amount of $12,000,000.1306  The 
district court granted Glenayre’s motion for remittitur, finding that 
the evidence did not support a royalty in that amount, and reducing 
                                                          
 1295. Id. at 1361-62, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 1296. Id. at 1362, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 1297. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 1298. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671. 
 1299. Id. at 1363, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671. 
 1300. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671. 
 1301. 443 F.3d 851, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1302. See id. at 853, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642. 
 1303. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642. 
 1304. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642-43. 
 1305. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643. 
 1306. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643. 
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the damages award to $2,650,000 plus prejudgment interest.1307  
“Jackson accepted the district court’s decision to award him the 
remitted damages award plus prejudgment interest,”1308 but later 
“filed a motion to set trial on the stayed counterclaims of indirect 
infringement by Glenayre.”1309  The district court denied the motion, 
holding “that the judgment completely compensated Jackson for 
direct infringement and therefore there was nothing else owed to 
Jackson,”1310 and Jackson appealed. 
In the Federal Circuit, the panel majority affirmed, rejecting 
Jackson’s arguments that he was entitled to a new trial on reasonable 
royalty damages for indirect infringement by Glenayre.  Jackson first 
argued “that various statements and conduct of the district court and 
Glenayre require[d] that a second trial be held to address his claims 
of indirect infringement by Glenayre.”1311  The panel majority rejected 
this argument, concluding that “none of these statements or conduct 
constitute[d] a guarantee or promise by the district court that 
entitle[d] Jackson to a second trial as a matter of right.”1312 
Jackson next challenged the district court’s conclusion that he had 
been fully compensated for any indirect infringement by the original 
damages award.  The panel majority rejected this argument, too, 
noting that “Jackson’s allegations of indirect infringement [we]re 
based solely on Glenayre’s sales of infringing products to its 
customers followed by those customers’ use of the same products.”1313  
The panel majority held that, 
at least in cases like this one, where a patentee alleges that a 
manufacturer contributes to and induces infringement by its 
customers simply because it sells infringing products to its 
customers, damages assessed for indirect infringement normally 
will be the same as damages that would be assessed had the 
patentee sued and obtained a judgment against the customers.1314 
Moreover, the panel majority concluded that “in most cases 
damages assessed for indirect infringement will be equal to damages 
assessed for the underlying direct infringement.”1315  The panel 
majority found that general rule applicable and emphasized that 
Jackson had “presented evidence and arguments regarding customer 
                                                          
 1307. See id. at 854, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643. 
 1308. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643. 
 1309. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644. 
 1310. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644. 
 1311. Id. at 856, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. 
 1312. Id. at 856-57, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. 
 1313. Id. at 858, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. 
 1314. Id. at 858-59, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 1315. Id. at 859, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
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use to the jury and judge during and after the first trial.”1316  It thus 
concluded that Jackson’s attempt to get damages for indirect 
infringement amounted to an attempt to re-litigate the district court’s 
remittitur from the first phase, which “ha[d] already been litigated to 
a final judgment.”1317 
The panel majority next turned to considering three Supreme 
Court precedents in this area, Birdsell v. Shaliol,1318 Union Tool Co. v. 
Wilson,1319 and Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co.1320  The panel majority found that Birdsell precluded Jackson “from 
suing to collect damages for direct infringement by Glenayre’s 
customers because actual damages ha[d] already been collected from 
Glenayre and Glenayre’s customers simply use[d] infringing devices 
made and sold by Glenayre.”1321  Similarly, it found that Union Tool 
applied the principle 
that when a patentee receives full compensation for the wrongful 
use of an invention in devices made and sold by a manufacturer, 
the patentee effectively adopts the sales by the manufacturer such 
that purchasers and users of the devices receive implied licenses 
that free them from liability for infringement of the patent.1322 
Finally, the panel majority reasoned that Aro Manufacturing was 
inapplicable because it related only to “the question of whether 
Glenayre’s customers are liable for actions they took before Jackson 
accepted the remittitur,” an issue that was “not before us in this 
appeal.”1323 
Judge Newman dissented.  She opined that “a damages award 
against a manufacturer does not automatically include a paid-up 
license for infringing operations by the manufacturer’s customers.”1324  
Further, she reasoned that “[w]hether users and resellers who 
acquire the patented invention from an infringing manufacturer can 
incur liability for infringement and additional damages, is 
independent of whether the infringing manufacturer has already 
paid the judgment based on its own infringing manufacture.”1325  
Because she believed that the original damages award did not fully 
                                                          
 1316. Id. at 860, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 1317. Id. at 862, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649. 
 1318. 112 U.S. 485 (1884). 
 1319. 259 U.S. 107 (1922). 
 1320. 377 U.S. 476 (1964). 
 1321. Glenayre, 443 F.3d at 864, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651. 
 1322. Id. at 865, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 1323. Id. at 871, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 1324. Id. at 875, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 1325. Id. at 877, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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compensate Jackson for indirect infringement on the part of 
Glenayre, she dissented from the judgment.1326 
In Aero Products International, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp.,1327 the 
panel considered the circumstances under which an award of 
trademark damages must be remitted as duplicative with a 
concurrent award of damages for patent infringement.  Aero sued 
Intex for its sales of certain mattresses and asserted that, in doing so, 
Intex had infringed a patent relating to inflatable support systems, 
and also a registered trademark on the phrase “ONE TOUCH.”1328  
The district court entered a judgment of infringement under both 
theories, and awarded patent-infringement damages in the amount of 
$2.95 million (which it doubled based upon a jury finding of 
willfulness) and, additionally, $1 million in trademark-infringement 
damages.1329 
Intex appealed, arguing that “Aero’s recovery of both patent and 
trademark infringement damages represent[ed] an impermissible 
double recovery.”1330  The panel noted that, “[g]enerally, the double 
recovery of damages is impermissible,” and, in particular, “double 
recovery for the same injury is inappropriate.”1331  The panel reviewed 
several precedents in this area, concluding that they “teach that, in 
determining whether there has been an impermissible double 
recovery of damages, the inquiry focuses on whether the damages 
issue arose from the same set of operative facts.”1332  Intex argued that 
the damages awards did stem from the same set of operative facts, 
namely the sales of the same infringing mattresses.1333  Aero, on the 
other hand, argued that the operative facts were different, because 
the patent and trademark infringements constituted “two separate 
wrongs.”1334 
The panel held that the two awards had stemmed from the same 
set of operative facts and, therefore, were impermissibly duplicative.  
The panel noted that the patent damages represented a reasonable 
royalty on sales of the accused mattresses,1335 and that the only 
evidence supporting the trademark damages was the fact of the same 
                                                          
 1326. See id. at 878-79, 78 U.S.Q.P.2d (BNA) at 1662. 
 1327. 466 F.3d 1000, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1328. See id. at 1003, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
 1329. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
 1330. Id. at 1016, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491. 
 1331. Id. at 1017, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. 
 1332. Id. at 1018, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. 
 1333. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492-93. 
 1334. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493. 
 1335. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
954 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
sales.1336  Thus, it found that “Aero based both its patent and 
trademark damages solely on sales of the accused Intex mattresses.  
Aero did not rely on any other evidence in support of its trademark 
damages.”1337  Because “all of the damages awarded to Aero flowed 
from the same operative facts:  sales of the infringing Intex 
mattresses,”1338 it held that “Aero was fully compensated” by the 
reasonable royalty award,” and “could not also be awarded 
defendants’ profits for trademark infringement based on the same 
sales of the same accused devices.”1339 
2. Lost-profits damages 
In 2006, the Federal Circuit added little in the way of new analytical 
development in the area of lost-profits damages.  It issued decisions 
applying the Panduit factors and evaluating the proper temporal 
scope of lost-profits awards based upon the scope of a plaintiff’s 
exclusive license to the patent in suit. 
In Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co.,1340 the panel reviewed 
an award of $429,256 (trebled to $1,287,766 for willfulness) in lost-
profits damages, plus attorneys’ fees, based on Peterson’s 
infringement of Golden Blount’s patent.1341  The district court had 
based the damages award on the Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre 
Works, Inc.1342 analysis, which looks to the demand for the patented 
product, the absence of acceptable, non-infringing alternatives, the 
capacity to exploit the demand, and the amount of profit lost by the 
plaintiff.1343 
The district court found that there was effectively a two-supplier 
market (with the parties before the court collectively controlling 
ninety-five percent of the market).1344  The court found, moreover, 
that the accused ember burner was “the basis for the customer’s 
demand” under the entire-market-value rule, and caused a loss to 
Golden Blount of “the entire burner assembly, the grate, and a full 
set of artificial logs.”1345  The district court thus “found that 97.5% of 
the time that Peterson sold [an infringing secondary burner], Golden 
Blount lost the sale of its entire burner assembly and a full set of logs, 
                                                          
 1336. Id. at 1019, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493. 
 1337. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493. 
 1338. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493. 
 1339. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493. 
 1340. 438 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
 1341. See id. at 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 1342. 575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 1343. See Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1370, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016. 
 1344. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016. 
 1345. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
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and that 2.5% of the time, Golden Blount lost the sale of its ember 
burner alone.”1346  Peterson challenged the district court’s inclusion 
of the entire burner assemblies in the lost-profits calculation.1347 
The panel affirmed the basic approach of the district court, finding 
that “Golden Blount proffered sufficient evidence from which the 
district court could find that ‘but for’ Peterson’s sale of the [accused 
burner], . . . the end-user would have turned to Golden Blount to 
satisfy its demand for the patented product.”1348  Because Peterson 
“c[ame] forward with no quantitative evidence to rebut th[e] 
testimony” of the retailer that full assemblies are ordinarily sold 
together, it “left itself open to the inferences reasonably drawn by the 
district court.”1349  Nonetheless, the panel reduced the damages award 
in light of “802 [burners] allegedly returned to Peterson before being 
assembled into an infringing configuration,” which the district court 
had included in its damages calculation.1350  The panel noted that, 
“[i]f the 802 [burners] were returned before having been sold to 
retailers and thereafter assembled into an infringing configuration, 
they should not have been included in the damages calculus.”1351  The 
court explained that “there can be no cognizable lost sale on which 
to base a damages award under the patent laws without an act of 
infringement to warrant it,” and the returned burners might never 
have been “assembl[ed] into an infringing configuration.”1352 
In DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,1353 DePuy sued 
Medtronic for infringement of a patent relating to pedicle screws 
used in spinal surgery.  The district court entered judgment that 
certain Medtronic screws had infringed the patent under the 
doctrine of equivalents, and awarded lost-profits damages.1354 
Medtronic appealed the damages award.  Medtronic “d[id] not 
contest that if DePuy Spine was an exclusive licensee during the 
relevant time period, it [wa]s entitled to the lost profits at issue.”1355  
Instead, it argued that DePuy had not been an exclusive licensee until 
August 31, 1999, and that the damages award had included profits 
allegedly lost from before that date.1356  The panel rejected this 
                                                          
 1346. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
 1347. See id. at 1371, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
 1348. Id. at 1372, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018. 
 1349. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018. 
 1350. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018. 
 1351. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018. 
 1352. Id. at 1373, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018-19. 
 1353. 469 F.3d 1005, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1354. See id. at 1009-10, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867. 
 1355. Id. at 1025, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
 1356. See id. at 1024, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
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argument, and thus affirmed the full lost-profits award, finding that 
the exclusive license with respect to the patent had “bec[o]me 
operative . . . in January 1998” as the result of a 1993 Technology 
Agreement.1357  The panel held that the 1993 agreement expressly 
“provide[d] an exclusive license for all of [the licensor’s] current and 
future . . . designs,”1358 and that, “when [the licensor] acquired the 
[patent in question], it acquired the design of the products covered 
by that patent as well.”1359  The panel thus held that the 1993 
agreement triggered an exclusive license as soon as the licensor 
acquired the patent in suit, and that this “provide[d] a basis for the 
jury’s lost profit award.”1360  The panel rejected Medtronic’s argument 
that a subsequent Exclusive License Agreement between DePuy and 
the licensor affected this conclusion, holding that because it had 
been entered into later, it was “not relevant to the rights that were 
created by the parties by the 1993 Technology Agreement entered 
into on February 4, 1993.”1361 
B. Enhanced Damages 
In nCube Corp. v. SeaChange International, Inc.,1362 the panel 
addressed an award of enhanced damages.  A jury found SeaChange 
liable for infringement of nCube’s patent.1363  Over a dissent by Judge 
Dyk, the panel majority upheld the findings of literal infringement, 
willful infringement, and indirect infringement by inducement.1364  
Affirming the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law 
rejecting the jury’s finding of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents,1365 the panel addressed the award of enhanced damages 
and attorneys’ fees. 
Under Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,1366 a district court may award 
enhanced damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284 if “the infringement 
is willful,” considering “the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct 
based on all the facts and circumstances.”1367  SeaChange challenged 
the district court’s finding of willfulness and its discretionary 
enhancement of the damages award.1368  The panel majority rejected 
                                                          
 1357. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
 1358. Id. at 1026, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 1359. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 1360. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 1361. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 1362. 436 F.3d 1317, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1363. See id. at 1319, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
 1364. See id. at 1319-25, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483-88. 
 1365. Id. at 1325-26, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488. 
 1366. 970 F.2d 816, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 1367. Id. at 826, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 1368. See nCube, 436 F.3d at 1325, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487. 
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this challenge with little analysis.  The panel majority noted that the 
district court had “awarded enhanced damages on the basis of the 
jury’s willfulness finding and the Read factors for enhancing 
damages.”1369  The panel majority held that, “[m]ost importantly, the 
court found that the case for literal infringement was not close.”1370  
The panel majority’s acceptance of this finding that the infringement 
case “was not close” was striking in light of the fact that Judge Dyk 
dissented on that very infringement question.1371  Ruling that the 
district court had permissibly determined that SeaChange had 
“deliberately copied” the patented invention, the panel majority 
“detect[ed] no clear error in any of the court’s subsidiary factual 
findings leading to its conclusion that this was an exceptional 
case.”1372  On the same basis, the panel majority also held that there 
was “no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s  award of attorney 
fees.”1373 
C. Attorneys’ Fees 
The Federal Circuit reviewed a number of attorneys’ fee 
determinations in 2006.  In several of these cases, the court 
explicated the standards for a case to be deemed exceptional for 
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 285.  It reversed one fee award on the ground 
that an objectively reasonable, but unsuccessful, litigation position 
could not support a determination that the litigation had been 
brought for improper purposes in the absence of evidence of bad 
faith.  In another case, the court applied the principle that the 
mootness of the underlying dispute does not foreclose the district 
court’s jurisdiction over a motion for attorneys’ fees.  And in several 
other cases, the court largely deferred to district courts’ 
determinations regarding whether cases were exceptional for fee-
award purposes. 
FieldTurf International, Inc. v. Sprinturf, Inc.,1374 involved competitive 
bidding on a project to construct a synthetic turf sports field for a 
school.1375  The school district’s initial Request for Proposal was based 
on a similar installation previously constructed by one of the bidders, 
FieldTurf.  A FieldTurf competitor, SportFields, bid on the project, 
                                                          
 1369. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 
816, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 1370. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487. 
 1371. See id. at 1326-30, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-91 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 1372. Id. at 1325, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487. 
 1373. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487. 
 1374. 433 F.3d 1366, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1375. Id. at 1368, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469. 
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and the school district ultimately awarded the project to 
SportFields.1376  Following the bidding process, FieldTurf sued 
SportFields, alleging that SportFields’s bid had constituted an 
unlawful offer to sell a product infringing a patent in violation of 
§ 271(a), and SportFields counterclaimed on several state-law 
grounds.1377 
The district court granted SportFields’s motion for summary 
judgment of non-infringement, and also on its state-law 
counterclaims.1378  The district court awarded attorneys’ fees against 
FieldTurf, finding, as a predicate, that the case was “exceptional” for 
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 285, and thus proper for the fee award.1379  
The district court based its finding that the case was “exceptional” on 
its conclusion that FieldTurf had “manufactured” the lawsuit “by 
seeking to include patented features in the bid specifications and 
then filing suit based on SportFields’ bid.”1380 
The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
of non-infringement.1381  Nonetheless, it reversed the award of 
attorneys’ fees.  Reviewing the “exceptional” case determination for 
clear error, the panel held that “FieldTurf’s patent position was not 
without support.”1382  Because an “exceptional” case determination 
must involve “some finding by the trial judge of unfairness, bad faith, 
inequitable conduct, vexatious litigation, or some similar exceptional 
circumstance,”1383 the panel did “not discern the egregious action 
required by precedent to support fee shifting.”1384  In the absence of 
such evidence of baseless litigation or bad faith, the panel held that 
the district court had clearly erred in relying upon the fact that 
FieldTurf had brought the instant lawsuit as a “manufactured” 
case.1385 
In Highway Equipment Co. v. FECO, Ltd.,1386 the Federal Circuit 
considered jurisdictional and merits issues relating to an attorneys’ 
fee decision.  Highway Equipment sued FECO for patent 
infringement stemming from the sale of certain agricultural 
                                                          
 1376. See id. at 1368-69, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469-70. 
 1377. See id. at 1369, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470. 
 1378. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470. 
 1379. See id. at 1373, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472. 
 1380. Id. at 1373, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472. 
 1381. See id. at 1369-70, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470-71. 
 1382. Id. at 1373, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473. 
 1383. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1384. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473. 
 1385. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472-73. 
 1386. 469 F.3d 1027, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  One of the 
authors was counsel to the DePuy Spine parties in this case. 
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equipment.1387  Shortly before trial was scheduled to begin, Highway 
Equipment issued FECO a covenant not to sue on the patent, and the 
district court dismissed the entire action, but retained jurisdiction 
over a motion by FECO for attorneys’ fees.1388  The district court 
found that the case was not exceptional, and denied FECO’s fee 
request on the merits.1389 
FECO appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees, and Highway 
Equipment cross-appealed the district court’s predicate 
determination that it had jurisdiction to award fees in light of the 
mootness of the underlying dispute.1390  Addressing the jurisdictional 
issue first, the panel held that “the district court correctly retained 
jurisdiction over FECO’s claim for attorney fees.”1391  The court noted 
that its precedents permitted district courts to retain jurisdiction over 
attorneys’ fee motions even after the underlying dispute had become 
moot.1392 
On the merits, the panel rejected Highway Equipment’s argument 
that attorneys’ fees were unavailable “because FECO did not receive 
judicial relief on the merits . . . .”1393  The panel agreed with Highway 
Equipment that the fee statute, 35 U.S.C. § 285, “prohibit[s] an award 
of fees to the plaintiff unless the court awards relief on the merits, 
either through a judgment on the merits or through a settlement 
agreement enforced through a consent decree.”1394  The “dispositive 
issue” was “whether the dismissal with prejudice had sufficient 
judicial imprimatur to constitute a ‘judicially sanctioned change in 
the legal relationship of the parties.’”1395  It found that standard 
satisfied, holding “that as a matter of patent law, the dismissal with 
prejudice, based on the covenant and granted pursuant to the district 
court’s discretion under Rule 41(a)(2), ha[d] the necessary judicial 
imprimatur to constitute a judicially sanctioned change in the legal 
relationship of the parties.”1396  According to the court, a contrary 
ruling “would imply that the only way for a defendant to obtain a 
disposition on the merits would be to oppose a dismissal and proceed 
                                                          
 1387. See id. at 1029, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122. 
 1388. See id. at 1030-31, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123. 
 1389. See id. at 1031, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123. 
 1390. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123-24. 
 1391. Id. at 1032, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124. 
 1392. See id. at 1032-33, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124-25. 
 1393. Id. at 1033, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125. 
 1394. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125. 
 1395. Id. at 1034, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125. 
 1396. Id. at 1035, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
960 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
to litigation on the merits, and would encourage the litigation of 
unreasonable and groundless claims.”1397 
The panel also affirmed the district court’s determination that, on 
the merits, the case was not exceptional, and its consequent denial of 
attorneys’ fees.  The panel affirmed the district court’s rejection of 
FECO’s inequitable-conduct argument stemming from the 
prosecution of the patent, which was based upon evidence that 
Highway Equipment’s nondisclosure of certain alleged prior art had 
followed investigation and discussion with patent counsel, and a 
determination that the alleged prior art might not have “had a 
spreader” of the type “disclosed in [the patent].”1398  It also affirmed 
the district court’s rejection of inequitable conduct premised on the 
failure to list a joint inventor, noting that the party that FECO 
claimed should have been listed had “indicated that he should not be 
named as an inventor.”1399  And it affirmed the district court’s 
rejection of litigation misconduct as a basis for finding the case 
exceptional with little analysis, in deference to the district court’s 
findings on these points.1400 
In Golden Blount,1401 as discussed above,1402 the panel reviewed an 
award of damages and attorneys’ fees resulting from Peterson’s 
infringement of Golden Blount’s patent.1403  The court briefly 
addressed the fee award on appeal.  The panel upheld the district 
court’s designation of the case as “exceptional,” thus warranting a fee 
award, based on the fact that the district court had permissibly found 
that Peterson’s infringement of the patent to have been willful.1404 
In Kao Corp. v. Unilever United States, Inc.,1405 the panel reviewed a 
district court’s refusal to award attorneys’ fees in a patent-
infringement action relating to cosmetic skin-care products.1406  The 
district court had held the patent valid and enforceable, but that it 
was not infringed by the accused Unilever product.1407  The panel 
affirmed the district court’s validity holdings, finding that the patent 
complied with the written description requirement,1408 and, over a 
                                                          
 1397. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126. 
 1398. Id. at 1037, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127. 
 1399. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128. 
 1400. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128. 
 1401. 438 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1402. See supra notes 1128-40 and accompanying text. 
 1403. See Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1373, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1019. 
 1404. See id. at 1373-74, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019. 
 1405. 441 F.3d 963, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1406. See id. at 965, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258. 
 1407. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258. 
 1408. See id. at 968, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
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dissent by Judge Mayer,1409 that it was not obvious,1410 nor the product 
of inequitable conduct during its prosecution.1411  The panel majority 
also affirmed the district court’s determination that Unilever had not 
literally infringed the patent, and that the plaintiff had failed to raise 
a doctrine-of-equivalents argument in the case.1412  Judge Newman 
dissented on the infringement analysis.1413 
Unilever appealed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees.  
Unilever challenged the district court’s finding that the case was not 
exceptional, arguing that the plaintiff had “‘engaged in bad faith 
litigation by pursuing its patent claim’ in the face of knowledge 
that . . . it could not possibly be infringed by Unilever’s product.”1414  
The panel rejected this argument with little discussion, holding that, 
“[a]lthough [the plaintiff’s] litigation position with respect to the 
infringement issue did not prevail, it was not so lacking in merit as to 
warrant ‘exceptional’ status.”1415  The panel also rejected Unilever’s 
argument that the plaintiff’s inequitable conduct during prosecution 
made the case exception, because it had determined on the merits 
that no such inequitable conduct had occurred.1416 
In Serio-US Industries, Inc. v. Plastic Recovery Technologies Corp.,1417 
Serio-US sued PRT for patent infringement, and the jury ruled that 
PRT had not infringed the patent.  The district court nonetheless 
denied PRT’s motion for attorneys’ fees.1418 
PRT appealed the fee denial, and the panel affirmed the district 
court’s denial of attorneys’ fees.  It held that, “[a]bsent misconduct in 
the litigation or in securing the patent, a trial court may only sanction 
the patentee if both the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith 
and the litigation is objectively baseless.”1419  The panel held that 
neither of those elements was satisfied, because Serio-US’s 
infringement allegation had been “objectively reasonable,”1420 and 
had been asserted in “reli[ance] on the opinion of patent counsel.”1421  
The panel thus affirmed the district court’s determination the case 
                                                          
 1409. See id. at 976-77, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267 (Mayer, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 1410. See id. at 968-71, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260-62. 
 1411. See id. at 971-72, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262-63. 
 1412. See id. at 974, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265. 
 1413. See id. at 975-76, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265-67 (Newman, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 1414. Id. at 974, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265. 
 1415. Id. at 975, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265. 
 1416. See id. at 974-75, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265. 
 1417. 459 F.3d 1311, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1418. See id. at 1314, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066. 
 1419. Id. at 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1420. Id. at 1321, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 1421. Id. at 1320, 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070, 1072. 
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was not “exceptional” for purposes of the statute, and its denial of 
attorneys’ fees on that ground.1422 
D. Permanent Injunctions 
As noted above,1423 the issue of when permanent injunctions should 
be granted in patent cases has percolated in the district courts since 
the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC.1424  
Unsurprisingly in light of the apparent tension between the blocks of 
concurring justices regarding how Justice Thomas’s unanimous 
decision for the Court should be construed and applied,1425 district 
courts considering motions for permanent injunctions after eBay have 
taken widely varying approaches.1426  The Federal Circuit has so far 
simply remanded pre-eBay permanent injunction decisions for 
reconsideration in light of eBay,1427 or otherwise disposed of 
permanent injunction issues without reaching their merits.1428 
VI. ALTERNATE SOURCES OF LIABILITY 
A. Antitrust 
Arguably, the most significant antitrust/patent development in 
2006 was the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. 
Independent Ink, Inc.,1429 holding that the fact that a product is 
patented does not, in itself, support a presumption of market power 
in that product.  The Federal Circuit also issued several significant 
decisions in 2006 relating to the antitrust laws as a source of liability 
in the patent area.  One case in particular revealed some internal 
                                                          
 1422. See id. at 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1423. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text. 
 1424. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
 1425. Compare id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that the 
historical trend of granting injunctions “in the vast majority of patent cases” might 
likely continue despite absence of categorical rule), with id. at 1842-43 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that historical trend discussed by the Chief Justice “simply 
illustrates the result of the four-factor test in the contexts then prevalent,” and 
suggesting that recent changes could alter that trend in some kinds of cases). 
 1426. Compare, e.g., Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., No. CV-96-5658, 2006 WL 
2844400, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006) (relying on language in pre-eBay Federal 
Circuit decisions to suggest that permanent injunctions are generally preferred), with 
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4-6 
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (denying permanent injunction and rejecting any 
presumption in favor of such injunctions). 
 1427. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1341-42, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1813, 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1428. See, e.g., Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1379-80, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1875 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that appeal of permanent 
injunction denial was moot in light of reversal on merits). 
 1429. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006). 
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divisions among the judges regarding the permissible scope of license 
terms asserted to constitute an illegal tying arrangement. 
In Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,1430 Monsanto sued Scruggs for 
infringement of patents relating to synthetic genes in agricultural 
products.1431  Scruggs counterclaimed, raising antitrust claims against 
Monsanto.1432  The district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of Monsanto on the antitrust counterclaims, and Scruggs appealed.1433 
On appeal, Scruggs first argued that Monsanto had unlawfully 
attempted to monopolize, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman 
Act,1434 by engaging in anticompetitive conduct including Monsanto’s 
inclusion of “no replant” provisions in its license agreements relating 
to the patented biotechnology, and its imposition of technology fees 
in those agreements.1435  The panel majority rejected this argument.1436  
It held that Monsanto’s “no replant policy simply prevent[ed] 
purchasers of the seeds from using the patented biotechnology when 
that biotechnology makes a copy of itself,” and that such a limitation 
was “a valid exercise of its rights under the patent laws.”1437  Similarly, 
the panel held that the “uniform technology fee [wa]s essentially a 
royalty fee, the charging of which [wa]s also within the scope of the 
patent grant.”1438 
Scruggs also argued that Monsanto had tied the purchase of its 
seed to the purchase of Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide, in violation 
of the Sherman Act.1439  To support this theory, Scruggs relied upon a 
grower incentive program that gave growers additional benefits if 
they chose to use Roundup exclusively, as well as upon Monsanto 
“seed partner agreements,” which required those customers who 
chose to use glyphosate herbicides to use Roundup.1440  The panel 
majority rejected Scruggs’s arguments.1441  It held that because “[t]he 
grower incentive program was optional, not coerced,” it did not 
support a tying claim,1442 and that, similarly, “Monsanto’s seed 
partners were not forced to buy Roundup under the seed partner 
                                                          
 1430. 459 F.3d 1328, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1431. See id. at 1333, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 1432. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815-16. 
 1433. See id. at 1333-34, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816. 
 1434. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 1435. See Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1340, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1436. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1437. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1438. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1439. See id. at 1340, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1440. See id. at 1339-40, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820-21. 
 1441. See id. at 1340-41, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1442. Id. at 1340, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
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agreements.”1443  The panel also rejected Monsanto’s argument that 
Monsanto had tied the sale of cotton containing the patented gene to 
the sale of cotton containing another trait.1444  It held that “Monsanto 
sells cotton without the [allegedly tied] trait and there [wa]s no 
evidence that Monsanto engineered a shortage of [the tying] 
cotton.”1445 
Judge Dyk dissented from the panel majority’s antitrust holding.1446  
Judge Dyk believed that Scruggs’s tying claim should have survived 
summary judgment in light of the license restriction requiring the 
use of Roundup by customers selecting glyphosate herbicides.1447  
Judge Dyk focused much of his argument on the district court’s 
conclusion that the tying claim was precluded because the EPA had 
approved only Roundup among this class of herbicides at that 
time.1448  He opined that, on the facts, despite the sole EPA approval 
of Roundup at the time, Monsanto’s requirement constituted a tie 
and that Scruggs’s claim should have been allowed to proceed.1449 
In Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A.,1450 Kemin 
sued Pigmentos for infringement of certain patents relating to 
extracting lutein from plants, and Pigmentos counterclaimed for 
violations of the Lanham Act and the antitrust laws.1451  The district 
court severed Pigmentos’ counterclaims and stayed them pending 
resolution of the plaintiff’s case.1452  Kemin ultimately prevailed in the 
trial on certain patent claims, and subsequently moved to dismiss the 
counterclaims.1453  Pigmentos responded by moving to amend and 
supplement its counterclaims.1454  The district court denied 
                                                          
 1443. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.  The panel noted that the district court 
had relied upon the fact that at the time that the seed partner agreements were in 
effect, “Roundup was the only glyphosate herbicide approved by the [EPA] for use 
with” the seeds, but the panel did not expressly adopt this rationale.  Id. at 1339, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820. 
 1444. See id. at 1340-41, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1445. Id. at 1341, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1446. See id. at 1342, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 1447. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 1448. See id. at 1342-44, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822-24 (Dyk, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 1449. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822-24 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 1450. 464 F.3d 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1451. See id. at 1343, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 1452. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 1453. See id. at 1353, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394. 
 1454. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
2007] 2006 PATENT SUMMARY 965 
Pigmentos’ leave to amend, and granted Kemin’s motion to dismiss 
the counterclaims.1455 
On appeal, Pigmentos challenged the district court’s refusal to 
allow it to amend its counterclaims.1456  The panel affirmed the district 
court’s determination that most of the proposed counterclaims 
“hinge[d] to a large extent on [Pigmentos’s] assertion that Kemin’s 
patents are invalid or unenforceable,” and were therefore “foreclosed 
by the judgment as to invalidity and unenforceability” from the 
previous trial.1457 
The panel, however, ruled that two aspects of Pigmentos’s antitrust 
and Lanham Act claims were not precluded by the disposition of the 
trial.  First, Pigmentos claimed that Kemin had committed antitrust 
and Lanham Act violations by “represent[ing] to the public and 
competitors that its products [we]re covered by” the patent when, in 
fact, “in light of the district court’s claim construction, Kemin’s own 
products [we]re not covered by” that patent.1458  Nevertheless, the 
panel rejected this argument, holding that “Kemin ha[d] maintained 
throughout the litigation” that the patent was “broad enough to 
encompass . . . its own commercial lutein products.”1459  There had 
been no judicial determination “that Kemin’s products [we]re 
outside the scope of” the patent, and the panel found Kemin’s 
position to be “sufficiently plausible” to avoid the conclusion that 
Kemin had “acted with the deceptive purpose necessary to trigger 
liability under the false marketing statute (or, derivatively, to form 
the basis for an antitrust or Lanham Act claim).”1460 
Pigmentos also argued that Kemin had “engaged in unfair 
competition and antitrust violations by continuing to represent to the 
public and competitors that [Pigmentos wa]s infringing” after Kemin 
knew that Pigmentos had stopped using the infringing component in 
its products.1461  The panel rejected this argument as well, because the 
district court properly found that Pigmentos had not demonstrated 
that it had “modified its process in any significant way, much less that 
said modified process did not use” the infringing component.1462  The 
panel held that “[a] patentee in Kemin’s position [wa]s entitled to 
                                                          
 1455. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394. 
 1456. See id. at 1344, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 1457. Id. at 1353, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 1458. Id. at 1354, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 1459. Id. at 1355, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 1460. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 1461. Id. at 1354, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 1462. Id. at 1355, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
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assert that an accused product infringe[d] its patent unless an 
opponent c[ould] show that the patent holder acted in bad faith.”1463 
B. Lanham Act 
In 2006, the Federal Circuit decided a handful of important 
Lanham Act issues in connection with decisions on patent issues. 
M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co.,1464 involved a 
determination that the defendant had violated the Lanham Act based 
upon “false representations concerning its eraser wheels by marking 
them with [a] patent number and with the label ‘patent pending,’ 
when the wheel itself was not protected by a patent.”1465  The district 
court also relied upon the defendant’s “letters to [the plaintiff’s] 
customers,” which it found had “deceived customers and diverted 
sales from [the plaintiff] to [the defendant].”1466  Following the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec Inc.,1467 
which “require[s] a showing of bad faith for a Lanham Act 
violation,”1468 the district court found this requirement satisfied in 
light of “clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant had 
engaged in inequitable conduct during the patent prosecution.1469  
The district court thus adhered to its determination that the 
defendant had acted in bad faith and violated the Lanham Act.1470 
The Federal Circuit reversed.  Specifically, the panel determined 
that this element no longer supported a determination of bad faith 
because the panel had reversed the district court’s inequitable 
conduct finding on which that court’s bad faith determination was 
“essentially based.”1471  Because “a Lanham Act violation requires a 
finding of bad faith” and the district court had “decide[d] that its 
finding of inequitable conduct constituted evidence of bad faith,” the 
panel “vacate[d] on the Lanham Act claim.”1472 
                                                          
 1463. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396 (internal quotation marks and brackets 
omitted). 
 1464. 439 F.3d 1335, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1465. Id. at 1338, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. 
 1466. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. 
 1467. 182 F.3d 1340, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 1468. M. Eagles Tool, 439 F.3d at 1335, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 1469. Id. at 1339, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 1470. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 1471. Id. at 1343, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236. 
 1472. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.  The district court also vacated an award of 
attorneys’ fees, because the predicate “exceptional case” determination, too, had 
been “based on the determination of inequitable conduct.”  Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1236. 
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In Serio-US Indus., Inc. v. Plastic Recovery Techs. Corp.,1473 discussed 
above,1474 Plastic Recovery (“PRT”) asserted Lanham Act violations 
against Serio-US in counterclaims to Serio-US’s patent-infringement 
action.  The panel affirmed the denial of Lanham Act liability on the 
ground that such liability can be imposed “on a patentee for 
marketplace statements only if the statements are proven to have 
been made in bad faith.”1475  PRT’s Lanham Act claim was predicated 
solely on “Serio-US’s statements to the [relevant] industry and trade 
generally and to its customers . . . that PRT’s product infringes” Serio-
US’s patents.1476  Moreover, the panel agreed with the district court 
that there was no evidence that those statements had been made in 
bad faith, because the infringement allegation was “objectively 
reasonable,”1477 and “Serio-US brought its action in reliance on the 
opinion of patent counsel.”1478 
In Optivus Technology, Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications S.A.,1479 Optivus, a 
seller of proton-beam therapy systems, sued IBA, a competitor in that 
market for, inter alia, violations of the Lanham Act in connection with 
statements IBA had allegedly made in obtaining a contract with the 
University of Florida.1480  Optivus argued that several statements made 
by IBA—most significantly, a statement that IBA “would finance $50 
million of the technology component of the proposed system”—were 
false and misleading, and had “caused Optivus not to be awarded the 
contract with Florida.”1481  The district court granted summary 
judgment to IBA on the Lanham Act claim, holding that the 
statements did not satisfy the materiality requirement for Lanham Act 
liability even if they were actually made.1482 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed this part of the 
judgment.1483  It held that “an issue of fact exist[ed] as to the 
materiality of the financing statement.”1484  IBA relied upon a 
workgroup rating that placed Optivus last, behind a third 
competitor.1485  But the panel observed that there was “no indication 
that Florida adopted this ranking without consideration of other 
                                                          
 1473. 459 F.3d 1311, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1474. See supra notes 1405-1410 and accompanying text. 
 1475. Serio-US, 459 F.3d at 1321, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 1476. Id. at 1320, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1477. Id. at 1321, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 1478. Id. at 1320, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 1479. 469 F.3d 978, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1480. See id. at 980-81, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841-42. 
 1481. Id. at 987, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846. 
 1482. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846. 
 1483. See id. at 988 , 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847. 
 1484. Id. at 987, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846. 
 1485. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:15:24 AM 
968 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
factors.”1486  Because it concluded that a factfinder could have found 
that IBA made the financing statement and that there was a genuine 
question of fact as to its materiality, the panel reversed the grant of 
summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim and remanded.1487 
C. Copyright 
In Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc.,1488 the panel 
reviewed a grant of summary judgment of non-infringement of 
copyrights covering carved ornamental woodwork; the copyright 
claim had been asserted by a seller of bedroom furniture against a 
competing designer and manufacturer of bedroom furniture, and 
was coupled with a design-patent claim.1489  Applying Ninth Circuit 
law, the panel held that under the “access”-plus-“substantial 
similarity” test for copyright infringement, the “inverse-ratio rule” 
permits a stronger showing of access to reduce the required degree of 
similarity.1490 
Applying this sliding-scale approach, the panel held that “a strong 
showing of substantial similarity [wa]s required to prove 
infringement in this case, i.e., one approaching ‘striking’ 
similarity.”1491  The panel noted that the only evidence of access was 
deposition testimony of the defendant’s president “that neither he 
nor [the company had] made any effort to determine if their designs 
violated intellectual property rights,” along with “evidence that [the 
plaintiff had] displayed its designs at furniture trade shows” that the 
defendant’s president had attended.1492  The panel concluded that 
this evidence “d[id] not conclusively resolve the question of the 
access of [the defendant’s] designer[] to the protected work before 
the creation of the” furniture at issue.1493 
Turning to the similarity analysis, the panel held that “the trial 
court [had] correctly accorded protection to the expressive 
ornamental carvings on the furniture, but not the furniture pieces as 
a whole.”1494  Having thus correctly identified the relevant 
“protectable features,”1495 the panel addressed the trial court’s 
application of the Ninth Circuit’s “two-part analysis” for evaluating 
                                                          
 1486. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846. 
 1487. See id. at 988, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847. 
 1488. 439 F.3d 1365, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1489. See id. at 1367, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
 1490. Id. at 1368, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
 1491. Id. at 1369, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
 1492. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
 1493. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
 1494. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
 1495. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
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the similarity of the accused products to those features, which 
includes “an ‘extrinsic test,’” i.e., “an objective comparison of specific 
expressive elements,” and “an ‘intrinsic test,’” which “is a subjective 
comparison that focuses on whether the ordinary reasonable 
audience would find the works substantially similar in ‘the total 
concept and feel of the works.’”1496 
The panel held that the district court had erred in its application 
of this two-part test.1497  The district court had relied upon the 
extrinsic test, which the Ninth Circuit had held is better suited to 
summary judgment than the more subjective intrinsic test, in 
granting summary judgment of non-infringement.1498  Specifically, 
“the trial court erred in expanding its application of the ‘extrinsic’ 
part of the infringement test to encompass an examination of ‘the 
total concept and feel of the works,’” which properly belongs to the 
intrinsic test.1499  In particular, the district court had held that the 
ornamental features did not exhibit an original arrangement or 
selection, a determination properly “within the district court’s role of 
assessing the extrinsic prong of infringement on summary 
judgment.”1500  But, “the trial court then proceeded to examine, on 
summary judgment, the fact intensive question of the total concept 
and feel of the carvings in the furniture.  The court’s conclusion 
appear[ed] to be based primarily on its own visual inspection.”1501  
The panel held that this subjective determination impermissibly 
strayed into the territory of the intrinsic part of the test.1502  The panel 
held that “a reasonable jury could [have] conclude[d] that at least 
some of the accused designs satisf[ied] the heightened showing of 
substantial similarity thus far required in this case.”1503  For example, 
the panel noted one “whimsical” feature with respect to which “the 
accused design incorporate[d] a near-copy.”1504  Therefore, the panel 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.1505 
                                                          
 1496. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149-50 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1497. See id. at 1370, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1498. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1499. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1500. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1501. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1502. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1503. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1504. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1505. See id. at 1372, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152. 
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D. Takings 
In Zoltek Corp. v. U.S.,1506 the panel addressed the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Federal Claims over Fifth Amendment takings claims 
premised on allegations of patent infringement by the United States.  
Zoltek brought a lawsuit, asserting that the government had infringed 
its patent claiming methods of making carbon fiber sheets by 
contracting with Lockheed Martin to purchase aircraft incorporating 
components made using infringing methods.1507  The relevant aircraft 
components had been produced in Japan and then imported into the 
United States.1508 
The Court of Federal Claims held that it lacked jurisdiction over 
the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), which confers jurisdiction over 
claims for infringing patent use by the United States, because the 
relevant claim arose in a foreign country, and was thus precluded 
from the scope of § 1498(a) under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c).1509  
Nonetheless, the trial court held that it had jurisdiction over the 
patent-infringement claims under a different theory.1510  It “directed 
Zoltek to amend its complaint to allege a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment,”1511 and held that it could entertain the case under its 
Takings Clause jurisdiction.1512 
On interlocutory appeal, the panel majority affirmed the denial of 
section 1498(a) jurisdiction.1513  Rather than relying upon the arising 
in a foreign country limitation of subsection (c), the panel found 
subsection (a) unavailable by its terms, because “direct infringement 
under section 271(a) is a necessary predicate for government liability 
under section 1498.”1514  Because every step of a process must be 
performed in the United States to infringe a method claim,1515  the 
panel held that, “where, as here, not all steps of a patented process 
have been performed in the United States, government liability does 
not exist pursuant to section 1498(a).”1516 
                                                          
 1506. 442 F.3d 1345, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (per curiam), reh’g denied, 464 F.3d 
1335, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1507. See id. at 1349, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1508. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1509. See id. at 1349, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1510. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1511. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1512. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006). 
 1513. See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1514. Id. at 1350, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483-84 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 1515. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484 (citing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, 
Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763, 1789 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1516. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
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The panel majority reversed the trial court’s exercise of Taking 
Clause jurisdiction under section 1491(a)(1),  relying on Schillinger v. 
United States,1517  which held that patent infringement cannot give rise 
to a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment.1518  The panel majority 
also rejected the argument that Schillinger had been overruled by 
Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft.1519  The majority concluded that 
Crozier merely addressed “whether the trial court had jurisdiction to 
enjoin the government from alleged patent infringement,” and that 
“[n]one of the relevant Schillinger issues were joined:  Crozier was not 
filed in the Court of Claims, had nothing to do with the Tucker Act, 
did not allege a taking, and was solely in equity.”1520  While Crozier and 
other cases did “analyze the statute in terms of takings,” and 
“analogized [patent infringement] to ‘taking’ a ‘compulsory 
license,’”1521 the panel majority held that this “cannot disturb the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the Fifth Amendment in Schillinger.”1522  
The panel majority held that “Congress provided a specific sovereign 
immunity waiver for a patentee to recover for infringement by the 
government” in section 1498(a), and that this balance should not be 
upset by reading patent-infringement jurisdiction into the general 
taking jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.1523 
Each judge on the panel wrote a separate opinion.  Judge Gajarsa 
wrote a concurring opinion criticizing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, 
Ltd.,1524 the decision that grounded the panel majority’s holding 
under section 1498(a), and opining that “our decision today does not 
depend for its validity on NTP, as it is also supported by an 
independent line of reasoning.”1525  Judge Gajarsa opined that the 
trial court’s denial of jurisdiction under section 1498(a) was properly 
grounded on the “arises in a foreign country” limitation of section 
1498(c).1526  Judge Dyk also concurred, responding to Judge Gajarsa’s 
arguments against the NTP decision, and thus defending the panel 
majority’s ruling regarding the jurisdiction of the trial court under 
section 1498(a).1527 
                                                          
 1517. 155 U.S. 163 (1894). 
 1518. See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484 (citing Schillinger, 
155 U.S. at 163). 
 1519. 224 U.S. 290 (1912). 
 1520. Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1351, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1521. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 1522. Id. at 1352, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 1523. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 1524. 418 F.3d 1282, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 1525. Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486 (Gajarsa, J., 
concurring). 
 1526. Id. at 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
 1527. See id. at 1367-70, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496-99. 
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Judge Plager dissented as to both grounds of jurisdiction.  He first 
opined that the allegation that the government had taken the 
plaintiff’s property presented a facially “straightforward” takings 
claim.1528  He emphasized that the Schillinger case on which the panel 
majority relied “was decided in 1894,” and that at that time, “the 
judicial treatment of the then-new Tucker Act provision . . . was still 
in its early stages of development.”1529  He argued “that the identity of 
a separate, non-statutory, constitutional basis for takings remedies 
under the Fifth Amendment emerged” only over the course of the 
following decades, thus rendering the Schillinger decision of limited 
value in this area.1530  Turning to the section 1498(a) issue, Judge 
Plager agreed with Judge Gajarsa that the infringement was 
cognizable under section 1498(a), reasoning that “[n]othing in 
§ 1498(a) speaks about performance in the United States; that notion 
is come to only by incorporating into § 1498(a) the requirement for 
infringement by a private party under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).”1531  
Nevertheless, Judge Plager opined that the case did not arise in a 
foreign country for purposes of section 1498(c), at least as to some of 
the products at issue, because “some of the steps of the method 
patent [we]re practiced abroad, and some in the United States.”1532  
He concluded that “the Government is liable under § 1498(a) for an 
unauthorized use of a method patent unless all steps of the method 
are practiced abroad.”1533 
The Federal Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc.1534  
Judge Newman dissented from the denial, arguing that the panel 
majority’s Taking Clause rationale was erroneous and warranted 
review by the full court.1535  Judge Dyk, joined by Judge Gajarsa, wrote 
to concur in the denial, and stated that Judge Newman had misread 
the majority opinion as “leav[ing] private parties without an effective 
remedy for patent misuse against the government.”1536  Judge Dyk 
opined that the government would be put in the same position as “a 
private party under the circumstances of this case.”1537 
                                                          
 1528. Id. at 1374, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
 1529. Id. at 1376, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
 1530. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
 1531. Id. at 1379, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
 1532. Id. at 1382, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
 1533. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
 1534. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1335, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1535. See id. at 1336-39, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157-60. 
 1536. Id. at 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 1537. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
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E. Implied License 
In LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc.,1538 LG brought suit 
for patent infringement against several defendants.  The patents in 
suit related to personal computers.  The defendants purchased 
components from Intel, who had been authorized by LG to sell 
them.1539 Pursuant to their agreements, however, Intel informed the 
purchasers that “they were not authorized under that agreement to 
combine the products with non-Intel products.”1540  Several plaintiffs 
counterclaimed, asserting an implied-license defense.1541  The district 
court granted summary judgment of non-infringement, but denied 
summary judgment to the defendants based on the implied-license 
defense.1542 
On appeal, the panel affirmed the district court’s rejection of the 
implied-license defense.1543  The panel noted that, “[t]o prevail, 
defendants were required to establish that the products have no non-
infringing uses and that the circumstances of the sale plainly indicate 
that the grant of a license should be inferred.”1544  The panel agreed 
with the district court that the defendants had failed to satisfy this 
test, stating that “[r]egardless of any non-infringing uses, Intel 
expressly informed them that Intel’s license agreement with LG[] did 
not extend to any of defendants’ products made by combining an 
Intel product with non-Intel products.”1545  The panel held that “[i]n 
light of this express disclaimer, no license c[ould] be implied.”1546 
F. Patent Exhaustion 
The Federal Circuit decided two cases addressing the doctrine of 
patent exhaustion in 2006.  In LG Electronics,1547 the panel noted that 
an “unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee’s 
right to control the purchaser’s use of the device thereafter.”1548  The 
panel noted the rationale for the patent-exhaustion doctrine—once 
“the patentee has bargained for, and received, an amount equal to 
the full value of the goods,” the receipt of that money fully 
                                                          
 1538. 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1539. See id. at 1368, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446. 
 1540. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446. 
 1541. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446. 
 1542. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446. 
 1543. See id. at 1369, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447. 
 1544. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis 
omitted). 
 1545. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447. 
 1546. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447. 
 1547. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447. 
 1548. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447. 
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compensates the patentee for the subsequent uses of the product.1549  
Yet, the panel noted that a conditional sale precludes application of 
the doctrine, because the bargained-for price of the product would 
not then incorporate the value of uses violating the conditions.1550 
The district court had applied the doctrine based upon Intel’s 
purportedly unconditional sales of components of the patented 
systems to its customers, the defendants in LG Electronics.1551  The 
panel held that this ruling was erroneous, because the plaintiff’s 
license to Intel had “expressly disclaim[ed] granting a license 
allowing computer system manufacturers to combine Intel’s licensed 
parts with other non-Intel components,” and had “required Intel to 
notify its customers” of this condition.1552  In light of this requirement, 
the panel held that Intel’s sales of the components to the defendants 
“were conditional, and Intel’s customers were expressly prohibited 
from infringing LGE’s combination patents,” thus precluding 
application of the patent-exhaustion doctrine.1553 
The Federal Circuit rejected another patent-exhaustion defense for 
similar reasons in Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs.1554  In that case, the 
defendant argued that it had “purchased the Monsanto seeds in an 
unrestricted sale, and that it was therefore entitled to use those seeds 
in an unencumbered fashion under the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion.”1555  Again, however, the panel found that the factual 
predicate for the defense was absent:  “There was no unrestricted sale 
because the use of the seeds by seed growers was conditioned on 
obtaining a license from Monsanto.”1556  In the alternative, the panel 
found the patent-exhaustion doctrine inapplicable, because 
Monsanto had sold only the original generation of seeds to the 
defendant; “[w]ithout the actual sale of the second generation seed 
to Scruggs, there can be no patent exhaustion.”1557  More generally, 
the panel held that “[t]he fact that a patented technology can 
replicate itself does not give a purchaser the right to use replicated 
copies of the technology.”1558 
                                                          
 1549. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447. 
 1550. Id. at 1369-70, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447. 
 1551. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447. 
 1552. Id. at 1370, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447-48. 
 1553. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448. 
 1554. 459 F.3d 1328, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also supra 
notes 1430-1449 and accompanying text. 
 1555.  Id. at 1335, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817. 
 1556. Id. at 1336, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817. 
 1557. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817. 
 1558. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817-18. 
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CONCLUSION 
On many of the “big issues” in patent law, the Federal Circuit’s 
voice was more muted than usual in 2006, owing to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s unprecedented incursion into the Federal Circuit’s work.  
Viewed as a “dialogue” between these courts, these decisions in 2006 
begin to chart the course for the next wave of Federal Circuit and 
Supreme Court decisions in the patent-law area.  The next several 
years should be interesting, to say the least. 
 
ADDENDUM 
In our Article surveying the Federal Circuit’s year 2000 
jurisprudence,1559 we provided an Addendum discussing, in statistical 
terms, the year’s patent-law decisions from the Federal Circuit.  We 
were motivated by trying to provide an empirical (rather than 
anecdotal or impressionistic) answer to the question we are 
frequently asked, as Federal Circuit practitioners, by our clients:  
“When can we expect a decision?”  So we provided a statistical 
“snapshot” of the Federal Circuit’s work in the year 2000, based on 
our study of the court’s ninety-two published patent opinions from 
that year. 
We have reprised that effort for the year 2006, with a few additional 
analyses.  For 2006, there were ninety-eight published patent 
opinions—slightly higher than in 2000.  In addition to repeating the 
analyses we provided in 2000, we have added two others:  a table of 
the most frequent lower-court or agency venues from which appeals 
originated, and a tally of how many of these opinions resulted in 
affirmances, reversals, partial affirmances, etc. 
There are caveats aplenty here.  First, the universe of opinions 
being surveyed consists of the court’s published, patent opinions.  Our 
survey does not account for the presumably shorter disposition time 
of unpublished patent opinions, or “Rule 36” affirmances, or the other 
areas of the court’s work (government employment cases, 
government contract cases, etc.).  Second, the statistics we provide 
may be of limited predictive value, especially where they are based on 
a statistically insignificant number of data points.  Finally, treating 
each decision as an equal data point for statistical averages may not 
be fair or accurate:  Every case is unique.  Nevertheless, as in our 2000 
survey, we have found many of the results set forth below to be 
enlightening, and for that reason we are again sharing them with the 
                                                          
 1559. Adamo, supra note 14, at 1699-1706. 
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bench, bar, and other persons interested in the work of the Federal 
Circuit. 
 
TABLE 1:  PUBLISHED PATENT OPINIONS BY JUDGE, JANUARY 1, 
2006 – DECEMBER 31, 2006 
 
JUDGE # 
Authored 
# on 
panel 
# separate 
opinions 
# authored 
generating 
separate 
opinions 
% 
author 
(3-judge 
panel) 
Michel 6 23 3 1 26.1 
Newman 9 26 8 1 34.6 
Mayer 4 15 3 1 26.7 
Lourie 12 20 1 2 60.0 
Rader 15 32 1 4 46.9 
Schall 4 23 3 4 17.4 
Bryson 4 23 0 0 17.4 
Gajarsa 9 22 0 1 40.9 
Linn 11 25 1 1 44.0 
Dyk 10 33 6 4 30.3 
Prost 8 23 0 5 34.8 
      
Friedman 1 6 0 0 16.7 
Archer 0 10 0 0 0.0 
Plager 1 4 0 0 25.0 
Clevenger 3 9 0 0 33.3 
      
Per Curiam 1 — — 1 — 
      
Court 98 — 26 25 — 
 
Table 1 sets forth some raw numbers about the published patent 
opinions issued by the Federal Circuit during 2006, listed by judge. 
The first column (“# authored”) reflects the number of majority 
patent opinions each judge published in 2000.  Thus, Chief Judge 
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Michel authored six majority patent opinions that were published in 
2006, Judge Newman wrote nine, and so on.  Judges Rader, Lourie, 
Linn and Dyk led the way in double-digits with fifteen, twelve, eleven, 
and ten opinions respectively.  Judges Mayer, Schall, and Bryson 
trailed with four authored opinions each.  Only one case was decided 
per curiam. 
The second column (“# on panel”) sets forth the number of times 
each judge was on a panel for one of those cases decided in 2006.  
One interesting discovery this year are the outliers—while most of the 
active judges participated in anywhere from twenty to twenty-eight of 
the published patent opinions, two judges—Judges Dyk and Rader—
participated in thirty-three and thirty-two of the published decisions 
respectively, a difference that is perhaps statistically significant.  Even 
more striking is the discovery that Judge Mayer participated in an 
uncommonly low number—fifteen—of the court’s published 
opinions in 2006.  One possible explanation for this difference—
assuming that all active judges are likely to participate in roughly the 
same number of cases during the course of a year—is that Judges 
Rader and Dyk are somewhat more likely than their colleagues to 
request that the panel publish its disposition, which requires the 
concurrence of a panel majority (two of three judges) under Federal 
Circuit Rule 47.6(b). 
The third column (“# separate opinions”) lists the number of 
separate opinions (concurrences and dissents) that each Federal 
Circuit judge filed in 2000.  Two observations about this column are 
in order.  First, these numbers reflect a high degree of unanimity in 
reasoning and result—only twenty-three separate opinions were filed 
in 2006.  Second, two judges—Judges Newman and Dyk—were most 
likely to write separately in patent cases, far more than their 
colleagues, statistically speaking. 
Because of the relatively small number of separate opinions issued 
by Federal Circuit judges in 2006, the fourth column (“# authored 
generating separate opinions”) may not prove much at all.  It is 
meant to indicate the authoring judge for the majority in the cases 
where separate opinions were filed.  One unusual data point here is 
the fact that every one of Judge Schall’s four published majority 
opinions in 2006 occasioned a separate opinion from another of the 
judges on the panel. 
The final column (“% author (3-judge panel”)) on Table 1 
indicates, based on the published patent opinions from 2006, how 
likely it was that a particular Federal Circuit judge would be the 
author of the resulting opinion in a particular case argued before a 
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three-judge panel.  In a hypothetical world where opinions are 
randomly and evenly assigned, one would expect that each judge on 
a three-judge panel would wind up writing 33.3% of the opinions.  
What stands out as significant from this data is that three judges—
Judges Lourie (sixty percent), Rader (almost forty-seven percent), 
and Linn (forty-four percent)—who in 2006 wrote a majority (or 
close to a majority) of the opinions in cases where they voted on 
published patent decisions in 2006. 
TABLE 2:  SEPARATE OPINIONS IN PATENT CASES 2006 
 
JUDGE Concur in 
Opinion 
Concur in 
Judgment 
Concur in 
part, 
Dissent in 
part 
Dissent Total 
Michel 0 1 1 1 3 
Newman 1 0 0 7 8 
Mayer 0 1 0 2 3 
Lourie 0 0 0 1 1 
Rader 0 0 1 0 1 
Schall 0 2 1 0 3 
Bryson 0 0 0 0 0 
Gajarsa 0 0 0 0 0 
Linn 0 0 0 1 1 
Dyk 0 1 3 2 6 
Prost 0 0 0 0 0 
      
Friedman 0 0 0 0 0 
Archer 0 0 0 0 0 
Plager 0 0 0 0 0 
Clevenger      
      
Court 1 5 6 14 26 
 
Table 2 sets forth a breakdown of the twenty-one separate opinions 
by type and by authoring judge.  Again, because of the relative 
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paucity of separate opinions, these statistics may not carry much 
meaning.  As in 2000, these numbers for 2006 illustrate the Federal 
Circuit’s largely unanimous nature—only fourteen dissents, and six 
partial dissents, were filed all year.  If there is a striking statistic here, 
it is that Judge Newman wrote seven dissenting opinions (and her 
eighth, a separate opinion styled as “Additional Views,” was a separate 
opinion in a case where she herself wrote the unanimous opinion for 
the panel). 
TABLE 3:  DISPOSITION TIME BY JUDGE (IN DAYS) JANUARY 1, 
2006 – DECEMBER 31, 2006 
 
JUDGE Avg. time 
per opinion 
authored 
Avg. time per 
unanimous 
Opinion 
authored 
Avg. time 
when writing 
separately 
Avg. time 
when on 
panel 
Michel 69 66 267 101 
Newman 155 155 164 128 
Mayer 76 66 211 113 
Lourie 64 65 112 90 
Rader 162 150 311 138 
Schall 244 — 101 180 
Bryson 71 71 — 74 
Gajarsa 121 112 — 117 
Linn 131 122 72 122 
Dyk 148 100 133 135 
Prost 103 109 — 112 
     
Friedman 77 77 — 123 
Archer — — — 108 
Plager — — — 31 
Clevenger 36 36 — 96 
     
Per Curiam — — — — 
     
Court 121 105 166 121 
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Table 3 sets forth the average length of time it takes the Federal 
Circuit and its judges to dispose of published Federal Circuit patent 
appeals. This table is at the same time the most interesting, and also 
perhaps the one most subject to the criticism that every case is unique 
and demands unique treatment, and thus cannot be “averaged” 
together with other cases to yield meaningful results. 
Because the Federal Circuit does not publish the date of argument 
on the face of its opinions, we obtained from the PACER docket on 
the court’s website, or from the database of oral argument recordings 
now available there, the date of argument for each of the court’s 
patent opinions published in 2006.1560  We then calculated the 
difference, in days, between oral argument (or submission) and 
decision, and used those calculated figures in our statistics. 
The first column on Table 3 (“Avg. time per opinion authored”) 
lists, in days, the average time from argument to decision for each 
judge of the Federal Circuit.  Thus, for the six published patent 
opinions Chief Judge Michel authored in 2006, the average time 
from argument to decision was sixty-nine days (slightly more than two 
months), while for the four published patent opinions authored by 
Judge Schall, the average time from argument to decision was 244 
days (about eight months).  The average time of disposition for all of 
the Federal Circuit’s published patent opinions (in cases that were 
orally argued or submitted on the merits briefs) was 121 days, or 
about four months.  This is a significant change from the results of 
our year 2000 study, which showed an average disposition time of 
almost six months from argument to opinion.1561 
The second column on Table 3 (“Avg. time per unanimous 
opinion authored”) is meant to account for one type of delay in 
publication not attributable to the author of the majority opinion—
the authoring and issuance of a separate concurring, or dissenting, 
opinion.  In most—but not all—cases, limiting the relevant data set to 
unanimous opinions decreases the average disposition time per 
                                                          
 1560. Excluded from the calculations here were three published opinions in cases 
counted elsewhere in the statistical Addendum—Purdue Pharma v. Endo 
Pharmaceuticals, 438 F.3d 1123, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 2006), 
Nautilus Group v. Icon Health and Fitness, 437 F.3d 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2012 
(Fed. Cir. 2006), and In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  The first of those decisions was excluded because it 
was an amended decision on rehearing; the other two were decisions issued on a 
motion (Nautilus) and a petition for mandamus (EchoStar) and were not orally 
argued or “submitted” for decision on an ascertainable date, making a calculation of 
days between argument or submission and decision impossible. 
 1561. Adamo, supra note 14, at 1704-05. 
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judge.  The average time for the entire court for issuance of 
unanimous published patent opinions was 105 days after argument, 
or a bit more than three months—down significantly from the 154-
day (five months) figure we calculated in 2000.1562 
The third column (“Avg. time when writing separately”) supplies 
the average time from argument to disposition when the judge in 
question has written a separate opinion.  This data may suffer from 
some inadequacies.  First, it is based solely on the limited number of 
separate opinions in published patent cases in 2006.  Second, it 
cannot account for the unknown factor of how long the author of the 
majority opinion took to prepare the draft opinion which occasioned 
the separate concurrence or dissent.  Here, the overall court average 
is 166 days, or a bit more than five months—down from the 205 days 
(almost seven months) we found for 2000.1563 
The fourth and final column on Table 3 (“Avg. time when on 
panel”) supplies the average time from argument to disposition 
whenever a certain judge is on the panel hearing the case.  We have 
supplied this statistic on the assumption that the time a non-
authoring judge spends reviewing one of his or her colleagues’ draft 
opinion, even if it does not ultimately occasion a separate opinion, 
may have some influence on the disposition time.  For active judges, 
the results range from thirty-one days for Judge Plager (on limited 
data, since he is a Senior Judge and participated in only four patent 
cases resulting in published opinions in 2006) to 180 days for Judge 
Schall.  The court average, as earlier noted, was 121 days from 
argument to decision for published patent cases. 
TABLE 4A:  LOWER COURT OR AGENCY ORIGINATING CASE 
 
Northern District of Illinois 10 
Southern District of New York 8 
Central District of California 6 
District of Delaware 6 
Northern District of California 6 
District of Massachusetts 5 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 5 
Eastern District of Michigan 4 
Western District of Washington 4 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 3 
                                                          
 1562. Id. at 1704, 1706. 
 1563. Id. at 1704, 1706. 
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Eastern District of Texas 3 
District of Arizona 2 
District of the District of Columbia 2 
District of Minnesota 2 
District of New Jersey 2 
Northern District of Iowa 2 
District of Colorado 1 
District of Maryland 1 
District of Nevada 1 
District of Oregon 1 
District of South Carolina 1 
Eastern District of Arkansas 1 
Eastern District of California 1 
Eastern District of Missouri 1 
Middle District of Tennessee 1 
Northern District of Georgia 1 
Northern District of Indiana 1 
Northern District of Mississippi 1 
Northern District of New York 1 
Northern District of Texas 1 
Northern District of West Virginia 1 
Southern District of California 1 
Southern District of Florida 1 
Southern District of Indiana 1 
Southern District of Iowa 1 
Southern District of Texas 1 
United States Court of Federal Claims 1 
United States International Trade Commission 1 
Western District of Kentucky 1 
Western District of Michigan 1 
Western District of Missouri 1 
Western District of New York 1 
Western District of Pennsylvania 1 
Western District of Texas 1 
  
Total 98 
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TABLE 4B:  CIRCUITS ORIGINATING CASE 
 
Ninth Circuit 22 
Third Circuit 12 
Seventh Circuit 12 
Second Circuit 10 
Eighth Circuit 8 
Fifth Circuit 7 
Sixth Circuit 7 
First Circuit 5 
Fourth Circuit 3 
Eleventh Circuit 2 
D.C. Circuit 2 
Tenth Circuit 1 
No circuit (agency or U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims) 
7 
  
Total 98 
 
Tables 4A and 4B are new.  They demonstrate where the cases 
decided by the Federal Circuit (at least those resulting in published 
opinions) are originating.  Table 4A contains the unsurprising 
information that the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago), the 
Southern District of New York (New York City), the Central District of 
California (Los Angeles), the Northern District of California (San 
Francisco, Oakland, and Silicon Valley), and the District of Delaware 
(the preferred state of incorporation for so many American 
companies) are leading the way.  But Table 4A also has some 
surprises:  the relatively low number of cases originating in the 
Eastern District of Texas (a so-called “rocket docket” with special 
patent rules that has attracted more patent lawsuits than any district 
court save the Central District of California),1564 and the complete 
absence of cases originating in the original “rocket docket,” the 
Eastern District of Virginia. 
                                                          
 1564. See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 
2006, § 3, at 1 (“More patent lawsuits will be filed [in Marshall, Texas] this year than 
in federal district courts in San Francisco, Chicago, New York and Washington.  Only 
the Central District of California, in Los Angeles, will handle more patent 
infringement cases.”). 
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Table 4B simply breaks down the data in Table 4A by Circuit rather 
than by district court; it suggests that, if Congress had not centralized 
all patent appeals in the Federal Circuit, the Second, Third, Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits would be the major patent-law circuits today. 
TABLE 5:  RESULTS OF PUBLISHED OPINIONS 
 
Affirmed 42 
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part 1 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part 3 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded 5 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part 1 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded 
4 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded 10 
Cross-appeal dismissed 1 
Mandamus granted 1 
Reversed 6 
Reversed and remanded 4 
Reversed; cross-appeal dismissed 1 
Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded 3 
Appeal transferred 1 
Vacated 2 
Vacated and remanded 12 
Vacated in part, dismissed in part, and remanded 1 
  
Total 98 
 
The final table, Table 5, is also new.  It sorts the “decretal 
language” from the Federal Circuit’s published patent opinions in 
2007 to demonstrate how many of those opinions resulted in 
alterations of the rights of the parties.1565 Table 5 thus shows that, in 
2007, the Federal Circuit’s ninety-eight published patent opinions 
yielded across-the-board affirmances in forty-two cases; total reversals 
in eleven cases (six “Reversed,” one “Reversed and remanded,” and 
                                                          
 1565. See, e.g., Hon. Jon O. Newman, Decretal Language:  Last Words of an Appellate 
Opinion, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 727 (2006) (“‘Decretal language’ is the portion of a 
court’s judgment or order that officially states (‘decrees’) what the court is 
ordering.”). 
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one “Reversed; cross-appeal dismissed”); and a variety of dispositions 
in the rest.  Of course, using the universe of published opinions to 
compile these statistics will not reflect the court’s true rate of 
affirmances or reversals; it is probable that the decisions the court 
chooses to publish under its Rule 47.6(b) are those that address 
issues of first impression or otherwise “ad[d] significantly to the body 
of law”1566—and those cases are more likely to result in different 
outcomes than in the lower court as compared to the body of 
unpublished opinions. 
 
                                                          
 1566. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b). 
